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The Study of Maternal Employment in South Korea: Cultural and Structural Constraints

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Statement and Signature

I hereby declare that this thesis has not been and will not be, submitted in whole or in part to another University for the award of any other degree.

Signature: ……

List of Abbreviations

BHPS	British Household Panel Survey
GDI	Gender-related Development Index
GEM	Gender Empowerment Measure
ILO	International Labour Organisation
ISSP	International Social Survey Programme
KDI	Korea Development Institute
KLI	Korea Labor Institute
KLIPS	Korea Labour and Income Panel Study
KLoWF	Korean Longitudinal Survey of Women and Family
KWDI	Korea Women Development Institute
ONS	Office for National Statistics
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
RAT	Rational Action Theory
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

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The Study of Maternal Employment in South Korea: Cultural and Structural Constraints

Summary

This thesis explores factors in the low rates of maternal employment in South Korea through a quantitative analysis of a large-scale survey dataset, the Korea Labour and Income Panel Study (KLIPS). This thesis elaborates Western debates and theories of women's labour market participation within Korean contexts, develops hypotheses on a theoretical basis accommodating both individual factors such as human capital, children and spouse factors and structural factors like the workplace and class practices, and examines them through descriptive, cross-sectional linear and logistic regression analyses.

The thesis finds that mothers' decisions toward paid work are responsive to children's ages, implying that lifestyle preferences adapt in accordance with the family's life cycle. Also, it is found that precarious employment and a long work-hour culture contribute to career interruptions while parental welfare such as child care leave and provision have a negative association. The thesis finds social class to be a critical factor linked to mothers' labour force participation. Middle class mothers tend to delay their career by trading off time for childrearing, including attending to children's educational needs, whereas lower class mothers tend to return more quickly to work.

A key finding is that whilst married women's labour market behaviour appears to be explained in part by individual factors, such as work experience and the presence of children (as neo-classical theorists have argued), this thesis strongly suggests that structural factors are key to explaining the low level of maternal employment in Korea with a gendered labour market and welfare regime – such as the long work-hour culture and low parental welfare – sitting alongside social class as primary explanatory factors.

Chapter 1

Introduction

Socioeconomic changes in South Korea (Korea hereafter) in the decades since the 1960s, such as industrialization and urbanization, improved standards of living, changes in family values and attitudes towards gender roles and the rise in women's education, have contributed to the overall increase of women's (especially married women's) labour market participation. In particular, there have been demographic changes such as the low childbirth rate and the rapidly aging population, so that the economy increasingly requires women's labour market participation, along with the increasing importance of female spouse earnings to uphold living standards in an era of surging economic and job instabilities. Nonetheless, female economic activity rates in Korea have remained below 50 per cent until recently, compared with over 70 per cent in the advanced economies such as the Nordic nations, the UK, the Netherlands, Australia and the US (Hong, Kim, and Lee, 2010:3). Why do many women in Korea give up paid work and stay home? This may well be related to the Korean-specific socio-economic, institutional and cultural contexts.

1.1 Socioeconomic changes over the past decades

1.1.1. Changes in socio-demographical context

First of all, the socio-demographic changes over the last two decades in Korea will be considered. According to the national statistics as shown in Table 1.1 (Seok et al., 2009), the Korean population (48,750,000 in 2009) is decreasing steadily, along with the low childbirth rate, and is aging rapidly (Kim and Lee, 2009:7-9); the childbirth rate of growth has decreased to 1.19 per cent in 2008 (1.08 in 2005) from 1.45 per cent in 1998 (2.57 in 1983), and the population aged over 64 has increased from 5.9 per cent in 1995 (3.8 in 1980) to 9.3 per cent in 2005. Accordingly, the average number of household members has decreased to 2.9 in 2005 from 3.7 in 1990 (Lee and Kang, 2009:141). Over the period from 1995 to 2005, among people aged over 14, marriages decreased slowly (from 60.7 percent to 59.3 per cent) and divorces rose considerably (1.1 percent to 3.0 per cent), while the proportions for widows/widowers remained around 7.4 per

cent to 7.6 per cent (Kim and Lee, 2009: 9-10). Notably, the number of well-educated people has increased dramatically; university/college graduates have increased from 25.0 per cent in 1995 to 38.8 per cent in 2005. As women's education level has increased, women tend to delay the first marriage (increasing the average age from 25.7 in 1997 to 28.3 in 2008) and the first childbirth (increasing the average age from 26.9 in 1997 to 29.6 in 2008). In general, middle class women's economic activity, particularly among the well-educated (university graduates upwards) has increased considerably since the 1980s whereas lower class women's economic activity for their livelihood has remained stable (Lee and Kang, 2009:159-60).

Table 1.1 Socio-demographic changes in South Korea over the years, 1995, 2000 and 2005 (percentage)

% of the population		1995	2000	2005
Sex	Male	50.2	50.2	50.0
	Female	49.8	49.8	50.0
Age	0-14	23.0	21.0	19.1
	15-64	71.1	71.7	71.6
	Over 64	5.9	7.3	9.3
Marital status[a]	Never-married/single	30.8.	30.1	30.2
	Married/with spouse	60.7	60.6	59.3
	Widowed	7.4	7.4	7.6
	Divorced	1.1	1.9	3.0
Education level	Primary school	14.4	12.5	11.0
	Lower secondary school	15.0	12.7	11.0
	Upper secondary school	45.6	42.7	39.2
	University/college and upper	25.0	32.1	38.8

Source: Table I-1, Seok et al. (2009:8). Note: [a] statistics for people aged over 14.

1.1.2. Changes in the socioeconomic context

Over the 40 years since the 1960s, there have been dramatic changes in industrial and employment structure, reflecting successful economic growth. In the 1960s, when the

Korean economy centred on agricultural and fishery industries, industrialization and urbanization took place rapidly (Kim and Kim, 2004:1-3). The majority of workers were self-employed (mostly male) and non-paid family employees (mostly female) in the agricultural and fishing industries. In the industrialization process through the 1960s and 1970s, waged employment began to rise while non-paid family workers decreased rapidly because of the increasing number of paid female workers (Kim and Kim, 2004:1-3). Nonetheless, few women continued to work after marriage or after giving birth, until the late 1980s. Meanwhile, in the late 1970s, with the slow-down of the economy caused by the impact of the international oil crisis, the government-controlled economy required adjustment; for instance, privatization and liberalization of the banking system (Kim and Kim, 2004:3-5).

With the economic boom of the late 1980s, Korean firms, particularly small and medium-sized firms, suffered from labour shortages, especially in the manufacturing sector (Kim and Kim, 2004:3-5). In order to resolve the labour shortage in the manufacturing sector, the government focused on increasing the married women's labour force participation and expanded childcare facilities as well as strengthening supervision to ensure workplace practices did not discriminate against married women (Kim and Kim, 2004:3-5). In effect, the number of married women employed in production-related jobs increased sharply, contributing to the increase of the female economic activity rate (37.0 per cent in 1963, 39.3 per cent in 1970, 42.8 per cent in 1980 and 47.0 per cent in 1990) (Kim and Kim, 2004:3, 86). In the 1990s, while the manufacturing sector began shrinking and production jobs decreased, neo-liberalism – which seeks labour market flexibility and deregulation – accelerated, particularly after the 1997 financial crisis, by sharply increasing employee lay-offs and irregular (or non-standard) employment such as part-time, dispatch, daily (casual) and temporary jobs (Kim and Kim, 2004:3-5).

As a result, many women with lower education became irregular employees because of the decrease in the number of lower educated women employed as permanent employees in the manufacturing sector, while the number of female college/university graduates taking on irregular employment increased steadily after the end of the 1990s (Kim and Kim, 2004:3-5). Recently, in the 2000s, there have been continued changes in

industrial and employment structures (Jang and Bang, 2009:109). Between 2000 and 2008, as shown in Table 1.2, the number of workers in fishery and agriculture fell sharply to about 7 per cent in 2008 from 10.6 per cent in 2000, while that for manufacturing reduced from 20 per cent to 17 per cent. However, that for service industries increased relatively sharply overall over the same period: specifically, there was a notable increase in personal/social/other services from 34 per cent to 43 per cent, which contrasted with the decrease in food/lodging services from 27 per cent to 24 per cent. Along with the continued expansion of the service sector, irregular employment increased continuously to reach 37 per cent in 2004, although it appeared to decrease slightly or to become stabilised between 2005 and 2007 (Jang and Bang, 2009: 109-11).

Table 1.2 Changes in the industrial structure in the 2000s (percentage)

	Agriculture & Fishing	Manufacturing	Construction /electricity /water	Food/lodging service	Personal/ business/ social service	Column-total %
2000	10.6	20.4	7.8	27.2	34.1	100
2003	8.8	19.1	8.5	26.4	37.1	100
2005	7.9	18.6	8.2	25.4	39.8	100
2008	7.2	17.4	8.1	24.1	43.2	100

Source: adapted from Table IV-4, Seok et al. (2009:110).

In 1997, the economically active population aged over 14 in Korea was 65.5 per cent. However, although it fell sharply after the financial crisis, it has recovered steadily since 2004, staying at about 62 per cent in 2008 (66.0 per cent for those aged between 15 and 64); by the international standard definition of the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the economically active population includes the employed who are working for remuneration and the unemployed who are actively seeking a job and willing to work if a job is offered (Jang and Bang, 2009:106-8; ILO, 2010). Over the 20 years since the 1980s, as shown in Table 1.3, the employment rate for men has stayed above 71 per cent while that for women has remained below 50 per cent despite increasing steadily by about 5 per cent from 44 per cent in 1988 to 49 per cent in 2008. Accordingly, the contribution of female spouse earnings to household income remains small, accounting for only 12.7 per cent of the household income in 2008 (Lee and Kang, 2009:140-5).

There were notable falls in the employment rate and sharp rises in the unemployment rate in 1998 for both sexes, due to the impact of the 1997 financial crisis. Waged employment grew from 57 per cent in 1988 (52 per cent in 1983) to nearly 70 per cent in 2008, decreasing the proportion of non-waged employment from 43 per cent in 1988 (48 per cent in 1983) to a third of the total employment (31 per cent) in 2008 (Jang and Bang, 2009:108-10). However, the proportion of non-wage workers in Korea remains relatively high when compared with the other OECD member countries.

Table 1.3 Employment and unemployment proportions by gender and non-wage employment share between 1988 and 2008 (percentage)

	Employment rate		Unemployment rate		Non-wage employment proportions of total employment
	Male	Female	Male	Female	
1988	70.7	44.2	3.0	1.7	43.0
1990	71.8	46.2	2.9	1.8	39.5
1996	74.4	48.1	2.4	1.6	36.7
1998	69.2	44.4	7.8	5.7	38.3
2000	70.7	47.0	5.0	3.6	36.8
2002	72.2	48.4	3.7	2.8	36.0
2004	72.0	48.3	3.9	3.4	34.0
2006	71.3	48.8	3.8	2.9	32.8
2008	70.9	48.7	3.6	2.6	31.3

Source: derived from Table IV-1,2,3, pp108-9, Jang and Bang, 2009. Note: the statistics are for the population aged over 14.

According to a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report on GDI (gender-related development index), the gender difference for Korea is high, as the country was ranked 98th for this in 2009 among the UN member nations (193 in 2013; see UN, 2013). The GEM (Gender empowerment measure) has remained low (0.554 in 2009, 61st among the UN nations): this is measured by such factors as the percentage of female members of parliament (14 per cent), female managers in the upper occupational class (9 per cent), female professional/skilled workers (40 per cent), and women's average income level to men's (52 per cent) (Lee et al., 2009:279). Likewise, there is a distinctive gender difference in employment: in 2008, 60 per cent of male workers were permanent whereas 62 per cent of female workers were temporary/daily. Of females in

non-wage employment, 42 per cent were non-paid family workers whereas for males it was only 5 per cent (Jang and Bang, 2009:109-11). The proportion of women in permanent and employed/self-employed jobs remains low, at less than 30 per cent (Kim and Kim, 2004:4).

It is important to note that the 1997 financial crisis and the consequent labour market restructuring in the early 2000s affected the whole of society; massive unemployment among professional manager jobs had an impact on the middle class. Instabilities in jobs, especially those taken by men, increased due to continuous labour market restructuring, so women's employment became more important for securing income sources (Lee and Kang, 2009:140-4). The income inequality between households has become higher since the 1997 financial crisis, compared with the relatively low income gap in 1995. This is due to the differentiated increase in the rate of earnings which are the major source of the household income, accounting for 68.5 per cent in 2009 (Lee and Kang, 2009:140-4). The increasing household income gap is partly explained by the increasing gap of female spouse earnings between the well-educated and the less-educated (Lee and Kang, 2009:144-5); as the earnings gap has widened between the well-educated and the less-educated women, it has contributed to the income gap between households (Lee and Kang, 2009:159-160).

In parallel with increased income inequality between families, the middle class appears to have stopped expanding since then and has reduced steadily in the mid 2000s; according to the national statistics of Koreans' perception of their class (taking into account such factors as the household head's earnings, occupation and assets), statistics for the upper class in 2006 (1.5 per cent) has not changed much, compared with 2003. However, that for the middle class (53.4 per cent) has reduced by 2.8 per cent while increasing by a similar amount for the lower class (45.2 per cent) (Lee et al., 2009:278). Moreover, the 1997 financial crisis affected the education expenditure differently by income class: the middle income class spent consistently on child education over the period between the late 1990s and the early 2000s, whereas the lowest income class reduced expenditure for that period, which strongly suggest that the impact of the financial crisis was greater on lower income families (Lee and Kang, 2009:146).

1.1.3. Changes in the legislations for supporting women employment

In the late 1980s, the economy suffered a labour shortage and there were also active labour movements and women's movements along with the gradual political democratization. Accordingly, as growing attention has been paid to women's labour force participation, especially by married women, the Korean government incorporated women's issues such as childcare and gender discrimination into the national economic development policy and established the Equal Employment Act 1988 and the Infant Care Act in 1991 (Kim and Kim, 2004:3-5; Hong, Kim and Lee, 2010:3-5). Subsequently, the government established the Women's Development Act in 1995 and the Gender Equality Act (or Gender Discrimination Prevention and Relief Act) in 1998. In the 2000s, maternity rights and childcare schemes were enhanced dramatically, by improving the legislation and increasing the revenue for childcare services. Public support for childcare expense (2002) was extended to cover up to 70 per cent of lower income families and the revenue for childcare services increased in 2008 to about 6 times what it was in 2003 (Hong, Kim, and Lee, 2010:4-5; KDI, 2008:72-3).

More recently, the Korean government introduced work-life balance schemes (that is, childcare leave, paternity leave and flexible work arrangements) into the Gender Equality Act in 2008 to encourage businesses to support working mothers (Grubb et al., 2007:57; KDI, 2008:71; Hong, Kim and Lee, 2010:3-5). In addition, Korean childcare policy has extended the scope from the existing childcare service for pre-schoolers to after-school care services for school age children, as an OECD report (2007) emphasises (Hong, Kim, and Lee, 2010:19-20); and legislation for after-school care services was enacted in 2004 through the re-adjustment of the Infant Welfare Act and was further enhanced by introducing day-long childcare programmes (open up to 8 pm) in 2009 (Hong, Kim, and Lee, 2010:38-9, 41-2). Despite these recent improvements in the legislation, the childcare policy has been criticised for focusing on support for lower income families based on a means-tested scheme, and for not being extended to middle class working parents (Hong, Kim and Lee, 2010: 4-5). The majority of infants aged between 0 and 5 are excluded from public childcare support (only 29.5 per cent benefit from childcare expense support). Moreover, the proportion of primary school children in after-school care programmes is very low, remaining at 0.8 per cent of total primary

students in 2006, 1.2 per cent in 2007, and 1.4 per cent in 2008 (Hong, Kim, and Lee, 2010:27-9, 38-9, 41-2). Furthermore, the legal enforcement of the work-life balance scheme remains in doubt because it is not obligatory for businesses, but instead is left to their discretion (KDI, 2008:71).

1.2 Maternal employment

Despite the steady increase in Korean women's economic activity rates, however, women's participation in the labour market is still considerably interrupted by marriage and childbirth, which are often seen as critical events in life (Kim and Kim, 2004:20; Kim, 2003:67-101). There is a worldwide phenomenon that sees parenting, and particularly the presence of preschoolers, as having a negative effect on women's careers, as Gornick and Meyers (2003) have pointed out (Hong, Kim and Lee, 2010:20).

Figure 1.1 Women's economic activity rate by age group in 2005



Source: ILO (2005), LABORSTA Internet (E), Yearly Statistics. http://laborsta.ilo.org.
Note: For the UK, the age cohort grouping is different from the other countries: 76 per cent for the age group 25 to 34, and 78.7 per cent for the age group 35 to 49. However, in order to show the trends, the statistics for the age groups of 25-29 are repeated in the age cohort of 30-34.

However, the bimodal pattern of women's participation in most developed countries has become flatter since the 1980s, whilst Korea has a clearer M-shaped participation, as

shown in Figure 1.1. The figure shows that the trends towards non-working for women in their early 30s, who are more likely to be starting a family, is more pronounced in Korea compared with France, Germany, the Netherlands and UK. In this regard, Hwang's study (2003:26-36) observes that the influence of having young children is crucial, that is, the *preschooler effect*, as Gornick and Meyers call it (2003). Hwang (2003) analyses Korean women's work patterns in accordance with the stages of family life, in 5 stages, as shown in Table 1.4. The employment rate of married women in the first stage (the period from marriage until childbirth) is 45 per cent; however, that of married women in the second stage (the period from the first child's birth till the last child reaches 2 year old) drops sharply to 25 per cent. In the third stage (the period when the last child is aged between 3 and 12), the employment rate of married women increases sharply again. It is also notable that married women's unemployment rate is highest in the third stage, rising sharply to 2.7 per cent from 0.2 per cent in the second stage. This suggests strongly that married women, particularly mothers, want to return to the labour market, but have difficulty re-entering it.

Table 1.4 Married women's economic activity by the stages in family life in Korea, 2001 (percentage)

	Stages in family life					Total
	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	
Employment	45.1	25.7	48.3	45.4	9.7	41.4
Unemployment	1.3	0.2	2.7	1.3	1.5	1.6
Spouses' employment	91.6	95.4	92.3	69.6	29.5	79.6

Source: Table 2-10, Hwang (2003:33). Note: Hwang (2003) identified 5 stages of family life using the fourth wave of the Korea Labor and Income Panel Study, Korea Labor Institute.

In addition, attention needs to be paid to the different life courses of the genders, in that an interrupted career is typical for women rather than for men (Hakim, 2004). Kim and Kim (2004:39) found that the different working life patterns of men and women are more pronounced in Korea, indicating that the impact of child care responsibilities is greater on women. This is clearly shown in the statistics for the second stage of family life in Table 1.4 above: married women's employment was about 26 per cent whereas male spouse's employment reached 95 per cent. In short, it is suggested that the presence of young children is the most influential factor on the labour force

participation of Korean mothers, rather than fathers, and subsequently affect the mothers' chances of re-entering the labour market as their children get older. This implies that it may not be just about motherhood but that other factors are involved, to the point that maternal employment is not necessarily affected greatly by motherhood itself, as shown in many other societies; for instance, the Nordic nations. Then, what other factors are involved behind Korean motherhood? This leads to the research question: *What accounts for the low level of maternal employment in Korea?*

Contextual understanding of motherhood appears to be essential for exploring the research question, which requires the adoption of more structuralist perspectives in this thesis. Therefore, in the light of structural perspectives, this thesis pays particular attention to Korean-specific cultural and structural contexts. The rationale for this decision is supported by the broader literature focusing on geographical regions outside Korea which often links maternal employment with socially and culturally-constructed gender role attitudes or motherhood (Crompton and Harris, 1999a; Duncan and Irwin, 2004; Treas and Widmer, 2000). Treas and Widmer (2000:1410) have pointed out that gender role attitudes respond to the structural and cultural contexts produced by distinctive historical experiences, such as religious heritage and service sector development. Treas and Widmer (2000:1416) argue that 'normative beliefs reflect both a general dimension of structural and cultural factors facilitating female labor force participation and a life course dimension specific to maternal employment'.

In considering Korea, it is strongly suggested that gender role attitudes and motherhood are likely to be responsive to Korea's culture-specific heritage, 'Confucian familism' (Whitley 1992; Won and Pascall 2004), which is reflected in the policy logic of the Korean welfare regime putting greater emphasis on women's responsibilities for childcare; despite the recent improvements in the legislation toward supporting working parents, there is a gender difference in the take-up of childcare-related leave; childcare leave is predominantly taken by women; moreover, men are reluctant to take this up, due to the gendered workplace culture (Won and Pascall, 2004:278-9; Hong, Kim and Lee, 2010:44-45). In addition to the cultural heritage, maternal employment can also be understood in the structural context of the labour market. The existing literature has carefully documented Korean women's low labour market position, particularly the

concentration of married women in low-paid non-standard/irregular employment (Grubb et al., 2007:22). It has been claimed that perhaps the sex segregation regime during the industrialization process is responsible, 'putting women in subservient positions under the expectation that they will leave employment upon marriage' (Whitley, 1992:218-238). Furthermore, Treas and Widmer (2000:1429) argue that in countries where part-time work is not readily available, a substantial number of women choose between full-time work and staying at home: 'Women have the choice of working full-time or not at all – an objective condition of employment that surely influences respondents' evaluation of alternatives.' In this context, the low incidence of part-time employment in Korea (around 10 per cent) is likely to be reflected in Korean mothers' evaluation of their alternatives. The low availability of reduced hours (part-time) work is closely related to the long work-hours culture in Korea. In the literature, long work-hours are pointed out as a barrier to mothers' take-up of employment due to its creating extreme tensions between the demands of employers and the demands of their children (Kim and Kim, 2004:17; Won and Pascall, 2004:282). An EU study reports that numbers of working parents aged between 30 and 44 suffer from work-family conflict and these are found to be greater in nations with a long work-hour culture (Han, Hong and Jung, 2009:42). Furthermore, parents in permanent/full-time jobs complain about the lack of work-hour flexibility whereas self-employed/non-paid family workers and, notably, irregular (temporary and daily) workers complain about long work-hours (Hong, Kim, and Lee, 2010:21).

More importantly, previous studies of the UK have found that mothering is differentiated by class: for instance, middle class women prefer or value one-to-one care of children more than lower class women do (Duncan and Irwin, 2004:391, 397; Vincent et al., 2008:13-4). Won and Pascall (2004:274-5) also indicated that class inequality is implied in the experiences of Korean motherhood. Class differences in motherhood could be reinforced, directing mothers' choices as dichotomous – either to participate in the labour market or stay at home – and linked to the policy logic of the welfare regime in Korea with greater dependence on family care and very limited public childcare support. Therefore, Korean mothers' decisions about whether to take up paid work are likely to be constrained by a culturally-specific construction of motherhood, the labour market and welfare regimes as well as class status.

The literature reviewed here leads to the research hypotheses that aim to answer the research question. There are five hypotheses accommodating both the micro-level and the macro-level to be explored in this thesis: the first is whether individual factors like education, work commitment and work experiences are significantly associated with mothers' labour market participation. The second is whether situational factors like dependent children and spouse's job are significantly associated with mothers' labour market participation. The third is whether Korean culturally-specific workplace practices, such as discrimination and long work-hours, are significantly associated with Korean mothers' labour market participation. The fourth is whether gendered welfare regime factor, such as the low level of parental welfare provisions, is significantly associated with mothers' labour market participation. Lastly, the fifth hypothesis considers whether class-differentiated mothering is significantly associated with mothers' labour market participation. The main concern of all the hypotheses is to explore whether they are statistically significant and which factors best explain Korean mother's labour market behaviour. The explanatory value of these hypotheses will be examined throughout the chapters that follow.

1.3 Outline of the Thesis

Chapter 2 reviews the debates and theories of women's labour force participation in both the Western and Korean literature, and focuses particularly on understanding the relevance of these debates within the Korean context. This chapter provides a structuralist critique of neoclassical explanations, while pointing out that both neoclassical and social structural explanations in the Korea literature recognise that gender role attitude plays a part in Korean society. This chapter attempts to identify both individual and cultural/structural factors in the Korean context, which are very likely to constrain Korean mothers' labour market behaviour. It focuses on the cultural legacy of gender norms, the policy logic of the labour market and welfare regime, and the workplace culture, paying particular attention to how the different classes experience or organise their mothering role as a potential factor.

Chapter 3 explains the methodological approach chosen in this thesis: a quantitative approach, the analysis of large-scale survey data, was chosen. I describe how the surveys were selected, the study sample, the data analysis techniques, and how I arrived at the thesis hypotheses to answer the research question despite the data limitations. Using a Korean national panel survey of urban areas, the Korea Labor and Income Panel Study (KLIPS), this chapter defines the employed as including job seekers and non-employed, in accordance with the international standard definition of economic activity. It also provides the concepts of work attitudes, work commitment, gender and discrimination, with the caveat that this thesis is not appropriate to address work attitudes due to the unavailability of attitude data in KLIPS. In addition, it attempts to draw the hypotheses at both the micro-level and the macro-level, under the assumption that both individual factors and structural factors are associated with maternal employment in Korea. Finally, Chapter 3 explains the research framework of this thesis: quantitative employment research without a gender bias, using the secondary data, KLIPS.

Chapter 4 examines to what extent individual (human capital) and situational factors, explain Korean mothers' labour market behaviour (whether they are employed or not), which permits an enquiry into the arguments of human capital theory, mainly through the one way-ANOVA analysis and logistic and linear regression analyses. Firstly, through the one way-ANOVA analysis I explore whether there is any difference in work commitment by gender and if motherhood is associated with work commitment. It is found that there is no gender difference in work commitment and motherhood itself is not linked to work commitment. Secondly, the chapter examines how education and the children's age cohorts are associated with the mothers' labour market participation, through using a series of logistic regression and linear regression analyses across the selected years to study, including the situational factors such as spouse's job-related factors. Human capital, such as work commitment and education, are found to be not necessarily important for Korean mothers' take-up of paid work, although work experience is very significant. In addition, interruptions to mothers' careers are associated with less education and household income rather than linked to their work commitment.

Chapter 5 examines whether culturally-specific workplace practices and self-reported experiences of discrimination are associated with mothers' labour market participation, by the use of logistic and linear regression analyses on the probability of being employed or not, along with comparisons between the genders through a multiple-response analysis. Discrimination experience is positively associated with employment interruptions. Furthermore, it is observed that parental welfare benefits and work hours are closely related to Korean mothers' employment interruptions. Parental welfare has a positive link to mothers continuing to work, while the long work-hours have a negative association with it. As might be expected, lower status jobs such as irregular and low-paid employment are negatively associated with mothers' continuous careers. The overall statistical analysis results suggest that Korean mothers' alternatives are likely to be restricted by their lower labour market status and culturally-specific workplace practices, particularly the long work-hour culture.

Chapter 6 addresses class-differentiated mothering and labour market participation, and examines further whether there is any difference between the classes in child education expenditure, mainly through frequency analyses and logistic regression models. Gender inequalities were found as well as class divisions in labour market participation. That is, middle class mothers were more likely to stay at home compared to lower class women, whereas middle class men were more likely to be employed than lower class men. It was also observed that there were class differences in expenditure on children's education and belief in social mobility. The greater the proportionate amount spent on children's education, and the greater the belief in social mobility, the more likely mothers were to stay at home and look after the children. Overall, the analysis of Korean mothers' class-based labour market behaviour clearly contradicts the expectation that middle class women with better human capital have greater expectations about combining motherhood with substantial employment opportunities.

Lastly, Chapter 7 summarises the findings of the previous chapters as well as acknowledging the limitations of this research. Along with providing a discussion about how neoclassical and structuralist arguments are supported by the analysis results, I conclude the research by suggesting the implications of the findings from a policy perspective and making recommendations for future research.

Chapter 2

Debates and theories of women's labour force participation and discussions in the Korean context

Chapter 2 sets out to review the debates and theories of women's labour force participation in the Western literature, and in particular to understand the relevance of these debates within the Korean context. The chapter also provides quite a broad range of discussions which are essential for this research, for a *contextual* understanding of what Korean mothers face in reality, based on the structuralist critique of neoclassical explanations in the Korean literature.

The Western debates are largely divided into either individualist or structuralist explanations, which tend to predict different trends in women's labour force participation: the individualist perspective is marked by neoclassical arguments based on human capital theory and self-selection theory and, relatively recently, by Hakim's preference theory (2000, 2002). The neoclassical theories claim that women's labour force participation is directed by women's self-selection through rational decision-making and based on human capital specified by their gender role, and the preference theory argues that individual preference is a major predictor of female labour market behaviour. On the other hand, the structuralist perspective of, for instance, welfarists and feminists, tends to discuss gendered welfare regimes and labour market discrimination and predicts that women's labour force participation has been and still is constrained by the legacy of a gendered regime. Furthermore, class theorists argue, along with rejecting the 'individualisation' thesis, that class-differentiated constraints and opportunities available are closely associated with mothers' attitude toward market work. Nonetheless, most sociologists, whether individualist or social-structuralist, recognize that both individual and structural factors correlate with women's labour force participation, although the two positions emphasise different influential or primary factors (Woodfield, 2007:32-45).

In the Korean debates, supply-side explanations based on neoclassical economic theories, especially the human capital theory, are the mainstream of labour market research. Most economists and labour market researchers emphasize supply-side factors such as human capital, often referred to as work commitment, education and work experience. On the other hand, some policy researchers stress demand-side and social structural factors, and feminist sociologists in particular tend to relate these to Korean gender patterns along with the recognition of culturally-specific gender-role attitudes.

There is also class-based research as an important structuralist approach, which mainly addresses class mobility and gender differences in the occupational hierarchy. However, there is no analysis of class-specific attitudes towards childcare, and no specific attention has been paid to a possible link between Korean mothers' labour market behaviour and class. The Korean literature indicates that gender assumptions defining women as the main child-carer and child education manager, culturally-specific workplace practices and a lack of welfare provision are the main barriers to women's employment in Korea (Jang and Bu, 2003:1-5; Shin, 2001:102-104; Kim and Kim, 2004:7-26). Yet there are no synthesized discussions incorporating both individual and structural factors under the assumption that individual labour market behaviour suffers cultural and structural constraints. Therefore, this chapter attempts to identify both individual and cultural/structural factors in the Korean context, focusing on the cultural legacy of gender norms, the policy logic of the labour market and welfare regime, and the workplace culture, paying particular attention to how the different classes experience or organise their mothering role as a potential factor.

2.1 The Western debates and theories of married women's labour force participation and structuralist criques of the neoclassical arguments

Much attention has been paid in Western literature to the gender division of labour, with ongoing disputes about the cause of occupational or labour market gender segregation largely between feminist sociologists and neoclassical theorists; that is to say, whether it results from discriminatory practices in organisations which assign inferior 'dead-end' jobs to women, or is the result of economic agents' rational decisions in the recognition of different gender-role specialisation (Hwang and Polacheck, 2004:1). The structuralists criticise the neoclassical approach for having a lack of contextual understanding, whereas individualists or neoclassical economists criticise the social structuralist approach for over-emphasizing social structural factors in their attempts to understand people's attitudes and behaviour. Nonetheless, the structuralist approach

appears to have more explanatory value with regards to gender role segregation in a gendered society of the cultural legacy, where 'the still-extensive, extra-individual factors' (Woodfield, 2007:32-4) cannot be ignored. Previously, Kanter's thesis (1977) indicated a significant influence of social structures on workers' work attitudes and behaviour patterns (Reskin and Padavic, 2002:64-78; Kanter, 1977:260-264), and recently, the importance of organizational contexts and personnel practices that 'link workers' sex with the jobs they hold and the places they work' (Reskin and Bielby, 2005:71) has been increasingly recognized.

2.1.1 Neoclassical, individualist arguments and the structuralist critiques

Neoclassical theorists explain women's labour market disadvantages by using the human capital theory or rational choice theory of economics; sex wage differentials are attributed to sex difference in *human capital*, defined by Mincer (1970) as 'earnings capacity units' (Polacheck, 1981:60-61). Furthermore, they argue that labour market discrimination can be solved by market functions; that is, firms with fewer discriminatory practices can maximize their profits. These arguments began with Becker, who initially linked traditional economics with sociology (Hakim, 2004).

> Becker's thesis is the fullest development to date of human capital theory and models formulated originally by Mincer (1962) and extended by others seeking to explain the characteristics of female labour force participation with reference to the family division of labour. (Hakim, 2004:13)

It is argued that human capial theory and rational choice theory (also called, rational action theory or exchange theory) in economics can be applied to the social institutions, i.e. the family, to explain 'non-economic aspects of the family, including the sexual division of labour in households, decisions about investments in children, and decisions about marriage and divorce' (Hakim, 2004:11).

Becker (1981, 1985) believed the gender division of labour arose from the different allocations of time and investment in human capital between married men and women, along with increasing returns from specialized human capital. According to Becker (1985:S58), married women economize on the effort expended for market work by seeking less demanding jobs due to more effort being required during the same period

for childcare and housework, and because the remunerative rewards for women are lower than those for men. Therefore, in short, the responsibility of married women for childcare and housework, and concomitant individual decision-making about paid work, account for the gender difference in earnings and occupations. Polacheck (1981) developed further the argument that the duration of time in and out of the labour force affects women's occupational choices and their intermittent labour force participation explains occupational segregation. Through the comparison, by sex and occupation, of the time spent on caring for the home, Polacheck (1981) found from the research of women in the United States that 'sex differences in labour force commitment alone account for much of the difference in professional and menial employment':

> If women were to have a full-time commitment to the labour force (zero home-time), the number of women in professional and managerial professions would increase respectively by 35% and more than double, and also women in menial occupations would decrease by a fourth… (1981:68)

He (1981) insists that occupational segregation arises as women choose jobs with low penalties for intermittent employment over their working lives, the reason why married women are concentrated in low-paid jobs and resulting in an earnings gap between the sexes. Even in the absence of discrimination by employers, occupational gender segregation takes place through the self-selection of the labour force (Polacheck, 1981).

These neoclassical, supply-side arguments have been subject to a considerable amount of criticism. Demand-side sociologists reject neoclassical arguments by arguing that women's lower wages are caused by market discrimination and this decreases women's incentives to invest, thereby reducing women's labour force participation, and thus corporate discrimination is the main factor in occupational segregation. Earlier Bergmann's occupational segregation theory (1974:294) explained occupational segregation through the crowding hypothesis, which assumes that racial labour market discrimination in the United States was responsible for concentrating African-Americans into certain occupations. The literature following Bergmann's occupational segregation thesis suggests that discrimination against women does take this form. England (2005:268) criticises the supply-side explanation while taking a position against the earlier more sociological view of gender role socialization. While being aware that supply side and demand side factors like recruiting/placement discrimination

reinforce each other, she refutes economists' assumptions that women are in mother-friendly jobs that best fit their childbearing responsibilities by arguing (from the evidence of the United States) that 'there is little evidence of women's jobs having more mother-friendly characteristics and also non-mothers were as concentrated in female jobs as mothers' (England, 2005:277).

Even Hakim (2000:31), who agrees in general with neoclassical theorists, is critical of economists' assumptions that parenthood alone produces role-segregation in the household, and points out that role-segregation takes place within marriage or cohabitation (for instance, childless couples also adopt role-segregation), adding that efficiency gains from role specialization may result in married women's preference for role segregation over egalitarian roles within the family, where roles are still considerably unequal in many modern societies. Hakim sees the human capital theory as useful for the analysis of female employment, particularly in explaining that the earnings gap between men and women is largely due to the difference in work experience and employment-related investment between the sexes. Nevertheless, she (2004:13) points out that the human capital theory has become somewhat discredited, especially by some sociologists who reject Polacheck's thesis (1979) explaining women's behaviour with reference to their family role because they see this as 'sexist or related to the discredited Parsonian functionalism' (Hakim, 2004:13).

Most importantly, the way neo-classical theorists address women's work commitment and sex-role attitudes is criticized in the statistical sense. Bielby and Bielby (1984:234-235) point out that from their data they infer inadequately operationalised work commitment. That is, they infer subjective work orientation from the (intermittent) patterns of labour force participation, where commitment was not at all operationalised and they also infer opinions about sex roles simply from employment patterns: 'Sex role attitudes represent an individual's judgment of appropriate roles for men and women in general, and tell us little about a woman's intentions, aspirations, and expectations for paid employment as part of her own constellation of work and family roles' (Bielby and Bielby, 1984:234-235). Bielby and Bielby (1984:234-235) argue from the American longitudinal data that intermittent employment is not a consequence of unstable work commitment, but a consequence of *adjusting* their labour market behaviour to

accommodate the demands of bringing up children.

More recently notable individualist explanations have emerged regarding married women's work attitude; for instance, British sociologists, Hakim's preference theory (2000, 2002) and Joshi's opportunity costs of caring (1992). The preference theory is about women's heterogeneous life style and having different work commitments and work plans from men. Hakim (2000, 2002) argues that working women include at least two qualitatively different groups defined by their work commitment and work plans based on a proxy indicator: full-time or part-time, the first having a work commitment and long-term work plans similar to those of men, while the second group has little or no commitment to paid work and a clear preference for a homemaker role. Hakim's placing responsibility on women for little or no work commitment for their lack of paid employment is disputable:

> Policy measures to facilitate women's return to work after childbearing (such as childcare services) could result in increasing the labour force participation of secondary workers with little or no work commitment and an insignificant investment in paid employment. (Hakim, 2002:440-442)

More specifically, Hakim (2002:440), through an analysis of British longitudinal statistics of 1999, argues that there is a long-term impact of attitudes, values and aspirations on labour market behaviour and outcomes and that there are three distinctive female lifestyles, according to their preferences: a home-centered, work-centered, or adaptive lifestyle (Table 2.1). Hakim finds that among these three female lifestyles, adaptors are the dominant group. Around 14 per cent of women are home-centered and their main priorities throughout life are family life and children and they prefer not to work. The majority of women (about 70 per cent) belong to the adaptive lifestyle group, which includes women who want to combine work and family, plus drifters and unplanned carers. Lastly, the remaining 16 per cent of women are work-centered. Childless women are concentrated here and their main priority in life is employment or activities in the public arena (Hakim, 2000:6). It is argued that these different lifestyle preferences are a major determinant of fertility, employment patterns, and work choices.

Table 2.1 Hakim's three female lifestyle preference groups

	Home-centered	Adaptive	Work-centered
% employed			
Full-time	40	35	63
Part-time	16	37	15
% not in employment	44	28	22
% married/cohabiting	71	80	45
Average number of dependent children			
Aged 0 to 16 at home	1.28	1.02	0.61
% left full-time education			
by age 16	55	56	42
17 to 21 years	33	32	40
Age 22+	12	12	19
Base = 100%	N=171	N=870	N=194
National distribution of the three groups	14%	70%	16%

Source: Table 5, p442, Hakim, 2002. Note: the sample consists of women aged 20 to 59 and the fertility indicator (the average number of dependent children) is shown for women aged 20 to 55 years.

In short, women have different work commitments and work plans from men and thus women prefer and are quite satisfied with secondary or peripheral jobs (low-skilled, low-paid, part-time, casual and temporary jobs) by valuing convenience factors over the higher pay and security of skilled and permanent full-time jobs (Hakim, 2002:453-455; 2004:15-16). Although it is agreed that this theory recognizes the heterogeneity of individuals and examines the impact of the presence of children on the participation of women of prime age (their choices between paid work and family varies by the presence of children), it has been subject to a huge critique due to its lack of sociocontextual understandings and the aptness of the statistical tests.

Indeed, Hakim's work is open to criticism. Her finding that the majority of women are adaptive is not surprising, because surveys concerning work commitment were biased in disregarding the reality that family care responsibilities mainly fall upon women's shoulders, not men's. Rather than simply comparing work commitment by gender without taking into account child responsibilities as a factor, it may be more useful to examine whether the presence of children affects work commitment in one or both genders. With regard to the emergence of a large group of adaptive women working part-time, particularly in the countries with the largest proportion of working women, Hartmann's argument (1981a) appears to explain more than the preference theory.

Hartmann (1981a) argues that this is because working part-time fulfils the patriarchal requirement that a substantial amount of women's work is necessarily in the home, doing housework and taking care of children:

> Men may perceive that part-time wage labour by their wives is useful in contributing to the family's financial support without interfering very much with the provision of household services to them. (1981a:391-392)

Her argument also explains the considerable size of the non-working women's group: 'Given women's restricted access to decent jobs and wages, however, women also maintain their interests in men's continued contribution to family support' (Hartmann, 1981a:391). In particular, the preference theory can be criticized for neglecting institutional and cultural factors (socio-contextual factors) in the statistical tests. Crompton and Harris (1999:105-127), using qualitative data from over 150 work-life biographies of women in two occupations - medicine and banking - in five countries (Western Europe), demonstrated how both choice and constraints play their part, and also showed how women's intentions and actions change and vary over time and with particular circumstances. Their study suggests strongly that any explanation based on individual choice or preferences must be supplemented by an account of the structural factors (occupational circumstances) shaping these choices. Also, McRae (2003:334) criticizes the aptness of the preference theory through an analysis of a British longitudinal data (from 1993 to 1999) showing little evidence that preferences distinguish the minority from the majority, although she agrees that employment careers are centrally important for only a minority of women. McRae (2003:334) stresses that a complete explanation of women's labour market choices after childbirth depends as much on how they understand the constraints as on their ability to overcome them, which is patterned by social structure/class.

Along with the lack of a full description of these structural constraints in general, from my viewpoint, Hakim ignores the simple reality that people are more likely to work either for financial reasons or in order to maintain their living standards. The reality overrides the preferences. In this regard, Bradley (2007:94) claims that in Britain 'most people believe that two salaries are necessary to achieve a decent or desirable standard of living for a family'. Also, Hakim failed in predicting the rapid change in women's

work aspirations over recent decades and the popularity of dual-salary couples (when both women and their husbands or male partners work fulltime). In the recent years, it seems that female employees' work ambitions become less important, as Shaw and Shapiro (1987:12) pointed out from U.S. longitudinal data of 1968 to 1980: 'Young women in their late teens and early twenties today appear to have much stronger work expectations than women in the past'. Similarly, Johnson (2001:340) found, from a longitudinal anlaysis using U.S. panel survey of high school seniors carried out since 1976, that gender differences in job values narrow in the transition stage from student to adult worker, and that for both males and females, job values change in response to the attainment of valued rewards rather than in response to their family roles. Johnson (2001:338) argues that certain circumstances, such as social constraints, can override personal preferences, which are highly likely to be adapted to the socially structured experiences during the course of an individual's life.

Last but not least, Hakim argues that lifestyle preferences (sex-role ideology) cut across educational levels and across all social classes (Hakim, 2002:440), along with an explanation of the function of education in the marriage market, which contradicts the human capital theory. According to the human capital theory, women make less effort or invest less time and money in developing their human or social capital (i.e., education) than men, and thus full-time homemakers are assumed to be less educated or are women with few qualifications or work experience. Hakim (2000:97) found that women graduates differ little in career or sex-role attitudes from non-graduate women in a comparison between attitudes in the 1960s and those in the 1990s, despite a massive expansion in higher education in Britain in the 1990s and a wider group of women now being university graduates. Based on this, Hakim (2000:94) rejects the economists' assumption by emphasizing that 'graduate women, or women of high ability, do not automatically prefer a career over family life,' and that polarized sex-role attitudes (family life or career) are also apparent among highly educated women just as in other groups of women.

Hakim (2000:159-163) suggests that education has a function not in the labour market but in the marriage market, arguing that higher education does not change women's preferences for paid work over marriage (in effect, does not lead to an egalitarian model

of family roles), but that women use it as a means of upward social mobility through the marriage market rather than through the labour market (Hakim, 2000:203, calls it the 'educational homogamy of spouses'). However, she does not consider the possibility that the most highly educated women might return to the labour market more quickly than less educated women, after child-rearing. In that case, higher qualifications do have a considerable impact on the employment market in the sense that higher qualifications appear to help them either return to work or find a new job more easily in a situation where mothers are likely to be penalised for taking maternity leave. Furthermore, there is no empirical evidence that 'highly educated women bring their qualifications as "an intellectual dowry" to a marriage' (Hakim, 2000:150-160). Even if this were true, men may prefer women with higher qualifications, not simply as an intellectual dowry, but to secure a potential place in an increasingly competitive labour market as insurance against their own unemployment, and this may also be another indication of their socioeconomic position (living standards) having fallen. It may well be sensible to say that highly educated women use their qualifications to secure both their marriage and career, while not giving priority to marriage over career.

Unlike Hakim's preference theory which has raised a vigorous debate as to whether the persistence of the gender division of labour should (or should not) be regarded as a reflection of women's own preferences, Joshi's concept of the opportunity costs of caring (1992) provides an alternative economic perspective to explain married women's attitudes to marketplace work. This concept compares a course of action with the best possible alternative, and opportunity costs are the value of what has to be given up in order to achieve a particular goal (Joshi, 1992:110). In the light of Joshi's concept of the opportunity cost of caring, the rise in cash opportunity cost in post-industrialized economies could affect women's lifestyle choices more than ever before. Dex (2003:10) has noted that the opportunity cost of caring for children is increasing because mothers have much higher potential earnings than in the past owing to the rise in women's education levels; that is, the opportunity cost of caring is higher as women's educational levels rise. This suggests that as the opportunity cost of caring goes up, women are more likely to prefer paid work to staying at home to care for their children:

> Opportunity cost is the amount that you could be earning, or the amount you forgo in the alternative best activity. If other opportunities would pay more per hour, the

> opportunity cost of an hour goes up. If you have to forgo more lucrative opportunities to care for your own children, then it becomes relatively less attractive. If you have no alternative earning options, the opportunity cost would be zero. Any changes in these relative prices/costs will affect (some) people's decisions at the margin. (Dex, 2003:10; footnote 1)

By estimating the opportunity cost of caring using British cross-sectional data, Women and Employment Survey of 1980, Joshi (1992:124) attempted to contribute to understanding the change in people's attitude to women's care for children and unpaid domestic work (which has often been devalued and disregarded). Joshi estimated women's foregone earnings as a result of giving up employment, using the concept of opportunity cost, suggesting mothers may speculate about what might be the gross cash loss if they give up work or reduce their hours of work, especially before making decisions about how to allocate their time between paid work and other activities. Joshi (1992:112) found evidence in a statistical analysis that women with dependent children tend to have interrupted work patterns and also reduce their hours of work in subsequent employment, rather than withdraw completely from the labour force. Based on this evidence, Joshi shows the difference in lifetime participation between hypothetical groups of women with and without children (Table 2.2).

Table 2.2 Average lifetime workforce participation according to number of children

Number of births	Age at giving birth	Reduced years of full-time employment	Extra years part-time	Net effect on time in paid work (years)
1	25	- 7.16	+ 2.83	- 4.32
2	25,28	- 9.05	+ 2.80	- 6.25
3	25, 27, 29	- 10.44	+ 3.10	- 7.34
4	25,27,31	- 11.44	+ 2.80	- 8.24
5	25, 27, 29, 31	- 11.77	+ 2.99	- 8.79

Source: adapted from Joshi (1992:115), 'The cost of caring', in Glendinning and Millar (eds), *Women and poverty in Britain: the 1990s*.

According to Table 2.2, as the number of children increases, women's full-time work decreases (incrementally from seven years for one child to twelve years for four). In contrast, women's choice of part-time work appears to remain stable regardless of how many children they have. However, it seems clear that the overall time allocated to paid work decreases as the number of children increases. From Joshi's observation of the

effect of various patterns of child-bearing on subsequent employment histories (1992:114-115), it is suggested that the opportunity cost of caring explains why women adjust hours in paid work on having children. Although this argument could provide an alternative economic understanding of women's choices between paid work and child care rather than women's work attitude or aspirations, some criticism is inevitable because it is also based on a utilitarian rationale. While Joshi pays attention to the foregone cash gross loss resulting from adjusting hours in market work, many other social scientists note the practical reality that the cost of childcare arrangements will affect women's choices between paid work and caring for children at home:

> Several empirical studies confirm that in most countries, especially those with minimal public investment in childcare, the greater a woman's child-rearing responsibilities, the less likely it is that she will choose to participate in paid work; for women who are labour force participants, greater child-rearing responsibilities reduce the hours in paid work. (Gornick, 2000:123)

Gornick (2000:123) argues that the cost of alternative childcare arrangements can lower women's effective market wages; that is, if mothers have to spend a considerable amount of their earnings on paying for childcare, then effectively, their market wage is lowered. In that case, market wages are not attractive enough for mothers to return to work or to continue in full-time work.

There is no dispute that rational choice explanations have made a significant error disregarding the social and cultural contexts. It is the case that they see the individuals without the society, denying the social beings of humans. Therefore, alternative perspectives recognizing individuals within the social and cultural contexts are essential, particularly in the study of married women's labour market behaviour. That is, gender-role socialisation and class perspectives, which follow in the next sections.

2.1.2. Gender-role socialisation perspective: socially and culturally constructed motherhood and gender role attitudes

Gender perspective explanations, in terms of culturally constructed motherhood and gender-role attitudes, provides a different approach from the neoclassical explanations (Duncan, 2005:51; Duncan and Irwin, 2004:391; Won and Pascall, 2004:274). It is

argued that gender difference in the choice between labour market participation and staying at home must be seen as socially constructed by the gender belief system, beyond any supply aspect (Ridgeway and Correll, 2004:522-524). In particular, Duncan and Irwin (2004:391) criticize the rational choice explanations of the gender division of labour by arguing that it occurs not because of women's self-selection but through socially and culturally patterned gender norms (Duncan and Irwin, 2004:391; Duncan 1999:144). More specifically, Duncan and Irwin (2004:391-392) reject the grand theory, arguing that 'cost-benefit type economic questions are not separable from the social and moral decisions and individual goals are seen through the lens of family responsibilities and negotiated within wider social norms.'

In their study based on in-depth interviews of British women at Leeds in 2003, they attempted to demonstrate the inaccuracy of the economists' assumptions, by showing that there was moral reasoning in combining mothering with paid work, in allocating tasks with partners and in choosing childcare. They found that mothers make such decisions within socially negotiated moral accounts and these decisions are socially patterned by class and ethnicity: 'People do not view care simply as a constraint on paid work. Rather, they feel morally obliged to care and often wish to do so' (Duncan and Irwin, 2004:397). In addition, Duncan and Irwin (2004) believe that gender role attitudes are also an important predictor of married women' choices or behaviour in that gender role attitudes reflecting gender belief systems in a particular society are differently patterned in different nations and cultures. Crompton and Harris (1999a: 105-127) also point out that gender-role attitudes exert an important influence on the domestic division of labour along with other structural factors. Overall, it is suggested that socially and culturally constructed gender-role attitudes are not underplayed in modern society, which is why there is no significant change in married women's choices concerning paid labour.

2.1.3. Class perspective on the gender division of labour and mothering

Currently, debates have moved around the question of whether we live in 'classless' societies, relating to the postmodern arguments that 'modern societies have moved beyond class' (Crompton, 1998:140). Crompton (1998:140-142) argued that 'we have

never lived in a classless society' by pointing out the emergence of an 'underclass' and 'the new middle class'. Breen (2005:50) also argued that there is no evidence of the influence of class declining, but rather, that it is growing in many areas. This strongly suggests that class analysis is no less important in contemporary societies, despite recent evidence of the weakening of any causal connections between class structure and class action, such as weaker linkages to labour struggles or voting behaviour. In contrast to the arguments for a classless society, it is argued that class inequalities have been reinforced through the period of the decline in class-based research; that is, record levels of inequality (for instance, in Britain) marked the period in which individualist theorists argue the demise of class and individualization as late modern social actors (Gillies, 2005:836). Class-based perspectives seem important in recent years for having strong indications of social division arising from the increasing family wage gap in modern societies.

Apart from the debates over whether there is a class or classless society, gender questions in class debates have been raised against grand class theories focusing on male-breadwinning households. Marxist theorists see women's domestic labour as serving the needs of capital by generating surplus value, not serving men, and women are seen as part of the working class (Hartmann, 1981b:22,31). However, the grand class theories are criticized for not taking gender into account (Crompton, 1998:92-93). With regard to class and gender relations, Hartmann (1981a:372) argues that capitalist social structures rest on the division of labour organized by patriarchy and capitalism: 'Patriarchy's material base is men's control of women's labour: both in the household and in the labour market, the division of labour by gender tends to benefit men' (Hartmann, 1981a:373).

That is, Hartmann's dual systems theory (1981) sees the patriarchal system as equivalent or similar to the class system, and also sees 'women as suffering a double disadvantage – by virtue of their sex as well as in their employment' (Crompton, 1998:93-94):

> The material disadvantages of women in respect of employment is that women have been concentrated in less well-paid, sex-typed occupations and are disadvantaged in the labour market as a consequence of their domestic and child-

> rearing obligations, and – until relatively recently – excluded by men from access to many of the better-paid and more prestigious occupational roles.

In addition, Hartmann (1981b:22) suggested there is a vicious circle of the effects of the material disadvantages of women in the labour market; 'the lower pay women receive in the labour market both perpetuates men's material advantage over women and encourages women to choose wifery as a career, and women's home responsibilities in turn reinforce their inferior labour market position.' She basically rejects the claim that the receipt of patriarchal benefits (from wives' housework and childcare) will vary according to class. Nonetheless, Hartmann (1981a:385-386) sees that income has the most important effect on the relative amounts of patriarchal benefits. For instance, wives of husbands with lower incomes (rather than with higher incomes) spend relatively fewer hours on housework due to their participation in work outside the home compared with full-time homemakers; at the same time, they experience the "double day" of waged work and housework (Hartmann, 1981a:385-386). Indeed, recently, one study (Bradley, 1999) found a growing gap between the middle and working classes in Britain by deducting advantages or suffering from disadvantages from economic and social/cultural capital, particularly by gender. This reveals that gender segregation is less rigid at the top of the employment hierarchy, while relatively strong among manual workers and at the lower levels of service work (Bradley, 1999:30): 'in manual jobs, occupational segregation has hardly declined' (Bradley, 2007:93). This suggests that class-differentiated experiences may modify women's choices of paid work, in effect bringing about a class-differentiated gender division of labour.

2.1.3.1. Class-differentiated experiences of mothering and labour market behaviour

Crompton (2005:23-27) asks why occupational segregation in the West remains stable despite the very real changes in the law, women's education levels and women's employment rates, and answers by arguing that despite dramatic changes in family formation and behaviour, family arrangements and relationships are economic as well as cultural or normative. Overall, along with rejecting the 'individualisation' thesis, she sees class-differentiated attitudes in respect of mother's employment as closely associated with the class-differentiated constraints and opportunities available. The

class-differentiated attitude is well articulated by Goldthorpe (1996)'s rational action theory (RAT), based on economic utilitarian rationalities (Duncan, 2005:1-2). Goldthorpe argues that rational decision-making differs according to class condition. However, this utilitarian-rationality idea, despite the class-based explanation, is critiqued just as the individualization thesis has received many critiques for the same reason (Duncan, 2005:1-2). Rejecting theories of classless preference (Hakim) or class-based utilitarian rationality (Goldthorpe), Duncan (2005:50-51) argues that class-based motherhood created by socially and culturally constructed moralities underlies preferences and rationality. That is, motherhood practices are differentiated by class-based cultures.

In addition, Duncan (2005:55-56) argues from the qualitative research of white mothers with children under 11 in England (during 1988-2000) that there are fragmented constructions of social moralities within each class, that is, different types of mothering exist within a class. Working class mothers divide into a smaller, peripheral group, who expressed a primarily mothering role, and a larger, more central group who tended more towards the primarily worker position. Middle class mothers divide into a group of suburban wives (a considerable number) and a professional/managerial group. The division within each class is contrary evidence to Goldthorpe's rational action theory. According to Goldthorpe's class-based rationality, middle class mothers with better conditions and who can afford childcarers are more likely to combine mothering with substantial employment (the primarily worker role), while working class mothers with much lower paid employment cluster towards having a primarily mothering role (Duncan, 2005:60-62).

In particular, Goldthorpe does not explain the 'irrational action' of the suburban wives who orient towards part-time employment or a primarily mothering role despite their high human capital assets and better competitive edge in the job market (Duncan, 2005:60-62). Neither does Goldthorpe explain the central working class group who tend towards having primarily a worker role despite their relatively low human capital and having to take low-quality jobs (Duncan, 2005:60-62). The reasons why they act 'irrationally' are the cost of childcare as an additional class constraint and the extent to which they value a mother's own care. According to Duncan (2005:62-70), concerns

about the cost of childcare lead many mothers in the less well-paid central working class group to use informal childcare if not their own care at home. The professional and managerial class group tends to choose more expensive nursery options in relation to child development, as they have fewer concerns about costs. However, the high-income suburban wives group valued mother's own care and tended to stress their pre-given gender roles more than the other two groups. In short, Duncan (2005:62,70) suggests that class patterns of values and choices do not always follow class patterns of resources as argued by Goldthorpe, and more importantly, also suggests that middle class mothers, in particular, tend to prioritize the culturally constructed moral exercise of motherhood (socially patterned rationalities) over the utilitarian use of their economic/social capital (or rational action). Even though Goldthorpe's explanation based on utilitarian rationalities has been criticized, the attention paid to the division between the classes is still valuable. In fact, the division between the classes has been the concern of many.

Vincent and Ball (2006:163), from a qualitative research of British parents, found not only evidence suggesting that the traditional gendered division of domestic responsibility continues to be apparent among middle-class women, but also that choices about childcare differ according to class, which serves to generate and maintain class divisions. In particular, the understanding of 'people like us' is complex and nuanced for the middle class (Vincent and Ball, 2006:163). Further, based on the results of two qualitative research projects focusing on middle and working class people in the UK, Vincent, Braun and Ball (2008:5) point out the key importance of social class for understanding the role and purpose of childcare. They also found that the affordability of childcare related to class in the UK, where costs of childcare are very high and parents bear about 75-80 per cent of the total costs. There is expensive (small-group) private childcare largely available to middle class parents and there is cheaper state or voluntary sector provision exclusively for working class parents (Vincent, Braun and Ball, 2008:10).

The type of childcare preferred by mothers differs according to their social class: 'the middle class mothers tended to stress the risk of emotional neglect in nurseries whereas the working class mothers appeared more concerned about the possibility of physical neglect or harm from childminders' (Vincent, Braun and Ball, 2008:13-14). Therefore,

most middle class mothers tended to value the one-to-one care at home and the nursery was not seen as better, while the working class mothers tended to value the nursery with professional carers and more space. In addition, Crompton and Lyonette (2008:3) identified class differentiated family strategies in respect of mothers' employment and paying for childcare packages from work-life interviews of British parents with child/ren under 14. They argue that there are persistent class differences in couples' employment strategies and also suggest that childcare use differs according to class.

Apart from the class differences in preferences for employment and childcare, there are divisions in the use of flexibility between the working and middle classes, as well as within the middle class (Crompton, 2000:165-170). Crompton (2000:165-170) argues, from qualitative research on British working women, that working class women tend not to enjoy the same kind of flexibility as women in the middle class; middle class women tend to cluster in certain professions in the upper occupational hierarchy, which affords them some employment flexibility, whereas working-class women tend to cluster in inferior kinds of jobs, so-called flexible/non-standard jobs; although these jobs can provide some kind of flexibility, most are low-paid, low-skilled jobs which cannot pay for the same quality of childcare that middle or upper class women can afford. Crompton (2000:169-170) found that even within the middle class, there are differences in how women use flexibility; women in some professions – such as pharmacy – have employment flexibility, which women in managerial jobs requiring long working hours do not, suggesting that this may explain the lower representation of women in managerial jobs than men:

> Within the middle class, women have tended to cluster in occupational niches that facilitate a combination of employment and caring. The rapid feminization of some professions, such as pharmacy, may also be explained to a considerable extent by the fact that part-time and flexible employment opportunities abound within this occupation, while managerial jobs, which require long working hours, do not afford employment flexibility. (Crompton, 2000:169-170)

Moreover, Lareau and Weininger (2008:437) argued, from their analysis of in-depth interviews of U.S. children and families, that 'parents allocate responsibility for children's organized activities primarily to mothers, finding that mothers' socioeconomic status is closely linked to the amount of children's time in organized

activities, that is, better educated mothers increase their participation in children's organized activities by trading off their own time at work (Lareau and Weininger, 2008:440-441).

2.1.3.2. Class-differentiated attitudes toward children's education

The Western literature has well documented class-differentiated attitudes toward children's education. Class-differentiated efforts for children's education is explained again by Goldthorpe's rational action theory (RAT) and culturalist explanations, as mentioned in section 2.1.3.1 above. According to Goldthorpe, RAT decisions about children's education are made based on utilitarian calculations of the costs, benefits and probabilities of success of various options open to them, and furthermore, these calculations or evaluations differ according to social class (Hatcher, 1998:10-12). More specifically, the cost of education is a heavy burden for working-class families while it is relatively less so for upper and middle class families. In fact, the benefits of education are greater for upper and middle class families, particularly for middle class families, as the risks of downward mobility are higher, so their children's education can be a safeguard against further falls, which is not the case for working-class families. Finally, the probabilities of success in terms of academic attainment, for instance, are also higher for middle class children than for working-class children because their parents' greater capital – such as better educational levels and social networks, and being better informed – can help the children more effectively.

Therefore, given their greater capacity to afford education costs, middle class families tend to risk failure in education more readily than the working class. In contrast, working-class families are likely to be less ambitious and to avoid the risk of failure by having lower costs, given their inability to afford high costs. This is because the consequences of failure to attain higher education qualifications may be more serious, such as the additional costs and the risk of subsequent exclusion from other alternative options (for instance, vocational courses). According to Goldthorpe (1996), despite the expansion of educational opportunities, class differences remain, due to there being little change in relative cost-benefit-probability factors in each class (Hatcher, 1998:11). However, Hatcher (1998:16-17) pointed out that RAT makes an error by counterposing

rational choice to culture, arguing that there are various other reasons for decisions, and these are not necessarily based on maximizing personal benefit in economic terms. Indeed, by indicating there is empirical evidence from the British youth to show that working class people have high aspirations for upward class mobility similar to the middle class, Hatcher (1998:15) suggests aspirations for upward social mobility are also influenced more or less by the cultural setting, for instance, schools. Hatcher (1998:16) saw rational choice as neither necessary nor sufficient to explain choices, as 'RAT has no concept of a multiplicity of historically-constructed social identities.' Therefore, Hatcher (1998:21) suggested we need a comprehensive theory which makes space for rational-strategic decision-making within a cultural paradigm.

On the other hand, apart from the arguments of class-distinct attitudes regarding social mobility, neoliberal approaches have also been popular in recent years. They argue that greater emphasis on the meritocracy of industrial societies has inevitably brought increased social mobility, which has contributed to increased social stability, equal opportunities, and societal convergence (Crompton, 1998:209-210). However, this has been widely criticized by those who emphasize the persistence of class inequalities; in other words, extensive social mobility is rather a source of destabilization, far from being a source of social stability, as reflected in the wide income gaps between different educational levels (Crompton, 1998:210). Regarding social mobility (in the occupational hierarchy), whether this is through education (meritocracy) or by class origins, positions are divided. Marshall et al. (1997) argue that the class effect still has a substantial influence on occupational attainment rather than educational levels, while Saunders (1996, 1997) argues that ability and effort (such as motivation and work attitudes) are more important for achieving higher-level occupational positions than class origins (Crompton, 1998:216-217). However, paradoxically, Crompton suggests that the evidence from both sides can be used to support the other's case – Marshall et al.'s evidence for neo-liberal arguments and Saunders' evidence for class theorist arguments (Crompton, 1998:217):

> Marshall et al. have suggested that the 'class effect' on occupational attainment has declined somewhat over the years, suggesting a move in the direction of greater meritocracy. Saunders's evidence shows that private schooling is important for class I/II children in avoiding downward mobility, suggesting that the private schools may offer middle-class parents some means of insuring their less able

offspring against downward mobility.

Crompton (1998:216) argued that in effect, both positions are in competition and have some validity. Thanks to greater emphasis on meritocracy, middle class mothering – giving more commitment to children's education – is accepted as the legitimate culture (Gillies, 2005:849-850). Ironically, however, it is suggested, in Gillies's qualitative study of British families (2005) that the rising meritocracy of the middle class contributes to widening class divisions in modern societies, as middle class mothers will invest more time and money in their children's education than working class mothers will. Therefore, parenting in relation to social mobility efforts may affect mothers' labour market behaviour and also contribute to the still-existing class inequalities. This is why a class-based perspective is necessary in this thesis.

In sum, the critical reviews on the neoclassical arguments suggest that it is necessary to pay more attention to the normative and structural factors, as identified as the primary constraints facing women: e.g. gender norms and attitudes, the cost and availability of childcare, and the outcomes of different social origins (McRae, 2003:329). Therefore, this thesis attempts to identify normative and structural constraints including class in the Korean context in the next section that follows.

2.2 Critiques of Korean neoclassical explanations and identification of normative and structural factors in the Korean context

In the case of Korea, despite noticeable debates between Korean labour scholars and feminist sociologists, there has been no significant debate concerning female work attitudes in the Korean literature on this subject as there is in the Western literature. However, both take note of the culturally-specific gender role attitude, as argued in the Western literature, that married women's choices are closely related to their gender role attitudes, particularly those which are culturally constructed. It is also notable that most of the Korean literature addresses 'married women' as one group, without a focus on

'mothers', presumably due to the fact that mothers without marriage is neither the norm nor commonplace in Korea.

Hwang and Polacheck (2004:1-2) examined whether the self-selection theory holds true in the Korean case, rejecting Bergmann's occupational segregation theory (1974):

> Discrimination against women in the primary sector forces women to find jobs in the secondary sector, which makes the secondary sector crowded, resulting in an excess-labour supply which lowers secondary job wages and puts women at a disadvantage.

Based on Korean data, they argue that their study findings support the self-selection model, as the evidence shows that the population chooses jobs to maximize lifetime earnings or utility by matching each gender's talents and preferences for skill types (Hwang and Polacheck, 2004:1-2); Women take female-type (female dominated) jobs and men take male-type (male dominated) jobs because women are relatively advantaged in female-type jobs as are men in male-type jobs. In short, their argument is that gender divisions in the labour market are the result of self-selection based on personal and work characteristics rather than labour market discrimination. However, there is some recognition of the existence of sex discrimination in the Korean labour literature: for instance, one piece of labour research acknowledges that the human capital theory cannot explain everything, and that gender differences in the Korean labour market might be explained – to a considerable extent – by sex discrimination (Keum, 2002:176-179). Also, feminist sociologists in Korea have argued consistently that there is occupational sex segregation or gender division of labour due to the cultural heritage of gender norms (Kim, 1995:182; Shin, 2004:102-106).

Looking from the feminist perspective, Hwang and Polacheck (2004) ignore the fact that the jobs characterized as female-type or male-type are defined by social gender norms and are likely to be the product of labour market discrimination. Furthermore, it is likely that as rational beings, both men and women can maximize their wellbeing by taking 'integrated' (gender-neutral) jobs (such as information service operatives) rather than female-type jobs (for instance, nursing) or male-type jobs (for example, in the construction industry), if the number of integrated jobs exceeds that of gendered jobs. In fact, in Korea, the number of females in integrated jobs and the number of integrated

jobs available are both tending to increase (Hwang and Polacheck, 2004:15, 17). If this tendency continues, then work attributes (female-type, male-type, or gender-neutral jobs) may not explain the labour market segmentation by gender. There are other explanations, particularly among welfarists, emphasising Korean-specific structural constraints and suggesting that the culturally-specific labour market system and workplace culture and welfare regime are likely to affect women's labour force participation. In this vein, the supply-side/individualist arguments are criticized and subsequently demand-side/structuralist constraints in the Korean context are illuminated. Furthermore, the last section explores the Korean class literature, drawing implications for the potential link between class and labour force participation by Korean married women, particularly mothers, a matter which is rarely paid attention to in Korean research.

2.2.1. Identifying individual factors in the Korean context: Korean culturally-specific gender norms and motherhood

Based on the neoclassical labour supply theory, Hwang (2002:26) argues – in her study of Korean married women's labour market participation – that whether married women take jobs or not is closely related to the burden of housework and their attitude to paid work. She presumes that although there is a notable difference between non-working and working groups, in their attitude towards sharing housework with their male spouses, traditional gender role attitudes can still be observed in both groups (Hwang, 2002:26[i] [1]): non-working women (over 90 per cent) consider housework as women's work and nearly half the working women questioned (43.6 per cent) also consider it as women's work. However, a very small percentage of women, non-working (1.9 per cent) and working (1.5 per cent), consider housework as women's work as well as men's work.

In addition, similar to Hakim's preference theory (2000, 2002), Hwang (2002:28-29) argues that there is a difference in the spheres of life satisfaction between non-working and working groups, suggesting that there are differences in work attitude between

[1] All Korean references (except those written in English) are translated by Jong-Soon Ahn as the author of this DPhil thesis. The original Korean version of each of the quotes numbered by Roman numerals (differing from the footnotes numbering system) is provided in the Appendix.

working and non-working women, although Hwang is left unsure whether these attitudinal differences are the cause or the result of married women's choices: homemakers are more satisfied with a more leisurely life and homemaking while working women are more satisfied with having some additional income (Hwang, 2002:28-9[ii]).

Furthermore, in a similar vein to the neo-classical economists, under the assumption that married women's human capital factors such as education and the subjects studied significantly affect their labour market participation, Hwang (2002:30) argues that married women's labour force participation is clearly divided by their human capital attributes such as age, education level and subjects studied. From the analysis of married women aged under 50 in the 4th wave (2001) of Korea Labour Income and Panel Study, higher participation rates were observed among younger and well-educated women and those with arts or human and social science degrees (Hwang, 2002:37-41). This study suggests that attitudes towards family duties over the family's life cycle differ according to women's human capital characteristics, thus supporting the arguments of the human capital theory. However, there are some critical observations of Korean women's work attitude.

A study of the influence of children's private education on married women's employment (Choi, 2008:33) argue that job commitment or career aspirations are not significantly associated with women's employment: only a very small percentage of female-type job seekers reported that a lack of job commitment and career aspirations were a barrier to finding a job – notably, the percentage decreased significantly from 8.1 in 1998 to 2.9 in 2006, as shown in Table 2.3 below. Most married women see childcare and upbringing as the main barrier to paid work, and the number of such women has even increased over time (Choi, 2008:33). From these figures, while the number of married women who see a lack of job commitment and career aspirations, as well as social prejudice and discrimination practices, as the main barriers to paid work has decreased over the researched years, the number of married women reporting unequal working conditions has remained stable.

Table 2.3 Barriers to women taking jobs (percentage, 1998, 2002 and 2006)

	1998	2002	2006
Childcare and bringing up children	31.4	41.1	47.9
Social prejudice, discrimination practices	27.6	21.7	17.4
Unequal working conditions	13	13.2	12.6
Housework	10.8	9.2	7.4
Lack of job commitment and career aspirations	8.1	4.5	2.9
Lack of skills	4	2	1.7
Lack of job information	.	2.4	3.2
Other/don't know	4.9	5.8	6.9
Row-total %	100	100	100

Source: my translation and adaptation from Figure 3-10, p33, Choi, 2008.

This suggests that married women's priority has been caring for children rather than their career aspirations, and unequal working conditions remain problematic, although social prejudice and discrimination practices appear to be decreasing as higher education and better employment opportunities become increasingly available to women as well as men. Similarly, Jang and Bu (2003:1[iii]), in a study of married women's choices between market work and child care, observe that Korean working women tend to show strong attachment to their jobs: 'working mothers often express their identity as workers and wish to stay in their jobs as long as possible if their childcare problems are solved'. Both studies found that married women view childcare responsibilities as the main obstacle to their labour force participation, other than career aspirations or work attachment (Jang and Bu, 2003; Choi, 2008).

Notably, Jang and Bu's study (2003:17-19[iv]) attempts to measure women's career aspirations ('job attachment' as expressed by the paper) by using survey scales in a questionnaire asking them to respond to the following questions:

- Would you wish to continue in paid work for as long as possible even if it were not economically necessary for you to work?
- Would you like to work for as long as possible irrespective of having children you might have to care for?
- Would you be more willing to work if there were extensive social childcare support available for your children?

- Would you be prepared to work (more/longer) if there was no employer discrimination against working mothers?

Jang and Bu (2003) incorporated institutional factors into their survey questions of individuals' work attitudes. From the survey results, it was found that married women's work aspirations were very high. Although the Korean survey measures are not in accordance with the international index, they do indicate Korean working women's career aspirations. However, there is no sampling of women who are not employed, and thus the studies do not show the job attachment or career aspirations of non-working women. Furthermore, neoclassical arguments, including the human capital theory, do not explain satisfactorily the reasons for mothers' choices when they have young children, reasons which are likely to change as their children get older, because these women in Korea tend to be non-working regardless of education, job experience (before childbearing) and career aspirations. It seems that culturally-specific gender norms, especially during motherhood, are more likely to explain these women's behaviour. Therefore, Korean women's gender-role attitudes and their culturally-specific motherhood need to be elaborated upon further.

Some literature indicates that Korean gender role attitudes are rooted in the cultural gender norms and women's status in the family formed in pre-industrial Korean society, which has been defined as patriarchal (Byun, 2001:19-20[v]; Kim and Kim, 2004:6; Shin, 2001:103; Kim, 1995:182): women's status was subject to men's, and women were defined mainly as homemakers, not as part of the labour force, although lower class women participated in non-domestic work as well (Kim, 1995:182); for example, in agricultural work. Byun (2001:6-10) argues that although traditional gender role attitudes have been steadily weakening overall in Korea, in the younger age cohorts, along with the rapid increase in women's employment, women's status and their gender role in the family has not changed much; men's share of household chores is still low and there is some gender discrimination in educational investment, especially in working class families. Byun (2001) argues that there are more investments in sons, either due to the traditional preference for sons or due to gender-determined career prospects in the labour market and the fact that the care of children and/or elderly parents is still primarily entrusted to women, without much state support.

Like Byun (2001), Park et al. (2008:176) also suggest that gender role attitudes remain relatively unchanged for both Korean women and men. As shown in Table 2.4, there is a considerable gender difference in the hours spent on housework by working couples. Working women still spend considerably more hours on housework than working men. Even non-employed men do not share the housework, implying that gender role attitudes have not changed much despite the rapid increase in women's labour market participation. More recently, an OECD report (2011:13-15) confirms this, finding that Korean men do the least amount of housework (1 hour and 19 minutes per day) of all OECD member countries.

Table 2.4 The annual hours of housework of Korean married women and men

		Weekdays	Saturdays	Sundays
Women	Working	184	203	213
	Non-working	317	315	311
Men	Working	29	35	46
	Not working	37	38	49

Source: <Table V-5-20>, Park et al. (2008 :176). Note: for men, 'Not working' refers to the non-employment for the last week.

While British motherhood is seen by some researchers as having a culturally constructed heritage (Duncan, 2005:51), Won and Pascall (2004:274) define Korean motherhood as culturally ingrained from the tradition of Confucian expectations: 'the difficulties working mothers encounter come firstly from childcare and secondly from strongly ingrained cultural traditions.' In the past, Confucian values and assumptions expected women to obey their parents-in-law, husband and sons, consequently placing them in a low position in the family hierarchy, imposing heavy obligations and stronger obligations as daughters-in-law than as daughters (Won and Pascall, 2004:272). Won and Pascall (2004:273) argue that the traditional Confucian assumptions about gender relations still hold true in Korean families these days, in that 'motherhood frequently brings withdrawal from paid work while fatherhood strengthens men's roles as breadwinners.'

Shin (2001:97, 101-106) also points out that Korean mothers are seen as the primary

child-carers, and subject to the traditional normative role of motherhood, to the point that child-rearing is not shared between women and the Korean regime as is the trend in many Western developed societies. An empirical study supports this, finding that although nearly 60 per cent of homemakers had work experience before marriage or childbirth, more than half the researched group did not want to work, the main reason being so they could be available for childcare and their children's education, which suggests that motherhood seems trapped by the traditional gender norms (Jang and Kim, 2000; 55-63). Therefore, it seems evident that culturally-specific normative motherhood along with little-changed gender role attitudes is associated with married women's work behaviour.

2.2.2. Identifying socioeconomic factors in the Korean context: labour market and welfare regime

2.2.2.1. Socioeconomic changes over the last four decades in Korea

An ILO research project carried out by Kim and Kim (2004:1-26) and Kim (1995:181-2) noted how socio-economic and institutional changes in Korea over recent decades have related to Korean family and work life, along with a historical review of Korean mothers' labour force participation. In the pre-industrial society, Korean married women of the middle and lower classes mainly carried out their traditional domestic work, including caring for the family:

> Women carried out sewing, spinning, weaving, milling, domestic chores and animal husbandry, vegetable cultivation and making soy bean paste and sauce, as well as preparing for the performance of Confucian rites. Middle-class and poor peasant women had to do field work as well, such as weeding, transplanting, and manual irrigation, though their contribution was undervalued or considered as valueless. (Kim, 1995:182)

However, with industrialization and urbanization, their domestic jobs were substituted steadily by industrial work, although most married women tended to participate in farming or home-based work which seemed compatible with their traditional roles and norms (Kim, 1995:182). Until the rapid industrialization of the 1960s, most workers were self-employed or unpaid family workers in the agriculture sector, which made it

possible for most women to work after marriage and childbirth as nearby childcare from family members or relatives was available (which is less the case in present-day society) (Kim and Kim, 2004:1-26). During the industrialization process, the number of women in paid employment – mostly young and unmarried – increased rapidly, but a small number of women continued to work after marriage and childbirth (Kim and Kim, 2004:1-26).

However, in the late 1980s, the economic boom caused a labour supply shortage in small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), particularly in the manufacturing sector, and thus the participation rate for married women increased dramatically, exceeding that of unmarried women (Kim and Kim, 2004:1-26). Nonetheless, as the labour supply shortage was unsolved, the Korean government began to address this issue by establishing the Equal Employment Act (1988) and expanded childcare facilities at the same time as the rise in the labour and women's movements (Kim and Kim, 2004:1-26). In the 1990s, with the shrinking of the manufacturing industry and the growth of the service industry, businesses were required to extend their labour market flexibility (Kim and Kim, 2004:1-26): as Dex (2003:5-10) indicates, businesses are required to extend their work hours 'to cater for customers' demands in the 24 hour/7 day society' in the postindustrialised economies, which is also true in Korea.

According to the literature, as in Western society, it seems that the 'de-industrialization (referred to the decline of manufacturing and the growth of the service industry) and structural changes in the Korean labour market (more labour market flexibility) under global trends of neo-liberalism' (Mishra, 1999:25; Kwon, 2001:214; Kim and Kim, 2004:23) have contributed to the continued increase in married women's participation by offering women flexible work. Since the financial crisis at the end of the 1990s, the deregulation and restructuring of the labour market in South Korea has also increased the number of female workers employed in non-standard/irregular work, especially the number of married women (Grubb et al., 2007:22). Furthermore, the structural reforms in the Korean labour market have necessarily continued until more recently, up to the mid 2000s, as economic polarisation has widened due to the economic recession after the financial crisis at the end of 1997 and subsequently the credit crisis in 2003 (Keum et al., 2009:7-8, 20-23). As a result, waged employment has increased steadily whereas

non-waged employment has decreased from the mid-2000s (Keum et al., 2006:2, 19).

However, the structural reforms since the financial crisis in 1997 have been differently experienced according to gender, and are most evident in the two or so years after the economic crisis as more women than men moved from permanent to irregular work or unpaid family employment, while more men than women moved from permanent to self-employed jobs (Keum et al., 2006:12-4). In addition, although the structural reforms of the mid-2000s in the service industry contributed decisively to the decline in self-employed businesses overall, the increasing rate of females as self-employed workers (23.5 per cent) is greater than that for males (13.4 per cent) in the period 1998 to 2007 (Keum et al., 2009:59[vi]). The increase in female workers in non-standard jobs including self-employed jobs suggests that married women's labour market status has been degraded. As Einhorn (2006:152) points out, the process of reforming the labour market system and economic restructuring is highly likely to be gendered in form and impact.

Apart from the changes in the economy and labour market, demographical changes in Korea are also related to married women's labour force participation. Although industrialization with rapid economic growth has brought some changes in attitudes and values concerning work and the family, Kim and Kim (2004:24) argued that the traditional Korean family (characterized as having very strong family solidarity) and the policy of prioritizing economic growth have been sustained over the last four decades. They indicated, however, that family structure and demographic changes with increased women's employment have weakened the function of families as the primary source of family welfare. Over the past 40 years, the number of traditional extended family households has rapidly fallen and that of single-generation households has increased steadily (Kim and Kim, 2004:9-12). Moreover, the number of single-person households has risen as well due to the increase in the number of elderly people living alone, divorced people (lone parents) and people who have never married (Kim and Kim, 2004:9-12).

While the demographic changes have increased demands for public support for childcare and care for the elderly, the Korean gender regime does not seem to respond to

this demand (Kim and Kim, 2004:9-12). In particular, family structural changes have intensified the childcare problems of working parents, especially lone parents in nuclear families, and furthermore, the traditional function of families of nursing and caring for the elderly and/or the disabled has been weakened considerably in a rapidly aging society (Kim and Kim, 2004:5, 12-13; Grubb et al., 2007:15). Therefore, it seems clear that Korean mothers face more work-life balance problems than ever, due to the lack of social support in response to demographic changes. Further reviews of socio-economic characteristics (namely, institutional structures) follow.

2.2.2.2. Labour market structural changes over the last four decades

During the last 4 decades of the 20th century there were changes to the industrial and employment structures in Korea, as shown in Table 2.5, with the industrial focus moving from agriculture and fishing to the service industry, so the number of women workers entering the SOC increased (Keum, 2002:77[vii]; Kim and Kim, 2004:1-5). However, in the service sector, the employment share of wholesale and retail sales and the hospitality industry (Korea has one of the largest shares of employment in the wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and hotels) has decreased, whereas the employment share of the finance sector, the medical and health industry, digital components and business services where men are concentrated has been growing considerably (Keum, 2002:77-78). Despite an increase in the number of jobs in some areas of the service sector such as in domestic service, education, health and social services, the proportion of females employed in these jobs accounts for just 14 per cent of total female employment and office/service/sales jobs where women are concentrated is relatively static (Keum, 2002:79-81). Similarly, Hwang (2008:27[viii], 54-55*)* argues from the analysis of labour panel data 2002 to 2006 that the growth of high value-added services (education and healthcare services) is slowing down and low productivity service areas are expanding, and that the service industry tends to lose jobs or increase the number of non-regular workers to reduce wage costs. With the concentration of female workers in low quality service jobs, it seems clear that high-quality service work for female workers is underdeveloped in Korea (Hwang, 2008:55-56).

Table 2.5 The proportions of employed females by industry over the past decades (percentage)

	Industrial distribution of employed females			Female ratio (against male ratio)		
	A&F*	M&M**	SOC***	A&F	M&M	SOC
1963	68.7	6.9	24.4	38.0	30.3	30.0
1970	57.3	12.2	30.6	41.5	33.8	31.6
1980	39.0	22.3	38.7	43.7	39.5	34.0
1990	20.3	28.2	51.5	46.2	42.4	38.5
1995	14.6	21.4	64.0	47.6	36.8	40.4
1997	13.2	18.4	68.4	48.2	35.7	41.8
1998	14.6	16.7	68.7	47.6	34.5	40.9
1999	13.3	17.4	69.3	46.9	36.0	41.4
2000	12.5	17.5	70.0	47.6	35.8	42.0
2001	11.6	17.0	71.4	47.2	35.8	42.5

Source: Table 1, Kim and Kim (2004:3). Note: *A&F refers to agriculture, fishing and hunting; **M&M refers to manufacturing and mining; ***SOC refers to Social Overhead Capital including all the public services (transportation, power, education, etc) and other services.

According to Keum et al.'s studies of Korean labour market structural reforms and self-employed business in the 2000s (2006:45-6; 2009:7-9, 59-61[ix]), structural reforms brought about respectively by the financial crisis at the end of 1997 and after the credit crisis in 2003 have had different effects on the labour market; for instance, the impacts on the self-employed sector in the early 2000s were different from those in the middle of the first decade of the 21st century. Firstly, the financial crisis in 1997 resulted in self-employment increasing dramatically for a few years, presumably as a secondary effect of high unemployment among waged workers (Keum et al., 2009:59-61); workers, especially male or older workers (in their 50s and 60s) tended to move from waged employment to non-waged employment. Indeed, there was a sudden rise in self-employed men in 2001 (see Table 2.A in Appendix). Also, after the financial crisis, the proportion of female non-paid family workers increased in 1998, as did female casual workers in 1999 (Table 2.B in Appendix).

Secondly, the structural reforms in the service and sales industry brought about by the credit crisis in 2003 led to an increase in waged jobs (receiving a salary), at the same time decreasing non-waged jobs (self-employed jobs) for both men and women, although this was also observed in most OECD countries in the early part of the first decade of the 21st century (Keum, 2009:45-49). More specifically, during the period of

structural change in the service industry, non-waged jobs in the wholesale/retail trade and hospitality industries (by number and concentration) declined, while waged jobs in business, and the personal and public service industries increased considerably (Keum, 2009:45-9).

Keum et al. (2009:59) see the decline of non-waged jobs as closely related to the collapse of poor and small-sized self-employed businesses after the 2003 credit crisis (see Table 1.3 in the previous chapter). In short, since 2003, there has been an overall decline in the self-employed sector along with a considerable decrease in the number of female non-paid family workers (Keum et al., 2009:21-23). Despite the restructuring as well as the decrease in non-waged employment, the proportion of self-employed workers (24 per cent in 2004) in Korea remains very high, a distinctive feature of Korean society (Grubb et al., 2007:13) compared with other developed countries (around 10 per cent in 2001), as shown in Table 2.6. Even excluding the farming and fishing industries where non-waged employment is concentrated, the proportion of non-waged workers in Korea is the highest.

Table 2.6 The proportions of non-waged workers in selected developed countries in 2001 (percentage)

	All industry			Industries except farming & fishing		
	Self-employed	Non-paid family workers	Total % of non-waged workers	Self-employed	Nonpaid family workers	Total % of Non-waged workers
Japan	10.8	5.1	15.9	8.9	3.4	12.3
Australia	13.6	0.4	14.0	11.8	0.3	12.1
France	8.9	0.0	8.9	6.8	0.0	6.8
Germany	10.1	0.9	11.0	9.5	0.5	10.0
Sweden	9.5	0.5	10.0	8.6	0.2	8.8
UK	11.3	0.9	12.2	10.8	0.9	11.7
US	7.3	0.1	7.4	6.5	0.1	6.6
Korea*	27.1	6.9	34.0	24.1	4.9	29.0

Source: adapted from Table 2-1, Keum et al. (2006:6). Note: * 2004 data replaced for Korea.

The incidence of part-time employment in Korea is also notable as shown in Table 2.7. Compared with other countries, it is particularly low (9 per cent in 2005). In countries

such as the Netherlands, Switzerland, Australia, Japan, the UK, and Germany, part-time employment rates are much higher than the OECD average (15.4 per cent in 2005). The proportion of part-time out of total employment was highest in the Netherlands (about 35 percent in early 2002), followed by Australia, Japan, Germany, Switzerland, the U.K, and Norway, averaging between 20 and 27 percent. Part-time employment rates as a percentage of women's total employment (rather than full-time, self-employed, and other non-standard work) in 2006 were highest in the Netherlands at about 60 percent, followed by Switzerland (about 45 percent), Japan (about 42 percent), Australia (around 41 percent), the UK (about 40 percent), and Germany (39 percent). For Korea, the percentage was around 12 per cent in 2006, an increase from 8.7 per cent in 2000.

Table 2.7 Incidence of part-time employment[a] and part-time female employment (aged 25 to 54 years) in the selected countries between 1994 and 2006 (percentage)

	Part-time employment as a proportion of total employment			Part-time rate of Women's total employment	
	1994	2002	2005	2000	2006
Australia [b,c]	24.4	27.5	27.3	41.8	40.7
Denmark	17.3	16.2	18.0	16.6 (1998)	25.6
Finland	8.9	11.0	11.2	9.2 (1997)	14.9
France	13.8	13.7	13.6	23.7	22.9
Germany	13.5	18.8	21.8	35.2	39.2
Ireland	13.5	18.1	18.6	29.7	34.9
Japan [b,d]	21.4	25.1	25.8	38.4 (1999)	40.9
Korea [b]	4.5	7.6	9.0	8.7	12.3
Netherlands	28.9	33.9	35.7	55.9	59.7
Norway	21.5	20.6	20.8	31.8	32.9
Portugal	9.5	9.7	9.8	11.2	13.2
Spain	6.4	7.7	11.4	15.3	21.4
Sweden	15.8	13.8	..	17.9	19.0
Switzerland [c]	23.2	24.8	25.1	47.1 (2001)	45.7
United Kingdom	22.4	23.4	23.6	38.6	38.8
United States [e]	14.2	13.1	12.8	14.6 (1999)	17.8
OECD total [f]	11.6	14.6	15.4	23.2	26.4

Source: adapted from Tables 2.4 and 2.5, Employment Outlook, OECD (2006, 2002, and 2007).
Note: [a] Part-time employment refers to work of less than 30 hours per week in the main job. Data include only persons declaring their usual work hours. [b] Data are based on the actual number of hours worked. [c] Part-time employment is based on hours worked in all jobs. [d] Less than 35 hours per week. [e] Data are for waged and salaried workers only. [f] Average percentage for OECD member countries.

Furthermore, the incidence of part-time employment is also significantly low among

temporary workers, while the incidence of temporary employment in the mining, manufacturing and construction industries is twice as high as the OECD average and three times as high as in the service industries, and temporary employment is concentrated in small establishments (Grubb et al., 2007:23). The characteristics of the Korean industrial structure, 'the low incidence of part-time employment and total employment in the service sector staying below the OECD average' (OECD 2007:24) implies that Korean women's choices for paid work are more likely to be constrained than in other developed countries. However, it should be noted that the low incidence of part-time employment is traded off by the high incidence of self-employment and non-paid family employment, which are likely to absorb women's labour efforts. In short, the characteristics of the labour market and employment structure suggest strongly that gendered labour market segmentation has a potential link with Korean women's (especially mothers') job take-up.

2.2.2.3. Sexual and marital division of labour and married women's labour market status

It is often argued that there is occupational segregation by sex in the Korean labour market. Women are concentrated in low-skilled and low-paid jobs or non-standard jobs, and are more likely than men to be unpaid family workers, while men are much more likely than women to be self-employed in Korea (Kim, 1995:185). Furthermore, Korean women's occupational status is in accordance with their marital and employment status (Kim, 1995:185). Jobs in agriculture, production, sales and services are predominately occupied by married women, while clerical, professional, technical and managerial jobs – considered of higher social status than that of factory workers – are largely taken by single women due to employers' preference for them (Kim, 1995:186-7). Kim (1995:188-9) found the difference between married and unmarried women's employment status also persisted in the sexually-divided labour market. Married women were less common in waged jobs and more likely to be self-employed and family workers than single women, in the 1990s (Kim, 1995:188-9). This suggests that married women's labour market status is even lower than unmarried women's. In short, although the demand for married women's labour is still increasing, occupational segregation by sex and by marital status seems to persist in the Korean labour market.

According to Kim and Kim (2004:4), the female share of non-standard jobs (temporary/daily workers and self-employed) has not changed over the last two decades, staying at around 50 per cent, and the female share is predominantly high among unpaid family workers (over 85 per cent), as shown in Table 2.8. The proportion of women in permanent and employed/self-employed jobs remains relatively low at less than 30 per cent, while the influx into temporary and daily jobs has been noticeable since 1997. As Hakim (2004:135) indicated, interrupted career patterns are typical of women's rather than of men's employment, and Kim (2007:39) also found that the difference in the life paths of men and women, particularly among irregular workers, is more pronounced in Korea. Many male temporary and daily workers are under 25 or over 60, whereas in the case of the equivalent female group, temporary and casual jobs are predominantly taken by women in their 30s and 40s, who are more likely to have childcare responsibilities.

Table 2.8 The proportions of working women by working status over two decades (percentage)

	Distribution of female employment by working status					Female ratio by working status				
	Employer/ Self-employed	Unpaid family workers	P.W[a]	T.W[b]	Casual[c] workers	Employer/ Self-employed	Unpaid family workers	P.W[a]	T.W[b]	Casual[c] workers
1980	23	37	..	..	8	26	76	..	..	33
1990	18	24	21	22	12	27	87	26	52	51
1997	20	19	22	27	10	29	90	27	56	46
2001	20	18	19	28	13	29	88	27	55	52

Source: Table 2, p4, Kim and Kim (2004). Note: [a] P.W. refers to permanent workers; [b] T.W. refers to temporary workers; [c] Casual workers are known as 'daily workers' in Korea.

Similarly, Grubb et al. (2007:22) found that a high proportion of women aged around 30 are in part-time work, and that married women, even compared with unmarried women, are concentrated in non-regular jobs along with an increase in the gender gap in older age groups, as shown in Table 2.9 below. In relation to the low-paid occupations taken mostly by married women, Grubb et al. (2007:25) found that the large wage difference between the sexes and between regular and non-regular workers in Korea is clearly attributable both to the prevailing labour market system and the frequent withdrawal of female workers from the labour market due to marriage and/or childbirth. With regard to the reason why married women are concentrated in non-standard jobs, Kim (1995:184) and Kim and Kim (2004:4) argue that this is associated with traditional gender

assumptions: ‘businesses presuppose women’s main responsibility is at home, so they seem to utilize women as a marginal workforce’ (Kim and Kim, 2004:4).

Table 2.9 Incidence of non-standard employment by gender, age and marital status in Korea in 2005 (percentage)

		Men	Women
Age cohorts	15-19	78.3	64.1
	20-29	32.0	33.4
	30-39	25.3	40.1
	40-49	29.2	46.7
	50-59	35.0	55.2
	60 and over	60.0	75.7
Marital status	Not married	36.7	35.0
	Married	28.5	46.4
	Separated	48.1	56.5

Source: Table 2.6, Grubb et al. (2007:22).

In the British case, Blackwell’s research (2001:159-60) attributed it to the allocation of females to such jobs, by pointing out that many women (over a fifth of British women in the study) who started off in better-paid, full-time jobs ended up doing low skilled, female-type work during their child-rearing years, mostly as part-timers. Similarly, a Korean researcher, Jang (2001:90[x]) argues from her study of Korean married women’s irregular employment that the reason why married women are trapped in the irregular job market is due to the structural mechanisms of female work depreciation, that is, women have been persistently allocated to female-type work and such jobs tend to be flexible such as temporary, part-time, and other casual employment, especially in small-sized firms where women are predominantly employed. In short, the research explored in this section suggests that married women’s labour market status is weak and low either due to discriminatory practices or the highly segmented labour market. Also, married women’s weak labour market status might affect their choice between being predominantly family carers or part of the labour force.

2.2.2.4. Cultural norms in the labour market and labour market discrimination

Recent research has found that gender inequality in the labour market is widely accepted in Korea, arguing that 'it could be that in cultures which accept gender inequalities, the role identity of women is in conflict with certain non-traditional roles (e.g. participating in the labour market)' (Tesch-Romer et al., 2008:344). Tesch-Romer et al. (2008:337) considered that culturally-specific attitudes toward gender equality could affect the level of gender inequality at a societal level such as in female economic activities. To examine these relationships, they used data from the World Values Survey (WVS) from 1999 to 2004 of the country specific gender equality norms measured by both men and women's agreement with the statement, 'when jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women'. In order to find any association between country-specific gender equality norms and maternal employment, the table produced by Tesch-Romer et al.'s study has been adapted by adding maternal employment with young children aged under 6 and by selecting countries, especially a few cases of Western and East Asian countries from the Human Development Report of 2002.

Table 2.10 Norms of gender inequality and maternal employment in Korea (percentage)

		Disagree on gender inequality(%)*	Relative female economic activity(%)**	Maternal employment with young children(%)***		
				Age 0-2	Age 3-5	Age under 6
Gender inequality on the labour market is widely accepted	China	43.0	86	.	.	.
	Japan	20.8	67	28.5	47.5	38
	Korea	27.1	70	.	.	25.7
Gender inequality on the labour market is widely rejected	Germany	55.7	69	36.1	54.8	45.5
	Ireland	76.9	52	.	.	56.3
	US	81.9	81	54.2	62.8	57.5
	UK	68.6	74	52.6	58.3	55.5

Source: derived from Appendix, C. Table 2-10, Tesch-Romer et al. (2008:346) and Selected tables from Employment Outlook (Vol.5), OECD (2007).

Note: * Norms on gender inequality: percentage of the total population disagreeing with unequal treatment of men and women in the labour market, based on aggregated data from the fourth wave of the World Values Survey 1999-2004. ** Relative female economic activity rate per country, based on the Human Development Report 2002. ***Average percentage of mothers employed with children aged less than 3 and 3-5, based on Appendix Table 3. The percentage of maternal employment with children aged less than 6 is the average of the two children's age groups. For Korea, data from Hwang (2003: 33) is used.

According to Table 2.10, the norms of gender inequality appear not to be associated with women's overall economic activities in East Asia, but to be closely related to the economic activity rates of mothers with young children (derived from Hwang's study (2003) of Korean married women's employment). In countries where gender inequality in the labour market is widely accepted, fewer than 40 per cent of mothers with children aged under 6 are employed. However, in countries where gender inequality in the labour market is widely rejected, about 50 per cent of mothers with young children are employed – ranging from 45 to 60 per cent. The gap between the two groups seems to be more pronounced in the employment of mothers with children aged less than 3. This implies that gender inequality in the labour market may affect mothers' labour market participation. As discussed earlier, in relation to Table 2.3, although discriminatory practices and systems appear to have reduced over time, the statistics indicate that married women see working conditions as unequal and this has remained unchanged over time. This implies that there is not much improvement in the gender and marital biased labour market system in Korea.

With more concern about sex discrimination, Keum (2002:194) argued that there is continued sex discrimination by firms in Korea despite the extension of gender equality legislation and government-led affirmative action. Similarly, Shin (2006:58) also shows that there is sex discrimination in the Korean labour market and that there is a considerable gap between the legislation and labour market practices. Keum (2002:110) pays attention to the discriminatory practices inside firms resulting from social/cultural gender norms and education. Keum (2002:136-140, 178) argues that although the research findings support the human capital approach, there is a considerable proportion which cannot be explained by individuals' expected productivity, so gender differences in human capital should be considered the result of sex discrimination because they could be caused by social prejudice towards gender roles and women's education. The author argues that the proportions can be explained by labour market discrimination (Keum, 2002:178-179[xi]): for instance, according to the research findings of explanatory variables for the gender wage difference in Korea, the considerable proportions left unexplained (29.5 per cent) suggests there *is* sex discrimination, while the gender difference in (expected) productivity accounts for 69.5 per cent.

In line with the human capital approach, he stresses the possibility that labour market discrimination may cause or reinforce the gender differences in pre-market human capital investment (in other words, parents may invest in their sons due to the market's discrimination against women), individual preferences (affected by parents and teachers) and gender comparative advantages (Keum, 2002:96, 153-154). More importantly, the author suggests that the removal of sex discrimination by market function, as mentioned above, is not likely to take place due to discrepancies in the supply and demand for female workers (Keum, 2002:194-196[xii]); while a highly educated labour force is increasing, the labour market lacks professional and highly productive jobs for the highly educated labour force. As a result, as firms prefer a male work force due to women's high turnover rates, married women are more likely either to give up employment voluntarily or take up low quality jobs such as temporary or daily jobs (Keum, 2002:194-196). Indeed, in Korea, although professional jobs for skilled administrators and management positions with high salaries and high productivity have increased, such occupations are more often taken by males than by females, and female workers are concentrated in low-paid service jobs (Keum, 2002:104-105[xiii]).

Table 2.11 Sex restrictive practices in recruitment by Korean firms in 2001 (percentage)

Jobs		No sex restriction	Employ only men	Employ only women
Management		48.9	48.9	2.1
Office work	Planning/promotion/recruitment/training	79.0	12.9	8.1
	Financing/accounting	57.4	24.6	18.0
	Clerical	65.3	16.3	18.4
Sales/service	Sales	65.9	25.2	8.9
	Customer service	72.0	20.0	8.0
Professional	Researching/design/technician	79.3	17.9	2.8
skilled	Sales engineer	54.6	45.5	0.0
Skilled	Field manager/supervisor	30.8	69.2	0.0
manual	Manufacturing production	61.6	31.3	7.1
Unskilled	Construction	40.0	50.0	10.0
manual	Driving/cleaning/porter	55.9	37.8	6.3
Total (the number of firms)		65.8 (538)	27.0 (221)	7.2 (59)

Source: Table 6-3, Keum (2002:160, my translation).

The analysis of the National Statistics data of 2001 suggests that 'gender division in occupation is over-represented in the Korean labour market and has got worse over recent years. Women's share of female jobs increased from 70.4% in 1993 to 77.0% in 2000, for instance, in service and sales jobs and bio-science and health, education, customer service jobs' (Keum, 2002:111-112). In particular, Keum (2002:161) gives evidence of sex discrimination inside firms such as in the recruitment, promotion, job assignation, position, wage level and on-the-job training in Korean firms. For example, 34.2 per cent of firms (in 2001) set sex restrictions in their recruitment: men are preferred particularly for the professional, managerial and supervisory jobs (Keum, 2002:159), as shown in Table 2.11.

Women in their late 30s upwards who want to re-enter the labour market after childbirth are more likely than men to stay economically inactive (Keum, 2002:157 [xiv]), presumably, due to labour market discrimination against their interrupted careers and age as well. Furthermore, there is a big sex difference in the top jobs, which suggests women have low status in firms and the likelihood that there is sex discrimination (Keum, 2002:164-165): for example, this is predominant in promotion experience. The paper observes that twice as many men receive promotion than women when controlling for explanatory factors such as wage level, seniority, employment type, job position etc., suggesting strongly that there *is* sex discrimination in the promotion practices of firms (Keum, 2002:170[xv]). Notably, women workers are more likely to be employed in a job with less chance of promotion as women workers are concentrated in small-sized firms, which offer little opportunity for advancement (Keum, 2002:175). The participation rates on job-training schemes between the two sexes also illustrate this, with the proportion for men being more than double that of women: 3.4% for men and 0.9% for women in 2001 (Keum, 2002:182).

In a similar vein, Shin and Cho (1998:718[xvi]) also stress that sex segregation in the labour market results from the gender division of job allocation through the recruiting process in response to employers' gender preferences and attitudes. Moreover, they argue that gender differences in the time of starting a job are associated with gender differences in job mobility (promotion) over the course of the working life, with strong indications of gender-discriminating organizational principles embedded in a gender-

divided job system and gendered value system in Korea – men tend to start work before the age of 30 while women tend to take up work later than men and may only enter the job market in their 30's; and while only 2.1 per cent of men begin work in their 30s, over 25 per cent of women start work after they reach 30 and these women tend to be concentrated in the lower occupational class (Shin and Cho, 1998:723[xvii]). On the other hand, a survey researching Korean people's consciousness of labour market discrimination, using a random sample of 2,000 interviewees aged over 20, found that, in general, people thought discrimination against disability and education was most serious, followed by discrimination against regional origins and irregular work in Korean society (Park et al., 2004:183-188). Park et al. (2004:57, 94-96) found that more women (51.2 per cent) were aware of sex discrimination than men (34.9 per cent), and that men, especially those with army service experience, and older and less educated people, were more likely to embrace traditional gender norms. As the literature suggests, in short, norms of gender inequality in the labour market and labour market discrimination may be closely connected with the Korean-specific labour market system and workplace culture which is illuminated in the following section.

2.2.2.5. Labour market system and workplace culture

Whitley summarized the characteristics of labour market systems in East Asian countries including Korea:

> East Asian societies share some common pre-industrial features and also their experience of rapid industrialization, and all 'post-Confucian' cultures share the common theme that individuals achieve their identity solely through family membership, which distinguishes these societies from Western societies. (1992:219)

In particular, Whitley (1992) described the gender difference in the labour market involvement during the industrialization process in East Asian countries that put women in subservient positions and developed policies for male skilled workers that were different from those for short-term female workers under 'the common expectations that they will leave employment upon marriage' (Whitley, 1992:218-238). The way the Korean labour market system has developed allows many industries to use low-paid, low-skilled female labour as a way of increasing flexibility during the rapid

industrialization process. The Korean labour market is characterized as a seniority-based wage and management system (Grubb et al., 2007:56; Kim and Kim, 2004:2). Grubb et al. (2007:56) found that a rigid seniority-based wage system remains dominant in Korean businesses. Kim and Kim (2004:2-5) also indicated that married women's low level of return to work was closely related to the seniority-based remuneration and personnel management system of Korean firms, despite the introduction of a performance-based system in recent years. Under the seniority-based wage and promotion system, wages increase with each successive year of continued employment regardless of employees' skills or performance, and promotions up to middle management positions are based on certain seniority measures, such as the level of education and the length of continuous service at work (Kim and Kim, 2004:2-5).

In fact, age is an important factor in the workings of gender and class dynamics in the internal labour market, which paints quite a different picture of Korea from that of Western societies. Korean women often suffer from an incongruity between age and authority in the workplace, and this is one of the reasons for women leaving jobs earlier than men or having a short job tenure (Janelli and Yim, 2002:119-121). Married women who often re-enter the labour market in their mid or late 30s after childbirth are more likely to confront age-related problems (Janelli and Yim, 2002:121): 'Female office workers usually are not promoted beyond the lowest rank, [and] a woman who stays employed will eventually find herself taking orders from a male superior who is her junior in age as well as in corporate experience'. This implies that the result may be the employment of fewer older women of working age in Korea compared with other OECD countries: in fact, in the case of older women aged between 55 and 59, the participation rate in Korea where the retirement age is 60 for both sexes (see Table 2.C in the Appendix) was nearly 52 per cent in 2009, below the OECD average of about 58 per cent in the same year (OECD, 2011c). Numbers in Korea have not increased much above the 51.3 per cent in 2000, while the OECD average has increased by 9 per cent from 49 per cent in 2000 (OECD, 2011c). It is highly likely that married older women are doubly disadvantaged by the cultural age and gender system.

In addition to the characteristics of the labour market system, the historical-specific developments of the Korean workplace culture are also important to note. After the

Korean War (1950-53), Korean society was led by a coalition consisting of an authoritarian military government and the conglomerates, the so-called 'Chaebol', which dominated the economy as well as the labour market hierarchy (Kendall, 2002:5-9). The Korean Chaebol copied many of the existing hierarchical and disciplinary practices, and these, as well as the organizational structure, were again widely copied by small and medium-sized firms (Kendall, 2002:6-7). The Confucian tradition of privileging men over women has been re-articulated over recent decades through the government's rhetoric of meritocracy and valuing military service (Janelli and Yim, 2002:115), and has been encouraged by the culture of common dining and after-hours activities in workplaces (Janelli and Yim, 2002:119-122); in particular, married women are not expected to join the long evening work-related socializing activities as often as men do. As Shin (2001:103-104[xviii]) argued, in the ideal Korean work model where men are assumed to be the main breadwinners and the ideal labour force, married women are most likely to be marginalized, because long working days and extra activities outside formal work-hours are often too heavy a burden for married women, and thus Korean cultural practices define married women within specific work areas or in the home. Jang and Bu's study of married women's work and childrearing (Jang and Bu, 2003:19-21) showed that for Korean married women workers, especially those in their 30s and highly educated, a masculine work culture and long work-hours are two of the major concerns, following the lack of a social system to support these women's work-life balance.

In research into the time-pressures within the family in Korea, You (2008:56-58) also found that a couple's long work-hours contribute to the different labour market behaviour of couples: in households with children, the male spouse tends to increase his work-hours and the female spouse tends to reduce hers. The culture of long work-hours is also reflected in the labour market system for regulating work hours and employment flexibility. In this regard, Won and Pascall (2004:271) pointed to the long working day culture by showing the unofficial work hours in Korea remain far higher – above 51 hours for men and 49 for women – than the official work hours, which are legally limited to 44 hours per week. There have been some attempts to improve practices by amending the legislation but with little success. According to Kim (2007:451[xix]), despite the reduction in official work-hours in Korea (to 40 hours per week) since 2003,

improved work-hour practices after the legislation became law spread very slowly in businesses and had little impact on individual workers' actual working hours. Kim and Kim (2004:27) found that working hours per year in Korea are about 600 to 900 hours longer than in other developed countries. In short, the long-work-hour culture is also associated with the form of married women's participation, as it is recognized as a barrier to working mothers and as creating extreme tensions between the demands of employers and the needs of children (Kim and Kim, 2004:17; Won and Pascall, 2004:282).

Along with the long-work-hour culture, absence of labour market flexibility may constrain women, particularly married women's choices to work or not, because flexible options such as part-time work offered by employers may affect their decision to settle for lower status work. Many Western developed economies, such as the UK – which has recently changed its social norms and undergone institutional change (Smith, 2003:180-182, 309-311), especially regarding maternal employment – have higher rates of mothers returning to work after completing their families, along with having more choices such as both full-time or part-time options. By contrast, particularly in Korea, women's choices seem to be very limited in that the incidence of part-time employment is relatively low and far from flexible. OECD statistical data (OECD, 2007), as shown in Table 2.7 earlier, indicates that part-time work is significantly and positively associated with women's participation, particularly mothers with young children, in the UK, for instance. Therefore, in a country where women's participation rate is relatively low, it is likely that mothers' choices are more constrained by less provision of work time flexibility.

Wakisaka and Bae (1997:259-262) argued that the reason why the proportion of part-timers is lower than in other Western countries and even Japan, is closely related to workers' status in Korea. However, rather than saying that workers prefer not to take part-time jobs due to 'their low-status', it would be better to consider the effects of the long-work-hour culture of the Korean labour market on the low incidence of part-time jobs. As a result, firms are likely to offer fewer reduced-hour jobs (that is, part-time) while longer hour flexible jobs such as temporary, dispatch, and casual jobs are more popular. This point of view I made is supported by Grubb et al. (2007:22) arguing that

temporary jobs taken by women are less related to the need for work-time flexibility in Korea, in that the incidence of part-time employment among temporary workers is significantly low: in 2005, only 14 per cent of temporary workers and 4.1 per cent of permanent workers worked part-time. However, temporary workers in Western developed countries seem to prefer part-time employment linked to flexible scheduling (Grubb et al., 2007:22): in 2000, over one-third in 10 OECD countries and over half the temporary workers in the Netherlands and Ireland worked part-time. In short, Korean women are disadvantaged by the labour market system, long-work-hour culture and the lack of work-time flexibility, suggesting that Korean married women's choices are more likely to be constrained by the gendered labour market regime.

2.2.2.6. Korean welfare regime and cultural gender assumptions in policy logic

The Korean welfare regime has been described as 'productivist welfare capitalism, due to the legacy of its early development era [which was] preoccupied with economic development' (Kim, 2008:110; see also Razavi, 2007:70).

> According to the productivist welfare capitalism thesis (PWC thesis) defined by Ian Holiday (2000:709 and 2005:149), the productivist welfare regime has two central features: that of the existence of a growth-oriented developmental state, and that of the subordination of social policy to economic and industrial policy, emphasizing that social policy does not have its own autonomous developmental logic and is fundamentally restrained by growth-oriented economic policy. (Kim, 2008:110)

It has also been referred to as 'Confucian social welfare', whereby the extended family provides an effective source of income support (OECD, 2000:3; Kim, 2008:109; Won and Pascall, 2004:271; Sung, 2003). However, there have been some welfare developments in the post-financial crisis of Korea. As joblessness and poverty rates increased after the 1997/98 financial crisis, the Korean government needed to respond with the expansion of the social safety net, and the Korean welfare regime appears to be moving towards a more universal social welfare system by expanding coverage and increasing benefit levels in the social insurance system and social assistance scheme (Kim, 2008:113). Nonetheless, it is still considered to be a residual welfare regime, where public relief programme reforms have been restrained – often due to the overriding concern of damaging work incentives – by retaining means-tested thresholds

and placing greater reliance on family responsibilities for welfare, and as one where there is an imbalance in the employment protection legislation of regular and non-regular workers in Korea, although the official coverage rate is claimed to be over 90 per cent for both groups (Ban, 2006:33-35).

In particular, discrepancies in corporate welfare coverage between regular, permanent employment and irregular employment are a salient issue in the Korean literature and policy discourses, because the weak function of corporate welfare as indirect compensation widens the pay gap between the two and increases the exclusion of irregular workers, in other words their 'marginalization' in the labour market (Ban, 2006:28[xx]). According to Grubb et al. (2007:26-27, 55), 'non-regular workers are openly denied the fringe benefits that a company provides its regular workforce' because of the number of employee benefits requiring a minimum working period or a working hour threshold. The situation is worse in small firms where most non-regular workers are concentrated, as the legislation is easily avoided (Grubb et al., 2007:26-27). Table 2.12 clearly shows that the proportion of non-regular workers benefiting from social insurance in 2005 is roughly half that of regular workers and while establishments compliant with the employment insurance system were 53 per cent, the compliance rate for small-sized workplaces (15.2 per cent) is significantly lower than the larger-sized (62.5 per cent). This implies a weaker position for non-regular workers, particularly Korean women, in the social welfare system.

Table 2.12 Compliance with social insurance schemes in 2005 (percentage)

	Employment Insurance	Public Pension	National Health Insurance	Employment Insurance System: By the establishment size	
Regular workers	63.8	75.7	75.9	Workplaces with fewer than five workers	15.2
Non-regular workers	34.5	36.6	37.7	Workplaces with five and more workers	62.5

Source: adapted from Table 2.10, in Grubb et al. (2007:27).

To solve this issue, the Korean government introduced anti-discrimination legislation in 2006, to combat discrimination relating to wages and working conditions between non-regular and regular workers (Grubb et al., 2007:54). However, Grubb et al. (2007:55)

suggest it is difficult to put into practice without reforms to the complex, seniority-based wage structure prevalent in Korean firms, where a number of different allowances are paid in addition to a basic salary, depending largely on an employee's seniority, with the result that many are excluded; for instance, 'employers may well argue that some specific allowances are paid as remuneration for long-term service, rather than for the job currently performed' (Grubb et al., 2007:55). In short, despite the recent reforms and the expansion of the Korean welfare system after the financial crisis, many see the changes as limited and thus the Korean welfare system is considered to have adopted a Confucian model or growth-friendly welfare system with the characteristics of voluntary – not compulsory – welfare for some employees (Kim, 2008:109-111). Particularly at the quality level and in practice, welfare schemes remain inadequate, as suggested by the considerable discrepancy between numerical and substantial coverage (Grubb et al., 2007:41).

On the one hand, it is argued that 'instrumentalist' family values – particularly in the sense that women's sacrifice of personal ambition is justified by the family's welfare – have been gradually fading, along with the social trend toward individualism and women's movements (Kim and Kim, 2004:9). On the other hand, many still see the legacies of the 'Confucian social welfare' (Won and Pascall, 2004:271) as reliance on the family remaining disproportionately high in the Korean social welfare system (OECD, 2000:2-3). The low public family welfare expenditure could be attributed to the characteristics of the Korean welfare system: public spending remains very low in terms of international comparison despite social expenditure per GDP increasing from 3.9 per cent in 1997 to 5.7 per cent in 2004 (Kim, 2008:114). Compared with Western countries, reliance on the family in the Korean regime seems distinctly greater:

> Korean state expenditure on childcare is low, with parents footing 72 per cent of the bill, compared with 59 per cent in the USA, 47 per cent in Japan and 17 per cent in Sweden. The proportion of children in formal childcare is only 7 per cent of those aged under 3, compared with 40 per cent in Canada, Sweden, Denmark and Norway, and 26 per cent of those aged between 3 and the mandatory school age, compared with 90 per cent and more in most OECD countries. (Won and Pascall, 2004:271)

Won and Pascall (2004:270-272, 278-279) argue that the Korean welfare system has to be understood as a product of Confucian ideals or traditional family culture, and

problems are closely related to the Korean government's gendered assumptions and the consequently heavy weight placed on the family and private sector. This strongly suggests that inadequate welfare provision is due to the cultural expectations of the family unit within the social policy's logic, and these earlier gendered cultural norms negatively impact on Korean mothers' employment. Kim and Kim (2004:21) explain the low maternal employment level in Korea as being due to the state childcare policy, that is, the childcare policy emphasizes private facilities rather than public facilities:

> Private nurseries have been encouraged through deregulation and cheap government long-term loans since 1997, with an almost three fold rise between 1995 and 2000, while the numbers of publicly funded and operated centres has remained consistently low. (Won and Pascall, 2004:276)

This has contributed to increasing the burden of childcare costs for parents, and as a result, limiting the economic activities of married women: for instance, most married women have no choice but to accept not to work. Kim and Kim (2004) criticize the government's childcare policy as one reason why the participation rate of married women with children under 6 years old has decreased steadily. Indeed, infant care, whether public or private, is severely limited: only 10 per cent of the demand for infant care is satisfied (Won and Pascall, 2004:279).

Kim (2005:48) also stresses the need for childcare for children of primary school age (up to age 8 in year 3), who need after-school care for the morning-only school sessions. Gornick et al. (1997:49) suggest that mothers' taking up paid work is heavily constrained by children's school hours. In the case of Korea, the school day for children at primary school (up to year 3) is very short, just morning sessions and lunch but with insufficient state after-school provision. State childcare and after-school clubs at school are offered, but mainly for lower-income families (Kim, 2005:48). This suggests that most Korean mothers suffer from a lack of good quality childcare for infants as well as primary school age children. In short, considering the low level of public spending on the family and small amount of state childcare provision, it seems clear that the policy logic of the Korean welfare regime is still rooted in cultural gender assumptions.

2.2.2.7. Public support for maternal employment and recent changes in the legislation

As for the impact and importance of welfare policies supporting maternal employment, this has been well documented in the Western literature. With a full recognition of the importance of public support for maternal employment, the recent policy changes in Korea are illustrated following the arguments of the Western studies. Gregg et al. (2003:15-16) demonstrated that policies concerning maternity rights, taxation and childcare can induce a change in mothers' attitudes toward returning to work after childbirth. Earlier, Lewis (1992:162) looked at the way in which twentieth century welfare states treated women as wives, mothers and paid workers and suggested that the idea of the male-breadwinner family model still more or less cuts across most welfare regimes. Similarly, Rubery and Grimshaw (2003:1, 43-50), in an attempt to incorporate gender-ordered welfare typologies and employment systems, suggested that the variants of welfare regimes characterized by the nature of the tax system, support for parents, the working patterns of women, female contributions to family income, and gender segregation were associated with maternal employment, along with their policy assumptions about the type of *legitimate* family model (the male-breadwinning family model).

In addition, Gornick et al. (1997:60) suggested from empirical observations of the cross-national variants of policies in 14 Western developed countries between 1984 to 1987 that women's employment is evidently associated with gender regimes by pointing out that schooling for children does not match mothers' work system or work hours:

> In countries where government benefits were altogether limited, without job protection and access to leave, many women workers faced stiff penalties for work absences due to childbirth, and without publicly subsidized childcare many had few viable alternatives to the full-time maternal care of children. (Gornick et al., 1997:65)

Gornick et al. (1997:65) further argued that in the countries referred to above, an M-shaped employment pattern was more likely as women workers would exit the labour force temporarily and/or repeatedly in response to inadequate social support. Moreover, they emphasized that such countries need to develop policy packages combined with

job protection and wage replacement at childbirth for women with dependent children below school-age: for example, separate support by child age cohorts such as leave/provision for the care of infants below the age of three, publicly subsidized childcare and early enrolment in state schools for the care of children above the age of three (Gornick et al., 1997:64). EU policy trends regarding maternal employment and childcare, and family-related leave and provision (especially parental leave), have been reinforced in recent years with increasing concern in European countries to encourage men to participate in childcare activities (Riedmann et al., 2006:35-36).

Likewise, more recently, the Korean government enhanced support for maternal employment by increasing the revenue for childcare provision and by introducing legislation for work-life balance schemes (integrated into the legislation for gender equal employment opportunities) in 2008 (Grubb et al., 2007:57; KDI, 2008:71). In order to support the work-life balance, the government has built a work-life balance scheme incorporating the existing childcare support scheme (KDI, 2008:71-75); the work-life balance scheme includes maternity leave, paternity leave, leave of absence (childcare leave), workplace day care, and flexible working arrangements; maternity leave and benefits have become a legal obligation and right, extended by increasing the government's burden of costs and coverage. The government's contribution (through the Employment Insurance System) means maternity leave has increased from 4 weeks to 8 weeks, particularly for SMEs, the cost of the duration of the leave being paid through employment insurance (Grubb et al., 2007:55-57).

Also, the period of maternity leave has increased from 8 to 12 weeks and from infants aged less than 1 year to those aged less than 3, but remains at a low level of benefit and is restricted to those with infants aged less than 3 (KDI, 2008:75). However, as in the case of unemployment, women must have been insured for at least 180 days in order to qualify for this benefit scheme (Won and Pascall, 2004:278-279). Despite these recent improvements, the duration of paid maternity leave is still only half the average of other OECD countries where, in 1999, the average length of paid maternity, parental or childcare leave was 26 weeks (Grubb et al., 2007:57-58). Paternity leave, which was at the employers' discretion, became obligatory in the updated legislation of 2008, and remains superficial and hardly generous in that paternity leave consists of 3 days'

unpaid leave (KDI, 2008:78). It is doubtful whether male spouses will really take it. As for childcare leave, Korean women can take paid childcare leave for 52 weeks and unpaid childcare leave for up to one further year (KDI, 2008:76). In the case of paid childcare leave, they receive 200,000 won a month (approximately £100) from Employment Insurance to compensate for their loss of income (Won and Pascall, 2004:278-279).

Flexible working-time arrangements have been introduced as a work-life balance support scheme to supplement 'leave of absence' (unpaid childcare leave) (KDI, 2008:76). Like childcare leave, the flexible working time arrangement is limited to one year and for mothers with children aged less than 3 (KDI, 2008:79-80). However, the right is not a statutory obligation but at the employer's discretion, and mothers with pre-school age children or primary school children at the lower level who have half a day's schooling, are excluded (KDI, 2008:79-80). Thus, the most needy are highly likely to be excluded from benefiting from the legislation. On the other hand, childcare services in Korea are provided predominantly by the private sector: in 2003, private childcare facilities accounted for 56.5 per cent, home-based private childcare facilities for 37 per cent, public childcare facilities for 5.5 per cent and company-based childcare facilities were 1.0 per cent (Kim, 2005:48).

Moreover, compared with the relatively higher percentage (on average 3 per cent) in EU countries of company-based childcare provision plus 2 per cent of other forms of provision (Riedmann et al., 2006:39-40), company-based childcare provision in Korea is extremely low; workplace childcare facilities are only for 1.2 per cent of all infants using childcare provision (Kim, 2004:2). Although workplaces with more than 300 female employees are obliged to have childcare facilities, only 48.4 per cent, in fact, offer workplace childcare and only 6 per cent of establishments offer a childcare assistance allowance (Kim, 2004:3-4). Support for workplace childcare has been reinforced by extending the financial support the government gives to the workplace; however, it is limited to businesses with 500 and more employees or with over 300 female employers (KDI, 2008:77-78). Furthermore, support for the childcare service is based on a means-tested scheme which excludes applicants who have wages of more than the average wage for all urban workers and who have children aged less than 5

(KDI, 2008:72-73). To sum up, the recent legislation (as of 2008) is presented in Table 2.13.

Table 2.13 The support for childcare and work-life balance scheme (2008)

		Length	Compensation	Eligibility
Maternity leave		12 weeks (90 days)	paid 100% of average of wages	working women with a child under 1 year: unemployed women need to have been insured for at least 180 days.
Paternity leave		3 days	unpaid	working men with a child under 1 year: newly introduced from 2008
Work-life balance scheme	Childcare leave	52 weeks up to one year	paid (about £100) unpaid	for working women with children aged less than 3 and for working women with insurance contributions for over 6 months
	Flexible working	up to one year	non-compulsory for employers	for working women with children aged less than 3
Childcare facilities	Workplace day care	1% (2003)		compulsory for workplaces with more than 300 female employees
	Public day care	5.5% (2003)		

Source: derived from Grubb et al. (2007:57-58), Won and Pascall (2004:278-279), Kim (2005:48), and KDI (2008:71-78).

Although the Korean government has improved maternity rights and childcare leave schemes by legislation such as the Gender Equality, Infant Care Act and Employment Insurance Act over recent years, violation of the legislation is common due to insufficient legal penalties and there is also a gender difference in the take-up of childcare leave (Won and Pascall, 2004:278-9). Most women (more than 60 per cent) are employed in small firms with fewer than 100 employees where violation of the legislation is common, and childcare leave is taken primarily by mothers (Won and Pascall, 2004:278-9):

> 36 per cent of firms violate it by not paying entitlements, or by partial payment. But the penalties are insufficient to ensure effective implementation. Many firms are reluctant to pay for temporary cover for childcare leave, and women who take leave may feel a burden to their colleagues. Only 0.7 per cent of working mothers took childcare leave on average, due to financial difficulties and lack of cover.

It is important to note here that Won and Pascall (2004:279) believe that both employers and mothers should take some of the responsibility because although the legislation is not effectively implemented in practice by employers, mothers are caught in the Confucian family ideology trap as well. Riedmann et al. (2006:35-36) also indicate that apart from the regulatory schemes, the take-up of parental leave by both mothers and fathers seems to conform to the prevailing gender roles within society, whereas considerably more mothers than fathers take it up in all EU countries. In short, the prevailing gender roles within a society as well as an inadequate and inefficient welfare policy for maternal employment are likely to influence married women's decision toward paid labour as well as both mothers' and fathers' take up of childcare leave/provision.

2.2.3. Identifying class factors in the Korean context: class differentiated mothering and child education

One assumption in this thesis is that Korea is a class society and women reflect their class as part of their identity and behaviour, while the 'class' or 'classless' debates are not a big concern in the Korean literature as the Western ones. To provide the context for the situation in Korea, an overview of the development of the class structure in Korea and the characteristics of married women's class identity are elaborated first of all and followed by a discussion of the class differentiated experience of mothering and child education in the Korean context.

2.2.3.1. Historical and cultural-specific development of class structures and the characteristics of married women's class identity

As the historical and cultural factors will affect how class is structured and people's class identities, it is useful to review the Korean-specific historical and cultural developments. According to Abelmann (1997:401-403), there are three main historical and cultural factors affecting the structuring of class in modern Korean society. The first is Korea's rapid structural change: the growth of the industrial sector and the dramatic rural exodus of the 1960s and 1970s including the radical rates of urbanization and industrialization and the profound restructuring of the labour market. The second factor

is the Korean War 1950-1953, which recast class configurations due to the war's real dislocation to downward mobility and the redistribution of wealth brought about by the relatively successful land-reforms (Abelmann, 1997:401-403; Kendall, 2002:1-6; Koo, 2001:46-48). Third, Korea's meritocratic institutions, particularly education (refer to Whitley, 1999/2000:156-164), have affected the occupational class structure. Similarly, Kendall (2002:1-9) points out that class and gender identities were re-shaped through the re-formulation of classes after the Korean War and the legacies of 'engender' in the pre-industrial society, the culture of privileging men over women, have been either preserved or reinforced by the coalition between the authoritarian military and the conglomerates, "Chaebol", which has contributed to the expansion of the white-collar class and dominated the labour market hierarchy. Janelli and Yim (2002:115) argue that women are set lower in the occupational hierarchy by the privileging of men, particularly in terms of men's higher education and military service in Korea.

Shin and Cho (1998:728-732[xxi]) also argue that the probability of female skilled workers becoming urban working class is higher than for men in Korea, suggesting that there is gendered structure sustaining the gender inequality embedded in the class relations. Due to the late entry of women into the labour market and their having fewer possibilities for class mobility (almost half those of men), women are much less likely to be in the upper occupational classes (such as professional, managerial and entrepreneurial) than men (Shin and Cho, 1998:715[xxii]). Furthermore, female workers' concentration in the low occupational class appears to have contributed to family income inequality in Korea as well (Kim and Shin, 2008:76-103). In the sense that the 'family as such is a unit incorporating individuals' earnings and consumption, and the investment in children's education which affects class mobility is also determined by the size of the material resources of the family' (Kim and Shin, 2008:81[xxiii]), wives' lack of income contributes to the family's economic inequality, which, it could be argued, is also related to the reproduction of generational inequality including regarding jobs and children's education.

It has been argued that the industrialization and urbanization in Korea over the past decades has developed in such a way as to widen the difference between the social classes (Byun, 2001: 20, 43-44[xxiv]): middle and upper class families have secure

employment and relatively higher incomes by contrast with lower class families in insecure and low-paid jobs. These historical and cultural-specific developments of class structuring will affect how Koreans, particularly married people, perceive their socio-economic status. While class divisions in the post-industrialization society appear to have been perpetuated along with economic growth and wider income gaps, class identity is becoming clearer than ever before, more than in the industrialization era. It is often noted that people's actions differ according to their class identity – different political affiliations, voting and consumption patterns. As this thesis is concerned with the relationship between class identity and labour market behaviour rather than political action and consumption, it is important to review how Koreans perceive class identity with reference to their socio-economic status before the analysis.

While Lee and Shin (2009:271[xxv]) define class as status identification referring to 'how society members perceive their socioeconomic status subjectively and which hierarchical level they belong to', they find that there is a difference in status identification between the sexes (Lee and Shin, 2009:273). Lee and Shin (2009:285-286) found that Korean married women tend to borrow or share their spouse's social status, even when they are themselves employed. In particular, Korean married men and women tend to report their class downward when their or their spouse's employment status is irregular, reflecting the fact that irregular jobs are considered low-status jobs in the Korean labour market. By contrast, a female spouse's status does not affect the male spouse's status identification. They also examined what factors are significantly associated with changes in status consciousness by comparing 1999 (the recession of the Korean economy after the financial crisis) and 2007 (during relatively good economic conditions), with the assumption that socio-economic conditions affect couples' status identification (Lee and Shin, 2009:280).

Their study shows that increases in household income and consumption are significantly associated with upward-status identification (Lee and Shin, 2009:284-285). Most interestingly, they found that married women tend to upwardly report their status when their employment status changes from irregular employment to non-employment (Lee and Shin, 2009:279-280). Married men do the same when their spouse's employment status changes from irregular to non-employment. This means that a female spouse's

non-employment status does not affect her status identification negatively and it also implies that a female spouse's non-employment (perhaps, staying at home as a kind of lifestyle) is considered as a 'legitimate culture' of the middle-class in Korea.

2.2.3.2. Class differentiated experience of mothering in Korea: class difference in access to quality childcare

Together with a widening family income gap, there is the suggestion of class inequality amongst Korean mothers; 'mothers in higher classes are more likely to be able to afford and have access to quality childcare than mothers in the lower class' (Won and Pascall, 2004:274-275). There seems to be a distinct class division in the affordability of childcare between the classes in Korea. Class divisions in access to childcare in Korea are closely related to the growing polarization of women by discriminatory labour market experiences and the welfare benefit system (that is, different benefits according to employment status). Women in the upper occupational classes are better educated and more likely to be promoted by overcoming gender discrimination, whereas gender discrimination is much more strongly experienced by women at the bottom of the occupational classes, as McRae (2003:334) suggests in the research of British women. Won and Pascall (2004:279) point out that 'Poorer mothers are experiencing more broken career patterns and poorer-quality work, often part-time work characterized by low wages, low skill, high turnover, poor working conditions, and limited legal protection'. Class differences in access to childcare imply that the Korean welfare regime does not function well in breaking down discriminatory class barriers.

In fact, the Korean childcare policy, which is characterized by low public support for childcare facilities and childcare costs, greater dependence on private childcare facilities with loose state regulation (as discussed in the Korean welfare regime above), produces problems of access for working mothers, especially those with infants and those with low earnings. In this regard, Kim (2004:7[xxvi]) also argues in the study of married women's employment using a large-scale panel survey, KLIPS (2001) that there is inequality of access to good quality childcare and childhood education, especially according to parents' earnings and childcare and education present a considerable financial burden for poorer families due to the low level of Korean government support.

Furthermore, she points out that public childcare facilities (which are supposed to prioritise free places for low-income families) are mostly given to middle class families (around 76 per cent) rather than lower-class families (around 21 per cent). Considering that many childcare centres and child education institutes have separate extra-curriculum activities charging extra fees, the household burden of costs can be very high. While it is still unclear how this affects Korean mothers' labour market behaviour, the literature nonetheless suggests that the household burden of childcare costs is likely to affect Korean mothers' decisions about whether to take paid work in their evaluation of the alternatives open to them, probably either full-time work or staying at home.

2.2.3.3. Class differentiated attitude toward children's education in Korea

Koreans' concern about child education is culturally unique, due to the historical background. Korean parents who experienced absolute poverty after the Korean War had a strong desire to escape from poverty and afterwards aim at upward mobility through their children's education (Sung, 2009:317[xxvii]). The desire for social mobility through education attainment is still quite strong in Korean society (Hong and Kim, 2006:14-15), because many came to believe that the possibilities for upward social mobility are through the attainment of higher levels of education, perhaps due to the re-formulation of the classes after the Korean War (Abelmann, 1997:401-407). Again, the desire for upward mobility leads to an interest in private education, sometimes causing excessive spending on it, especially amongst upper class parents. In Korea, private education is perceived as a strategy for upper/middle class reproduction and the means for upward social mobility (Kim and Yeom, 2009:31[xxviii]). Regarding the excessive zeal or ardour of Korean parents for private education, some scholars attempt to explain this from the perspective of state education failure and Confucian-cultural specific traditions with an emphasis on education (Kim and Yeom, 2009:31).

However, Kim and Yeom (2009:31) argue that it can be explained by the fear of downward mobility. In this regard, Hatcher (1998:11) has also argued in the study of British family: 'the main concern of families is for their children to obtain sufficient education to preserve their present class position, or at least, to guard against any decisive downward mobility'. For this reason, families are strongly committed to

investing in their children's education, even at the sacrifice of themselves, and most Koreans think upward mobility through education is most secure and fair. In addition, Kim and Yeom (2009:30) explain Korean's class-differentiated efforts and expenditure on private education for their children by Goldthorpe's rational action theory; that is, it is the result of class-based rational action rather than class-specific cultural practices: 'different socioeconomic locations give rise to different evaluations of costs, benefits and probabilities of success' (Hatcher, 1998:9). Kim and Yeom (2009:31) particularly indicate that private education in Korea is closely related to economic inequality in society and the resulting class-differentiated spending on it. For instance, 'As the costs of education bear more heavily on working-class families, their choices are more restricted in private education expenditure and reduced sharply, especially in an economic recession or especially if kids' records of achievement are poor' (Hatcher, 1998:10).

On the other hand, Byun (2001:41-44) argues that family strategies differ according to class. Middle and upper class families mostly sustain their family status by sharing resources with relatives and move their social status upwards through education (Byun, 2001:41-44): their main concerns are child education and children-centralism, which make their marriages secure. However, in the lower/working class families, the gender role divisions seem very complicated (Byun, 2001:41-44): the family strategies are to maintain their living standards by maximizing their income through all the family members' labour force participation (as many as possible) and by minimizing their consumption; thus, the main characteristics found in these families are women's high economic activity rates and high economic interdependency between couples, much sharing of the dual burden of reconciling paid work and family work, and fewer kinship resources (such as estate inheritance).

Similarly, in a study of Korean homemakers' daily activities and use of time (Jang and Kim, 2000:64-72), there are significant differences by class and education level in the time spent on childrearing (including children's education); upper class women spent on average 4.24 hours a day on childrearing while lower class women spent an average of 2.48 hours a day. Furthermore, Jang and Kim (2000:68) indicated that child education is a big burden for Korean homemakers, especially for middle class women, because the

majority of women in the middle class are homemakers. Interestingly, nearly 60 per cent of homemakers had work experience before marriage or childbirth, and many of them left their jobs after marriage (32.5 per cent) and childbirth/childrearing (about 40 per cent), while more than half did not want to return to work, mainly due to childcare and child education (Jang and Kim, 2000:63). This has strong implications for their gender role attitude, which may be seen as either traditional or obsessed with cloning class practices. Jang and Kim (2000:68) point out that mothers, rather than fathers, are considered responsible for parenting. Shin (2001:97[xxix]) defines Korean motherhood as primarily caring for children, with a strong emphasis on the mother's role as 'a manager of children's education', and indicates that childbirth and childrearing are not seen in Korea as distinct, as is the tendency in many Western developed societies, which separate giving birth as women's role from childrearing (including childcare and education), the latter of which is seen as a social role (Shin, 2001:102, 106-107, 112).

Just as Duncan (2005) and Vincent et al. (2008) argue that there are class differences in understanding mothering in the UK, so in the Korean literature, normative motherhood and concerns about child education are presumed to be different according to class (Choi, 2008; Byun, 2001). In particular, Byun (2001:43, 61-62[xxx]) supports this presumption by arguing that the gender role division is clearer in middle and upper class families than in lower class families, with both spouses' high labour force participation, indicating that the role of childrearing and socialization has been concentrated on mothers and this gendered role in the family has been passed on from generation to generation. More recently, in a study of children's education and married women's labour force participation in Korea, Choi (2008:97-100[xxxi]) also found that commitment to private education and children's school activities differs between well-educated and lower-educated women, suggesting a potential impact on married women's employment. While Korean parents spend a considerable amount of money and time on children's education in general, the expense of private tuition increases as women's education level and household earnings increase (Choi, 2008:97-100). In addition, higher educated and higher earning families tend to participate in their children's school events and parents activities, compared with the low participation rate of lower-educated and lower earning families (Choi, 2008:97-100). In short, the previous research argues that normative motherhood and class practices are somehow related to Korean women's

labour force participation.

2.3 Conclusion

In summing up the theoretical debates in the Western literature: firstly, the debates continue regarding the gender division of labour between the neoclassical economists and feminist sociologists. The former explains it mainly from the human capital model and the self-selection model based on rational choice theory, while the latter is mainly based on the occupational segregation theory and the gender-role socialization theory under the assumption of socio-culturally patterned rationalities. The debates which attempt to explain the phenomenon of the labour market are closely linked to individualist and social structuralist/class debates to explain people's behaviour and attitude towards market work and gender roles. According to neoclassical economics, people assumed to act rationally are self-selecting out of roles or jobs in order to optimize their lifetime earnings and/or their human capital, or couples allocate time and resources over their life course through the partnership negotiation. As a result, the gender division of labour takes place. However, many feminist sociologists argue that social structures define gender roles, and that socially and culturally patterned gender norms and roles are manifest in the labour market and people's decisions are made by socially-negotiated rationalities. Furthermore, class theorists argue that there is a class differentiated experience of mothering due to different class constraints and opportunities.

What do the Western debates lend to Korean research? From the structuralist critiques on the neoclassical arguments, Korean-specific culturally and socially constructed gender norms and motherhood appears to explain mothers' labour market behaviour in Korea, a culturally-bound society. Also, the gender regime or class-distinct behaviour might provide an explanation for Korean mothers' labour market participation. In particular, the class debates in the Western literature have strong implications for Korea where family wage gaps have increased in recent years (Won and Pascall, 2004:274-275) as in Western societies, and childcare/education is still seen as mothers'

responsibility under the cultural heritage of the meritocratic society. Indeed, the Korean literature (Choi, 2008:33; Won and Pascall 2004:275) has carefully documented evidence that more women tend not to work due to their childcare and childrearing responsibilities and that the number of women in this group has increased over recent years. Moreover, it is suggested that social prejudice and work commitment are becoming insignificant as women's education levels approach those of men's. So, what else can explain Korean mothers' labour force participation?

On the one hand, the Korean gender regime may more plausibly relate to Korean mothers' labour force participation. The traditional gender assumptions of the Korean government policy logic see women as the main carers in the family, so public childcare provision has not expanded much, and legislation such as for maternity and parental rights has not changed dramatically. Furthermore, unequal working conditions and the big discrepancy between legislation and practice (the low levels of parents actually taking up welfare benefits) may influence mothers' labour market behaviour. Indeed, it was found that particularly in the small-sized firms where married women are concentrated, rules and welfare violation is common. On the other hand, it appears that normative motherhood and the strong emphasis on children's education both bring about class-distinct behaviour in Korea. The literature identifies that children's education is a big burden to Korean women, especially middle class women (Jang and Kim, 2000:68), and also that children's private education has a much greater effect on Korean women in the higher earning families because these women with fewer financial burdens are likely to stay at home to bring up their children and fit in with their schooling (Choi, 2008:99). This strongly implies that their gender role attitude is either traditional or concerned with cloning class practices in the 'meritocratic society' (Whitley, 1999:156-164).

To conclude, from the structuralist perspectives, this thesis identifies both individual and cultural/structural factors in the Korean context in order to provide a *contextual* understanding of married women's labour market behavior, such as Korean culturally-bound gender norms and normative motherhood, Korean-specific workplace culture or the gender regime within workplaces, and different class experiences. Therefore, taking into account these Korean-specific factors, the thesis attempts to supplement the

literature on married women's work strategies from a slightly different approach by focusing on mothers and also questioning to what extent these factors explain Korean mothers' labour force participation. These questions will be explored in the analytical chapters which follow and answered in the concluding chapter.

Chapter 3

Methodology

3.1 Quantitative or qualitative approach?

Much of the feminist debate concerning the use of quantitative versus qualitative methods, especially in the 1980s, has arisen from criticisms of traditional quantitative approaches (Jayaratne and Stewart, 1991:85; Stanley, 1997:205). The concern was that the quantitative research method distorts women's experience; for instance, by simplifying individuals' experience into categories predefined or biased by the researcher (Jayaratne and Stewart, 1991:85). However, it seems there is now a consensus that both approaches have their merits and use; Jayaratne and Stewart (1991:100, 102) argue that there can be no single or prescribed method consistent with feminist values, either qualitative, quantitative or both methods, and the problems associated with each approach should be addressed. Kelly et al. (1992:152-153) also argue that feminist research must not necessarily be qualitative rather than quantitative, by pointing out that 'by only using small-scale studies we can be misled into believing that we have baseline knowledge which has not actually been collected.' In addition, Stanley (1997:199-200) warns that 'binary ways of thinking about methodology are unhelpful...' when *gender* is perceived as a matter of reading or seeing (particular interpretive frameworks), not as the product of a particular method.

Besides these negotiating viewpoints, there has also been a concern about the heavy reliance on qualitative methods with the relatively small samples in feminist research (Cannon et al., 1991:107). Cannon et al. (1991:107) argue that 'due to the relatively small and homogeneous samples of in-depth qualitative studies, it is limited to see the diversity of human experience.' They (1991:114-116) found from their research that many qualitative studies may have biased results caused by a bias in the sample selection, unless it is the case of the deliberate exclusion of a particular group or region. Thus, they emphasize that qualitative research sampling strategy needs improving, for example by random selection of subjects and including race and class in qualitative research on women. Based on the past decades' debate on methodology, it seems that the multi-method approach (using both methods) is considered the most desirable, as many scholars argue, especially in the case of women's employment research (Crompton, 1998; Hakim, 2000): Crompton (1998:90-93) has indicated that large-scale

survey data analysis (often based on the unit of households) neglect non-working women, so female employment research coupled with case studies is most desirable. Also, Hakim (2000:34-35; 2003:340) has argued that in-depth interviews and case studies are appropriate for the studies of women's own employment choices, while a variable-based analysis is appropriate for the studies of general (public) approval for women's employment.

Nonetheless, it appears common that research needs to be restricted to either one or the other according to what the study research aims are. As the thesis is concerned with aggregate differences (at the macro-level) rather than giving a voice to the research (at the micro-level), the quantitative approach is more appropriate here. In this regard, Kelly et al. (1992:152) support this view by pointing out that survey research concentrating on closed questions and attitude scales are the most amenable to the hypothesis testing approach. Furthermore, the thesis has a special interest in group behaviour such as social class groups, which necessarily requires a large-scale survey research with random selection.

3.2 Conceptal discourses and the research question and hypotheses

3.2.1. Defining employmed and non-employed/non-working

As the thesis is about women's economic activity, first of all I need to define what 'employed' means here. Put simply, employment is defined as 'work for remuneration' (Lain, 2008: 71-103). It appears that the term *paid market work* is also found in much feminist research to distinguish it from *unpaid housework*. International labour statistics often refer to either *participation* or *economic activity*. Generally, in terms of international standards, the concept of *economically active* includes employed and unemployed and also is differentiated from the concept of *economically inactive*. According to the International Labour Organization (ILO) definition:

> A person is economically active if they are either employed or unemployed in a particular period – usually the survey reference week. Economically active people supply, or want to supply, their labour to produce goods and services within the production boundary, defined by the UN System of National Accounts. Therefore, economic activity is on the supply side of the labour market framework. Some countries refer to 'participation' to mean precisely the same as economic activity. (Office for National Statistics (ONS) website, 2010)

By the ILO definition (ONS, 2010), *employed* denotes people aged 16 or over who have done at least one hour of work in the reference survey week or are temporarily away from a job, and includes four types of employment status: employees, the self-employed, unpaid family workers or participants in government-supported training schemes. The term *unemployed* refers to people aged 16 and over who are out of work, want a job, have actively sought work in the last four weeks and are available to start work in the next two weeks. On the other hand, *economically inactive* is defined as referring to 'those people who are not in employment, but do not fulfill all the criteria to be classified as unemployed' (ONS website, 2010). Witz (1997:241) has stressed it is increasingly necessary to distinguish carefully between employed, unemployed and economically inactive because 'women move between employment, unemployment and non-employment more than men do, and it has been suggested that there are new distinctly gendered mobility regimes emerging'. However, as this thesis attempts to explore mothers' labour market behaviour, that is, whether or not being employed (economically active), the unemployed (referring to those who want a job and are seeking one actively) must be included in the analysis of the employment for this study. Therefore, for statistical analysis, the thesis uses the contrasting concepts of *employed* and *non-employed/non-working*, which here refer to *economically active* and *economically inactive* respectively, in accordance with the ILO definitions above.

3.2.2. Conceptual discourses of work attitudes and defining work commitment

There are some useful definitions of career aspirations, work (job) values, work orientations, and work attitudes, although they appear not agreed-upon in the literature (Lincoln and Kallberg, 1990:22-29). Domenico and Jones (2006:3) define career aspirations as 'an individual's orientation toward a desired career goal under ideal conditions (unfettered by reality),' according to Gutek and Larwood (1987) viewing a

career as ‘a series of related jobs within an organization or different jobs within various companies.’ From the definition of career aspirations, it is differentiated with orientation toward work. The term orientation to work is referred to as ‘the central organizing principle in a person’s attitudes toward work’ (Blackburn and Mann, 1979:16). According to Walters (2005:197-8), orientation to work is told through assessing career aspirations and a set of attitudes: e.g. traditional or non-traditional attitudes to paid work, financial need to engage in paid work, attitudes towards the presence of young children, etc. Also, from the assumption in work value research that ‘a limited number of broad orientations towards work underlie people's ideas of what is important to them when making occupational choices’ (Ros, Schwartz and Surkiss, 1999:55), it is suggested that the orientations to work are shaped by people’s work values.

Ros, Schwartz and Surkiss (1999:54-55) define work values as ‘specific expressions of general values in the work setting’, which are identified by three distinctive types of work value, that is, intrinsic (self-actualisation) values, extrinsic (security or material) values, social (relational) values. Johnson (2001:316) views job values as ‘values pertaining specifically to the domain of work and beliefs about the desirability of various work features,’ and argues that job values are often defined by referencing types of rewards derived from working, such as extrinsic, intrinsic, altruistic and social rewards:

> For example, extrinsic rewards include instrumental and status attainment-related rewards such as income, advancement opportunities, and prestige; intrinsic rewards reflect the inherent interest of the work, learning potential, and the opportunity to be creative; altruistic rewards are derived from doing things for others, such as directly helping others or making a contribution to society; and social rewards are interpersonal, and include positive relations with coworkers, the opportunity to make friends, and working with people. (Johnson, 2001:317)

Much of the recent job values research has been concerned with whether men and women seek different rewards from working, e.g. extrinsic or intrinsic rewards and there are evidences of narrowed gender difference in job values (Johnson, 2001:316, 337-41). Palmer (1962:2-6) points out that work attitude questions have been developed to measure the degree of satisfaction in and identification with a company or type of work:

> Job satisfaction is measured by the degree of enthusiasm, liking, or preference expressed in response to a direct question; identification is referred to the psychological commitment a worker appears to have to an employing establishment or type of work.

Lincoln and Kallberg (1990:24) define that job satisfaction is a generalized affective work orientation toward one's present job and employer.' From the presumed link between positive work attitudes and performance behaviour, job satisfaction is regarded as an indicator of the performance, productivity, absenteeism and turnover, etc (Dex, 1988:11; Lincoln and Kallberg, 1990:25; Hakim, 1991:102). Notably, as to commitment, Lincoln and Kallberg (1990:22-3) argue that commitment to work per se is differentiated with commitment to an employing organization defined as 'identification with an organization and acceptance of its goals and values as one's own,' whilst seeing commitment to work as orientations to an occupational specialty or a career:

> People who are heavily involved in their work roles, who place great importance on the work component of their lives may well behave in ways that coincide with the interests of the firm and its management. But there is a difference between the worker who is highly motivated because of interest in and commitment to the work itself and one whose efforts are expended primarily out of devotion to the organization. The work-committed employee may be oriented to an occupational specialty and less inclined to accept alternative tasks for the good of the organization or for the sake of maintaining an employment relationship with it. (Lincoln and Kallberg, 1990:23)

Unlike conventional research on workers' attitudes at workplace, Bielby and Bielby (1984:235) argue that sex-role opinions and work behaviour need to be separated from the conceptualisation of work commitment, and define work commitment as 'the centrality of the work roles as a source of intrinsic satisfaction relative to other adult roles': they also indicate that 'it may be expressed alternatively as plans, expectations, preferences, or aspirations for particular combinations of work and family roles.' Attitude studies such as Dex (1988), Hakim (1991), Fagan (2001) and Walters (2005) (using quantitative data for the former two and using qualitative data for the latter two), usually basis on non-financial work commitment, which is measured by survey questions of whether respondents would carry on paid work in the absence of any financial need to do so.

In these attitude studies, work commitment is referred to as career commitment rather than organizational commitment. Likewise, instead of job satisfaction conventionally defined by job quality (e.g. extrinsic and intrinsic rewards), Walters (2005:210-2) highlights 'satisfactions with *being employed* rather than *satisfactions with a job, the actual work* (job quality per se),' noting that one may be in paid employment due to convenience factors such as shorter journeys to work and shorter work hours. In Walters' (2005) research, measures of work commitment and job satisfaction are extensive, including non-financial employment commitment, desire for promotion and a career and future plans, in order to tap work commitment, and also assessing levels of satisfaction with a broad range of areas of jobs held previously as well as the current job (Walters, 2005:201).

In this respect, within this thesis it is inappropriate to address the question of women's work attitude as the data allows only the surveys of employees' organizational commitment and job commitment at a present job (see Table 3.2, below). Thus, rather than dealing with work orientation or commitment to a career, this thesis is limited to examine workers' 'work commitment' as human capital, operationalized from measuring organizational commitment and satisfaction (called job commitment in the thesis dataset).

3.2.3. Concepts of gender and discrimination

Discrimination experiences are to be addressed in the analysis of gender regime provided in Chapter 5, and thus the concepts of gender and discrimination need to be illuminated here. First of all, the term "sex" is generally used to refer to biological differences between men and women and "gender" to refer to culturally constructed differences in many feminist theories (Rhode, 1989). However, particularly with discrimination, sex discrimination or gender discrimination appears to be used interchangeably in the literature. According to Levin and Levin (1982:51), 'discrimination can be defined as differential or unequal treatment of the members of some group or category on the basis of their group membership rather than on the basis of their individual qualities,' which inevitably leads to either preferential treatment of people belonging to one's own group ("positive prejudice") or discrimination against

people who belong to out-groups ("negative treatment"). Neoclassical theorists define discrimination as an exogenously given "taste", founded upon the notion of personal prejudice or aversion (Chiplin and Sloane, 1982:5). Meanwhile, Chiplin and Sloane (1982:5) suggest defining it in a broad sense:

> The meanings attached to discrimination involve some notion of prejudice, inequity or the use of irrelevant criteria in the differential treatment of individuals or groups in the society…Prejudice represents a desire or intention to discriminate which may be unfulfilled, discrimination could occur by mistake in the absence of prejudice.

One example of discrimination is the automatic exclusion of a woman from a job because she is presumed to be incompetent by virtue of being female (Levin and Levin, 1982:51). That is gender discrimination which occurs when a person is or people are treated unfairly because of gender (Crosby, et al., 2007:3). In the viewpoints of neoclassical theoriests, sex discrimination is seen as an aversion to contact (at least in the workplace) with women (Bergman, 2005:214-5). In the context of the labour market, sociologists often point out that sex discrimination is occurred by either the supply side or the demand side of labour market processes (Ridgeway and England. 2007:189-90): 'many supply-side processes are shaped by biases embedded in cultural beliefs about gender'; gender bias is often referred to as a preference or prejudice toward one gender over the other (Wisegeek, 2012). For instance, the widely held cultural belief is that males are better at math than females; although shaped by cultural assumptions, supply-side processes are not classified as discrimination, but demand-side patterns of behaviour (e.g. employers' behaviour or employment policies) is often involved with discrimination in the labour market (Ridgeway and England, 2007:189-90).

In short, gender discrimination is often referred to as demand-side patterns of behaviour concerned with gender, whilst gender bias is referred to as supply-side (personal) prejudice about gender. Furthermore, gender discrimination is conceptually differentiated from gender disadvantages. Doucet (1995:273-4) refers to gender disadvantages as the difference gender makes, that is, what follows from gender difference. For instance, the gendered division of household labour is seen as gender disadvantages because they further inhibit gender equality outside the home; it is many women who have to make adjustments in their working time to balance both paid and

domestic work (Doucet, 1995:274), and hence many women are disadvantaged because of their gender. Important to note, discrimination in this thesis is not restricted to refer to gender discrimination only, as the thesis data of discrimination includes discrimination against a wide range of areas like sex, age, education, disability, region, etc. However, discrimination against sex is to be focused in the analysis.

3.2.4. Research questions and hypotheses

I now turn to what should be taken into account in women's labour force participation before setting up the thesis hypotheses. As Witz (1997:240) has indicated, women's labour force participation is more likely to be affected by race, class, age and marital status as well as by dependent children, and thus it seems necessary to take these factors into account as basic analytical units in women's employment research. As Duncan and Irwin's research (2004) found, there are class differences in mothers' moral exercise of childcare responsibilities, so class can affect, perhaps decisively, married women's labour market behaviour. Besides, Hakim (2000:38) has stressed that we sometimes need to read respondents' employment decisions 'in the context of the family's lifestyle goals, social aspirations, and attitudes to the sexual division of labour'. Thus, it is also necessary and useful to interpret labour market behaviour according to individual attitudes such as gender-role attitudes or commitment to a career. In fact, Korean quantitative research concerning women's labour force participation tends to be repeatedly and heavily concentrated on human capital and child factors. Individual attitude factors like gender-role attitude or attitude to paid work, and social structural factors such as overtime work, welfare benefits and social class have been often neglected. It is very similar to what labour economists do: they only use job data such as work-hours, earnings, and positions in the workplace. Even where the data are available, attitude-related data are often ignored (Hakim, 2000:38).

The problem is related to a specific Korean research context. It is partly due to the lack of survey data on, for example, gender-role attitudes and, on the other hand, to preferring objective measurements to subjective measurements such as class research. Specifically, there is no national survey of gender-role attitudes in Korea. Furthermore, class research has been undertaken mostly on the basis of occupational class as a matter

of objective measurement, and, as a result, this excludes economically inactive (non-working) women. Recently, there has been some research into class measurement or definition discourses as the middle class expands; for instance, in the studies of Choi (2008) and KDI (2008). However, there are no studies identifying an association between labour market behaviour and class identity. Thus, with the aim of filling a gap in Korean quantitative research, the thesis attempts to include these factors that are lacking in other research, as far as the dataset allows. The research question, 'What accounts for the lower level of maternal employment in South Korea?', could be best explained by incorporating both structural and individual factors into the analysis. Either one on their own is biased. The structural factors focused on in my thesis are socio-cultural specific practices such as class-differentiated mothering and expenditure on children's education, discrimination in the labour market or society, the long working hour culture, and welfare provisions. Discrimination and the long working hour culture could be important indicators of a workplace culture disadvantaging women, while greater dependence on family childcare and private education could be considered as an indicator of the policy logic of the gendered welfare regime. In particular, expenditure on private education is quite cultural-specific, and hence could show quite a different picture from that in Western countries.

On the other hand, the individual factors focused on here are human capital factors such as work commitment, education and work experience, along with 'situational factors' such as dependent children and spouse factors, i.e. spouse job characteristics (pay, type of job or employment status); Crompton and Harris (1999a:118) classify 'employment, education level, and relative income' as material factors and 'age, sex, and family composition' as situational factors. In addition to dependent children, spouse's job characteristics (as situational factors) have a potential impact on maternal employment; for instance, female spouses are highly likely to be non-paid family workers when male spouses are self-employed (Grubb et al., 2007), and this can be seen in a culturally-specific, situational context. When it comes to education and job experience, there is much concern in the thesis, as most neo-classical labour research has considered these as indicators of human capital. On the other hand, as an individual factor, the gender-role attitude seems crucial in married women's labour force participation research, as suggested in Western studies using a gender-role attitude index provided by an

international social attitude survey programme (ISSP). Acknowledging that the analysis is limited, due to unavailability of the survey data of gender-role attitudes for Korea, alternatively, individual factors can be addressed from considering both human capital and situational factors. Despite of the limitation, these factors can be useful to examine the argument of human capital theorists who stress such individual factors as being decisive in gender differentials in the labour market.

Overall, the thesis assumes that it is mainly the social structural factors such as class-differentiated mothering, cultural-specific workplace practices and a gendered welfare regime that are significantly associated with Korean mothers' labour force participation, rather than the individual and situational factors like work commitment, education attainment and spouse's job. Based on this assumption, the thesis hypotheses to be tested are the following:

- First, individual factors such as work commitment, education, and work experience are significantly associated with mothers' labour market participation.
- Second, situational factors like dependent children and spouse's job characteristics are significantly associated with mothers' labour market participation.
- Third, Korean cultural-specific workplace practices are significantly associated with mothers' labour market participation.
- Fourth, the gendered welfare regime is significantly associated with mothers' labour market participation.
- Fifth, class-differentiated mothering is significantly associated with mothers' labour market participation.

The main concerns of all the hypotheses are to explore whether the explanatory factors are statistically significant, and to be specific, whether the factors to be tested are statistically significant, and further, to identify whether they are positively or negatively associated with maternal employment. More specifically, the first hypothesis examines whether individual factors such as human capital factors, work commitment, education and job experience are statistically significant and whether they are positively or

negatively associated with mothers' labour market participation. In particular, it will examine whether work commitment and work experience are different by gender, and whether education attainment explains mothers' employment decisions. The second hypothesis will consider how mothers' labour market participation is restricted by the situational factors, dependent children and spouse's job characteristics; that is, whether a spouse's job characteristics (permanent, irregular work or self-employed) is associated with wives' labour market participation positively or negatively and whether their labour market behaviour is associated with their children's age cohorts, as reflected in the M-shaped labour force participation of married women. The third hypothesis examines whether discrimination experiences and working hours differ significantly by gender, and also whether discrimination and the long work-hour culture are statistically significant and whether they are positively or negatively associated with maternal employment. The fourth hypothesis examines whether there is any difference between the genders in receiving corporate welfare (employee benefits), including parental benefits, and any difference by employment status. Also, it explores whether parental welfare and childcare expenses are statistically significant and how they affect maternal employment, positively or negatively. Lastly, the fifth hypothesis examines whether there is any class-differentiated labour market behaviour with children's ages taken into account, whether there is any difference between classes in social mobility beliefs and expenditure on child education, and whether these class factors are significantly and positively or negatively associated with maternal employment. However, examining these hypotheses is quite restricted by the availability of datasets, surveys and statistical techniques, and the statistical results will be restricted also by the study sample. Thus, first, the dataset and the study sample require explanation, and subsequently, the surveys (questions) selected and statistical technique issues are discussed as well.

3.3 The dataset and study sample

With regard to the question of which dataset is available for the thesis, a nationwide large-scale panel survey, KLIPS (Korea Labour and Income Panel Study) is selected, as it is relatively more accommodating for the research questions than other datasets which

have mostly quite limited surveys; for example, KLoWF (Korean Longitudianal Survey of Women and Family) collected from 2007 in KWDI (Korean Women's Development Institute) has wide ranges of information about women's job, household, family life, childcare, health, values towards family, etc (Yi et al., 2011); however, KLoWF does not contain class data and have very limited data of male spouse.

More specifically, KLIPS, produced by the Korea Labor Institute, tracks annually 5,000 households and their 13,000 members aged 15 or over in urban areas by random sampling. The survey has been conducted from 1998 up to now (from the 1st to 11th wave by August 2011), along with a retention rate of around 77 per cent across the waves. The data contains extensive individual and household information about jobs and income including demographic data, economic activity, education, job training, occupations, childcare provision, corporate benefits and tax, expenditure on private childcare and education for children of school age, debt, etc. However, although it provides a wide range of longitudinal labour data, which is not covered by other cross-sectional datasets, the data has limitations for in-depth studies in some areas such as welfare, labour market discrimination, work orientation, and childcare for infants (KLIPS website, 2010c).

The survey structure consists largely of two parts: a household survey and an individual survey including a new respondents' survey, as shown in Table 3.1 below. There are additional surveys with special topics in a specific year (though not in all waves) such as old age or health. For the thesis, additional surveys are not used, thus they will be excluded from the discussion here. The individual survey is sub-divided into a survey of the employed and another of the unemployed, together with individual job histories. As summarized in the table above, the contents of the survey are somewhat different according to the type of survey. First of all, the household survey contains data about households, including household members, income, assets, children's education, and housing. Next, the individual survey collects all the data concerning personal demographics, job details, work history and job-seeking activities. In addition, parents' education and occupation, social insurance, life satisfaction, health status and financial difficulties are surveyed.

Table 3.1 The structure of the survey, KLIPS from the 1st to 11h waves (1998 to 2008)

The structure (type) of the survey			Contents of the survey (the common surveys)
Household survey			- demographic data of household members including household generation (i.e. by marriage) or extinction of household membership (i.e. by death) / Relationship with household head, economic dependency between parents and offspring. - housing, children' education and childcare - household income, consumption, assets and debts - financial situation of the household, including hardship details
Individual survey	Work history survey	Preliminary survey	- a job surveyed in the previous year's survey - information of a new job taken after the previous survey
		For wage earners	- any changes in the job held in the previous year - job type and company size, contract, work-hour, wage, social insurance coverage through a job, labour union, the reasons for leaving a job, industry and occupation, job-seeking route
		For employer / self-employed	- any changes in the job held in the previous year - the number of employees and family workers - work-hours, annual sales and income, gross capital - reasons for leaving the job (business), job-seeking route - industry and occupation - difficulties in starting an enterprise
	For the employed		- economic activity, employment contract, fringe benefits or welfare, work-hours, job satisfaction, current job training and job skill level - job-seeking activity, difficulties of job-seeking, desired job - certificate and job training, regular training or education related to a job - social insurance entitlement - marital status, education, age, parents' education and occupation - life satisfaction and financial difficulty
	For the non-employed		- economic activity - job seeking activity, difficulties of job seeking, desired job - certificate and job training, social insurance entitlement - marital status, education, age, parents education and occupation - life satisfaction and financial difficulty
	For new respondents		the same surveys as the individual survey

Source: p32, KLIPS surveys, KLIPS user guide, 2010d.

However, in the individual survey, some questions are not collected annually, such as those concerning social mobility, social/economic status and discrimination experience. Social mobility questions were collected in the 8th and 9th waves, and socio-economic

status questions in the 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 8th and 9th waves (that is, in 1999, 2000, 2002, 2005, and 2006). Discrimination experience was surveyed only in the 7th wave. Regarding childcare and education in the household survey, the data are slightly differently collected. They were collected first in the 1st wave, but restricted to children aged up to 9 in the households. These questions were not collected in the 2nd wave. The children's age was extended up to primary school age (0 to 13 year-old children) in the 3rd wave. Until the 3rd wave household survey, the questions of childcare and child education were collected separately (with one question about childcare and the other question about children's education). From the 4th wave, the questions of both childcare and children's education became unified into one question, and the children's age was extended up to high school age (18 years old). In addition, it is also noted that the 3rd wave contains promotion-related questions and questions about the financial situation after the financial crisis of 1997. Most of these questions are included in the analysis of this thesis.

On the other hand, four waves (3rd, 5th, 8th and 9th), which contain questions of both class identity and children, are the ones mainly used for the analysis. This is why the thesis is concerned with the impact of class identity and dependent children on mothers' attitude towards labour market participation, as key factors. The question of class identity in the 2nd wave is used only in the discussion of the measurement issue. Thus, the analysis is mainly based on the four waves (3rd, 5th, 8th and 9th), but with supplementary use of the 7th and 4th waves for the analysis of discrimination experiences and the financial burden for childminders and child education costs. Before elaborating the surveys selected for the analysis, the study sample must be defined. Sampling for the analysis is an important issue because analytical results may be different due to the size of the sample or sampling method. Hakim (1996:129) has criticized the common sample selection bias arising from a non-random sampling of previous social science research on women's employment. In response to the criticism, McRae (2003:318) selected a British panel dataset with random sampling but restricted it to women with childbirth experience. Thus, McRae's study could not include women who do not have children.

The study sample of the thesis is from randomly-selected panel data and the main

(focus) analysis sample is restricted to married women who have children under the age of 19, along with a supplemented subsample of married men with children under the age of 19 for the gender comparisons. However, various further comparisons, such as comparisons between childless married people and people with grown-up children are not possible, due to the lack of data; that is, the survey, in relation to parenting, asks only: 'Do you have children under 19?' In addition, as the sample leans towards an older-age population, the study sample needs to be restricted by age in order to reflect correctly the behaviour of women who are potentially economically active. Past work experience is also taken into account because women's behaviour is likely to be different depending on whether they have experienced a successful entry into the labour market or not. Therefore, parents without past work experience and aged over 65 are excluded. In short, the study sample of the thesis is mothers and fathers aged under 65 and with work experience before 1998, when the first KLIPS survey started.

3.4 Surveys selected and how the questions are asked in the questionnaires

Based on the hypotheses to be examined, surveys are selected from the KLIPS questionnaires. First of all, questions of age, gender, marital status and job history data are required for the study sample, together with questions concerning the economic activity status. Next, for the main analysis explaining mothers' labour market behaviour, relevant questions are selected from the two survey questionnaires for the individual and household surveys; questions of class identity, social mobility, work experience, education, discrimination experience, working hours, corporate welfare benefits, organizational commitment, and spouses' jobs are selected from the individual survey, while the number of children by age, childcare and education costs and the burden, and household income, are selected from the household survey. Among these surveys, the questions of class identity are an issue to be noted because in the 3rd and 5th waves they are measured by two questions asking about a subjective sense of economic status and of social status. On the other hand, in the 8th and 9th waves, the two survey questions are unified into one question, asking about a subjective sense of 'socio-economic' status.

Thus, in the 3rd and 5th wave data analysis, either one should be selected to avoid causing statistical problems of unifying the two sets of survey data. It seems women's labour market behaviour is more easily explained by their social status, based on the results of the correlation analysis concerned (see Table 3.3). Finally, the question of the subjective sense of social status is selected from the 3rd and 5th waves. The details are described more specifically in the following section where statistical issues are discussed. Similarly, questions related to the cost of children and children's ages are also collected differently in different waves. In the 3rd and 4th wave data, questions of child costs and the burden are collected through two separate questions about childcare cost (including childminders) and (private) education costs for children up to 11 years old, while the 5th wave data and the subsequent waves collect data for childcare/education costs in a single question extending to children aged up to 18 years old. For this reason, the children-related survey questions selected are different between the 3rd and 4th wave and the other three waves. The detailed survey questions about the costs of children are provided in Table 3.2 below.

Table 3.2 The questions asked in the KLIPS questionnaires

Surveys selected	Questions and responses
Employment status	Do you have a job at present? 1. yes 2. no
Job seeking activity	Have you searched for a job in the last week? 1. yes 2. no If you had an offer, could you work? 1. yes 2. no
Sex	What is your sex? 1. Male 2. Female
Age	What is your age?
Education	What is your level of education? 1. before school age 2. no schooling 3. elementary school 4. lower secondary 5. upper secondary 6. 2 years of college, vocational, technical, associate degree 7. university (4 years or more) 8. post-graduate (Masters) 9. post-graduate (Doctorate)
Marital status	What is your marital status? 1. never married 2. married (living with a spouse) 3. divorced 4. separated 5. widowed
Children ages	Please give all household members' birth dates and gender, and relationship with the household head.
Work status	What is your current work status (for the main job)? 1.permanent work 2. temporary work 3. daily work 4. employer/self employed 5. non-paid family worker

Continued from Table 3.2. …

Work history	Please tell us your work history since you were 15 years old. What are the start and end dates, the type of work, position in the workplace?
Work hours	How many hours do you work weekly on average?
Discrimination experience -the 7th wave	Have you experienced any discrimination in the following situations? (Write all instances where you have been discriminated against) a- when seeking a new job, b- when receiving your wage or pay, c- when seeking education/job training opportunities, d- when being promoted, e- when leaving the job, f- when seeking further study or higher education, g- at home, h -in society in general. 1.sex 2. education 3. age 4. disability 5. region 6. other (specify).
Corporate welfare	- Are you participating in the national pension scheme through your job? a- special occupational pension, b- the national health insurance through work, c- the employment insurance, d- industrial accident compensation insurance 1. yes 2. no 3. don't know - What welfare benefits does your company provide? And which benefits are you entitled to? a- statutory severance payment, b- cumulative severance payment, c- paid leave, d- menstrual leave, e- paid maternity leave, f- sick leave, g- parental leave, h- shutdown benefits, i- partial payment of meal expenses, j- partial payment of school tuition fees, k- support for housing (e.g. mortgage loans), l- corporate welfare fund, m- partial payment of family event expenses (e.g., for congratulations and condolences), n- assistance for recreation/vacation, o- partial payment for recreation (vacation), p- partial payment of childcare expenses, q- savings grant, r- employee stock ownership scheme, s- partial payment for private pension, t- partial payment for life insurance, u- partial payment for individual health/accident insurance 1. yes 2. no 3. don't know
Work commitment (organizational commitment & job commitment)	What do you think of your job? How far do you agree with the points below? organizational commitment: a- this is a good company to work for, b- I'm glad to have joined this company, c- I would recommend joining this company to my friends who are seeking work, d- I take pride in being part of this company, e- I hope to continue working in this company if other things remain the same. job commitment: a- I'm satisfied with the job I'm currently doing, b- I am doing this job enthusiastically, c- I enjoy this job, d- I feel this job is personally rewarding, e- I want to continue this job if other things remain the same 1. strongly disagree 2. disagree 3. neutral 4. agree 5. strongly agree
Social mobility	Do you think it is possible for everyone to upgrade his/her socioeconomic status in our society? 1. strongly agree 2. agree 3. disagree 4. strongly disagree 5. don't know
Class identity	What do you think your socioeconomic status is considering your earnings, occupation, education and assets, etc? 1. upper- a. higher b. lower 2. middle- a. higher b. lower 3. low- a. higher b. lower

Continued from Table 3.2.…

Childminder and education (3rd and 4th waves) : childcare/education From the 5th wave and after)	- How many children under 19 years old do you have? - Are you using any childminder for children aged under 11? - If yes, how many and what type of childminder do you use? How much do you pay per child per month? - Are you using private education such as nursery, private institute, private tutoring or pre-school programme? - If yes, how many do you take part in per child per month? What type of education (per child)? How much do you pay per child per month? - How big a financial burden for childminder costs do you have? 1. very burdensome 2. somewhat burdensome 3. fair 4. not too burdensome 5. no burden at all 6. no use - And how big a financial burden do you have in order to pay for the private education of your children? 1. very burdensome 2. somewhat burdensome 3. fair 4. not too burdensome 5. not burdensome at all 6. no use
Annual household income: Earnings, financial income, real estate income, social insurance benefits, and transfer income	- Have your family member(s) had earnings in the previous year? 1. yes 2. no - What are the average total earnings (unit: 10,000 Korean Won)? - Have you had income from savings and investments in the previous year? 1. yes 2. no - What amount on average? 1-interest from savings in bank and other financial institutions, 2-interest from non-institutional financial products such as personal loans, 3-net gains from the sales of stocks, 4-dividends, 5-other financial income - Have you had any income from real estate in the previous year? 1. yes 2. no - What amount on average? 1- net monthly rent, 2- net gains from sales of real estate, 3- other income from renting land or lots, 4- a premium or key money, 5- other real estate income - Were there any recipient(s) of social insurance benefits in the household in the previous year? 1. yes 2. no - If so, how many recipients of social insurance are there? - What is the total amount of benefit from social insurance? - Have you had any transfers of income in the previous year? 1. yes 2. no - What amount/how much on average? 1- basic livelihood security benefits, 2- other support from the government, 3- support from social groups, 4- support from parents (including spouse's) who live elsewhere, 5- support from children who live elsewhere, 6- support from other relatives, 7- other transferable income

Source: the 10th release of KLIPS questionnaires, KLI, 2010a (from an English version).

Concerning discrimination experiences, the survey data are collected through multiple-choice responses. Thus, the questions are complex. The questions are mainly asked about six areas of discrimination (sex, age, education, disability, region, and other), when seeking a new job, when receiving a salary or a payment, when seeking education/job training opportunities, when being promoted, when leaving a job, when seeking further study or higher education, when at home, and in society in general. The last point to note is that the questions of corporate welfare benefits are also different in different waves. The surveys concerned have been updated from the 4th wave onwards by adding more welfare benefit items to those of the 3rd wave. So the questions of welfare benefit in the 3rd wave are different from the following waves (years). This means that the 3rd wave data for welfare benefit can be dropped in the comparative analysis by cross-tabulation. Lastly, the analysis of social mobility beliefs by cross-tabulation must be restricted to the data of 2005 and 2006 as the data are collected from the 8th wave and after. In short, the questions posed in the survey questionnaires are provided in Table 3.2.

3.5 Statistical techniques selected and statistical issues

3.5.1. Statistical techniques selected

Which statistical model is appropriate could be an issue in quantitative research, as it varies in accordance with what the study's aims are. Appropriate statistical models for this thesis were selected after reviewing models used in the relevant research. In Korean research, together with the cross-sectional analysis design using KLIPS data, Kim (2004) and Choi (2006) both used a logit regression model to explore the determinants of married women's employment. With a longitudinal research design, Kim (1999) and Jang and Kim (2001) used a hazard model (duration model) with retrospective job history data, but using different datasets (KWDI and KLIPS respectively). In Western research, on the other hand, using cross-sectional survey data, Crompton and Harris (1999a) carried out a logistic regression with the GRA (gender-role-attitude) index from

the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP)'s Family and Gender Relations module in order to assess its impact on the domestic division. McRae (2003) opted for a longitudinal regression model to examine women's work histories and women's attitude to gender-role following the birth of their first child, using a Maternity Rights Survey. Similarly, Kan (2005) used a series of recursive regression models (a cross-lagged model) using BHPS (British Household Panel Survey) to investigate the relationship between gender-role preference and labour market behaviour.

Most of the research mentioned used multivariate methods. However, there is some criticism of multivariate methods. Hakim (2000:34-35) criticizes multivariate methods fashionable with current social science researchers by pointing out that 'the multivariate methods produce fragmented results rather than integrated results and also misleading results with the use of multiple controls.' She argues that the impact of each variable is inseparable from that of all other variables, as human behaviour is connected to choices in the real world. For this reason, Hakim (2000:41) concludes that 'studies based on multivariate analysis are not sufficient, in isolation, to draw conclusions about causal processes,' and suggests cross-tabulation analysis as an alternative. Furthermore, Hakim (2000:38) criticizes labour sociologists' statistical methods of analysis, by suggesting that it is sometimes useful to analyze survey questionnaire responses about employment decisions 'as narrative documents case by case' (Hakim 2000). Based on these critiques, combining multivariate methods and cross-tabulation along with descriptive analysis and frequency analysis is an alternative method.

Taking into account the criticism of multivariate methods, the central argument of the thesis rests on a multivariate method, logistic and linear regression, but supplemented by cross-tabulation or other simple statistical models like the chi-square test and ANOVA analysis. A recursive test of the logistic-regression model with 4 waves of KLIPS (collected in 2000, 2002, 2005 and 2006) will contribute to finding social structural factors which have been neglected but explain Korean mothers' labour market behaviour more coherently than the previous research, while the ANOVA analysis seems more appropriate for interpreting individual work commitment without multiple controls and linear regression analysis of employment interruption in order to supplement the weakness of the logistic regression technique. In fact, the logistic-

regression model with economic activity status (employed or not) as a dependent variable is not appropriate for some specific variables such as work commitment, firm welfare, working hours and discrimination experience. There arises non-random missing data in the surveys of work commitment, working hours and firm welfare because the surveys only questioned the employed. For the analysis of these variables, a linear regression model is used with a different dependent variable: the number of employment failures during a specific period (before 1998 and between 1998 and 2006).

Furthermore, as for the surveys of discrimination experiences, there may be a measurement issue of 'oversimplification' arising from the process of scaling the surveys collected by multiple-responses, by counting the number of affirmative responses ('yes'). Instead of simplifying responses by recoding them into a scale variable, which is necessary for the multivariate models, multiple response analysis by frequency analysis or cross-tabulation could be more informative, as it shows a holistic picture of discrimination experiences across various arenas of society without downscaling the responses. Besides, as the research design is not a longitudinal analysis, there are limitations with the cross-sectional analysis. A longitudinal analysis is considered quite powerful, particularly in the case of employment research, because economic activity status is likely to change over time for some reasons, perhaps due to changes in conditions over time. However, the discrete analyses chosen in the thesis do not grasp the effect of covariates over time (the 7 year time scale) as a longitudinal analysis does. Nonetheless, the cross-sectional analysis seems to be able to capture any changes in a specific year among the selected years to study, with the analysis models tested recursively over the 4 waves of panel data. This will partly make up for the weakness of the cross-sectional analysis model.

3.5.2. Statistical issues

3.5.2.1. Addressing multicollinearity and measurement issues by the correlation analysis

When it comes to using the multivariate model, firstly, multicollinearity problems between the predictor variables selected here need to be addressed by conducting a

bivariate (pairwise) correlation analysis (Field, 2005:175). Basically, correlation analysis is generally appropriate for continuous (scale) variables, while categorical or ordinal variables are not acceptable. However, categorical variables are allowed if they are recoded into dummy variables (Field, 2005:179-181). Among the variables selected in the thesis, the economic activity status is a categorical variable, thus it is recoded into a dummy variable. A class identity variable is also categorical but ordered in terms of upper, middle and low. This variable could be considered an ordinal variable. According to Long (2009:275), 'Although Pearson correlations are not appropriate for ordinal variables, they work fine as a rough indicator of whether variables are positively or negatively associated.' Thus, the class variable (ordinal) is also put in the Pearson correlation model, together with other continuous variables.

From the results of the correlation analysis (see models 1 & 2 of Table 3.A and 3.B in the Appendix), it seems there is no multicollinearity problem, in that there is no variable with too high a coefficient (more than .8 or .9) which means it is more likely that multicollinearity exists (Field, 2005:175). It should also be noted that statistics for firm welfare and working hours are not computed, due to the perfect correlation with economic activity status; if employed, there is highly likely to be a response in the surveys for welfare benefit and working hours, but if not employed, there will be no data in the surveys. It appears that corporate welfare is not an appropriate variable to be measured in the logistic-regression model. Besides, the correlation analysis shows clearly that the results differ according to different samples; that is, one cohort is married women with work experience, the other is married women with job experience and aged under 65. Notably, the results of the class variable are in contrast, suggesting that married women of potential work age (under retirement age) in the latter sample are more sensitive to class factors. This gives a rationale for restricting the study sample to ages eligible for potential work.

On the other hand, different measurements across the waves can be addressed by correlation analysis as well. In the KLIPS 3rd and 5th waves, class identity is measured by two surveys about social and economic status whereas it is measured by one (united) survey of socio-economic status in other waves. However, it seems difficult to unite the two subjective surveys because class identity surveys are categorical. Thus, averaging

or summing up the statistics for class identity surveys does not make any sense. Unless the two can be unified, either one can be selected for the analysis.

Table 3.3 The correlation analysis between economic status and social status and economic activity status for married women with job experience (A) and those with job experience and aged under 65 (B)

	(A) Employed or not	Subjective social status	Subjective econ.status	**(B)** Employed or not	Subjective social status	Subjective econ.status
Employed or not	1[a] (3289)			1 (2881)		
Subjective social status	.006 (3289)	1 (3289)		.045* (2881)	1 (2881)	
Subjective economic status	-.011 (3289)	.896** (3289)	1 (3289)	.025 (2881)	.884** (2881)	1 (2881)

Source: the 5th wave (2002), KLIPS. Note: a."1" is printed if variables are perfectly correlated (Field, 2005:174). b. Class category values are 1 for upper class, 2 for middle class, 3 for lower class. Statistics are Spearman's rho correlation coefficient (N). Legend * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

In accordance with Spearman's rho coefficient model, which is a correlation analysis method for ordered categorical variables (Field, 2005:179-81), there is very high correlation between the two surveys of social status and economic status, nearly '0.9', which is very close to 1 (statistics for perfect correction) as shown in Table 3.3. This suggests that either can be selected because they are very similar. However, which survey of the two should be selected for the thesis? According to Table 3.3, in the sample of married women with job experience and aged under 65 (B), the social status variable is significantly associated with married women's economic activity status (employed or not). Based on this, class identity in terms of the subjective social status is selected for the 3rd and 5th wave, leaving out the survey of subjective economic status.

3.5.2.2. Categorization issues arising from the measurements of class in KLIPS

The class data of this thesis is individual subjective class identification. Class identity in my dataset appears to be measured in parallel with either Weberian tradition by distinguishing between economic status and social status (in the 2nd, 3rd and 5th waves) or the approach of Bourdieu (who is reluctant to separate them) by incorporating both (in the 8th and 9th waves), that is, 'socio-economic' status groups that share the collective

identities in terms of both non-economic elements such as education or occupational status, and economic elements like earnings and household income. Generally, class analyses are divided into a realist approach and a nominalist approach; the former identifies class (class structure) from occupational or employment aggregates. In contrast, the latter defines class as a nominal concept of people's perception of their life conditions and thus, grouping into certain numbers of categories is just for analytical convenience (Sorensen, 2005:134).

The class analysis of this thesis is a nominalist approach, based on people's subjective perception of class identity, which gives more room for manipulating class data; that is, grouping it into a certain number of categories for analytical purposes. Indeed, in the class research, the question *How many classes?* is an issue regardless of either the realist or nominalist approach. A popular categorisation is, for instance, upper class, upper middle class, middle class, lower middle class, lower class, underclass (Wright, 2005:183). However, Wright (2005:19) suggests that 'the number of class locations within an analysis of class structure depends on how fine-grained an account is needed for the purposes at hand'. Looking at the surveys of class in the 5 years' dataset KLIPS, classes were categorized differently into four, five or six under the main categories of *upper, middle and low*. Considering this, a broad 'three-class model' seems more appropriate, so that it is useful to contrast between three major groups, especially between the middle class and working class.

3.5.2.3. Addressing the under-representation issue of the upper class in the study sample

There is an under-representation issue in relation to the data for the upper class. Only a very small number of people report belonging to the upper class, compared with the numbers for the middle class and lower class, and thus this may distort the statistical results. Through the process of restricting the sample by sex, marital status, job experience and age, the number of respondents in the study sample decreases overall, and hence the number of respondents identifying themselves as upper class who are available for analysis drops sharply. In the case of the 9^{th} wave, the total number of respondents in the study sample is 3,095. The number of upper class respondents is 55

(1.8%), for the middle class it is 1,848 (59.7%) and for the lower class it is 1,192 (38.5%). In the multivariate model, the statistics for the upper class is less meaningful and highly likely to be distorted due to the under-represented sample size for the upper class. Thus, in order to obtain a meaningful statistic for the upper class, weighting the study sample may be a useful technique; however, weighting is not favoured by many statisticians, (Field, 2009:69, 692-693) as it could affect the statistical results; that is, the results might be different before and after weighting the data (which can be seen as a distortion of the data). For this reason, weighting is not considered in the thesis. Thus, all the three class data are included in the analyses.

3.5.2.4. Restrictions arising from the different surveys in each wave of KLIPS

There are survey data restrictions arising because not all waves contain the same survey questions, although the core questions are contained in all the waves. In other words, some of the surveys are not repeated in the following wave, or are re-surveyed some years later. For instance, the 1st and 2nd waves of KLIPS have no surveys of childcare costs, and the 1st, 4th, 6th, 7th and 10th waves do not have surveys of class identity. Furthermore, only the 7th wave contains a survey of discrimination experience. This causes difficulty in comparing the results of the regression analyses with same predictor variables (the same conditions) across waves. To overcome this problem, by necessity, some survey data are repeated in other waves where they do not occur. Surveys of discrimination experience in the 7th wave are repeated in the four study waves, 3rd, 5th, 8th and 9th. Surveys of social mobility surveyed after the 7th wave are also repeated in the 3rd and 5th waves.

When it comes to repeating data, it may be not such a trivial problem if some surveys are highly sensitive to time (year by year). For instance, social mobility agreements may differ from year to year. If people had experienced a sudden change in their social and economic status due to mass-unemployment or an economic crisis in a specific year, they are more likely to feel negative in the survey about social mobility for the following years. Thus, the social mobility agreement of 2000 is likely to be different from that of 2006, in that Korea had a financial crisis at the end of 1997 and it continued over the following few years until the economic recovery in the middle of the 2000s.

However, the difference between 2005 and 2006 KLIPS data is small, as the proportional difference in social mobility agreement is within 5 per cent. This suggests that caution is necessary when comparing waves with repeated data. Similarly, discrimination experience is also a concern. Some critics may suggest that repeating the discrimination experience data from the 7th wave is still problematic even though it is repeated in the same way in the study waves, considering that discrimination experiences are likely to increase because of the surge of unemployment in the financial crisis periods. These problems could be limitations for the thesis. Nonetheless, these are statistically acceptable by and large, as KLIPS data comes from a panel survey – that is, the survey data is collected from the same persons every year.

3.5.2.5. The issue of generalisation to the whole population

In the statistical tests, generalisation to the whole population may be problematic when a model-goodness-fit test like the Hosmer & Lemeshow test of the logistic regression model is not significant or the adjusted R-square of the linear regression model is very low (Field, 2005:281). Therefore, this thesis mostly presents, as a reference, the analysis results from the logistic regression models with significance in the Hosmer & Lemeshow test within 10 per cent of p-value. In the case of linear regression models with a low adjusted R-square, although it is difficult to generalize from the analysis results to the population as a whole, they are presented in the analysis chapter (Chapter 5) as the results are still valid for explaining the study sample (Field, 2005:214).

3.5.2.6. Transforming and merging data

In the statistical data analysis, there are always data manipulations including transforming data or the merging of datasets. There are a few main issues to be noted here. First of all, the survey of employment status (whether employed or not) alone cannot be used as the study variable to indicate whether someone is economically active or not, because the employment status in the questionnaire does not reveal which respondents have job-seeking status. Thus, according to the international definition of 'economically-active status' as described in section 2 above, it has to be transformed by incorporating job-seeking status with employed status data. Probably, the most notable

issue is regarding class data. Surveys of class identity have different categories in different waves. In the 3rd and 5th waves, class identity variables have 5 categories: upper class, higher middle /middle middle /lower middle class, low class. In the 8th and 9th waves, the variables have 6 categories: higher and lower upper class, higher and lower middle class, and higher and lower low class. Therefore, it is difficult to compare the data year by year due to these different measurements. To solve this problem, class variables are recoded into three categories of upper class, middle class and low class in all the study waves.

In addition, the cost of bringing up children between the ages of 0 and 18 years is surveyed differently in certain waves. In the 3rd wave, child costs are derived from two surveys, collecting data of childminder costs and child education costs separately. In the 5th wave and subsequently, these have been incorporated into one survey of children's education costs including childcare costs. Therefore, child cost data in the 5th wave and subsequently must be separated into childcare costs and child education costs as this seems necessary for the analysis. In order to separate child cost data, the data is deliberately split in terms of children's age, that is, childcare costs for children aged less than 6, who are most likely to need childcare and child education costs for children aged over 6 who are least likely to require childcare in general (more detailed explanations are provided in the analysis chapters). Some may oppose the separation of child cost data because this might cause a statistical fault by deliberately manipulating the original data. This must be a limitation of my thesis. Concerning children's ages, as the thesis pays special attention to the impact of child cohorts, children's ages are recoded (grouped) into three: under 6 (below school age), aged between 6 and 11 (primary school children), and 12 plus (secondary school children), in order to examine the M-shaped career path, whether mothers return or not to work when their children get older.

In addition, the surveys concerning organizational commitment and satisfaction and social mobility agreement are measured by the Likert scale with 4 or 5 levels of agreement (strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree, strongly agree). For the regression analysis which requires numeric variables, these variables need to be recoded into either scale variables or dummy variables. As for work commitment transformation, work commitment is scaled by totalling all the response scores given to the sub-surveys

(10 questions) of both organisational commitment (comprising 5 questions) and job satisfaction (comprising 5 questions), as detailed in Table 3.2 above. By giving score 0 for strongly disagree, 1 for disagree, 2 for neutral, 3 for agree and 4 for strongly agree, the scores should vary from 0 to 20 for each survey. In effect, work commitment scores will vary from 0 to 40 by totalling all the scores of the 10 sub-surveys, in the mathematical/theoretical sense, although in fact there may be no person having 40 by giving 4 for all the 10 questions. The score '0' refers to 'no commitment at all' and '40' to 'the greatest work commitment', along with 'having more or less work commitment' referring to scores between the two. Work commitment measurement is based on the comparison of average scores between groups concerned. On the other hand, the variable of social mobility agreement using an ordinal measurement is transformed into a dummy variable (0 for strongly disagree/disagree and 1 for strongly agree/agree) for the regression model.

Discrimination is measured by a multiple-choice question over six spheres of discrimination – age, sex, education, disability, region (as South Korea has 4 regional provinces with 4 different dialects, it is alleged there is discriminations against where people are from), and other. For the multivariate analysis, the multiple-responses with dummy values are computed by totalling all values to construct a scale, where larger values indicate more discriminatory experiences and smaller values indicate fewer. Lastly, as regards transforming the data, annual household income is computed for the logistic regression analysis by totalling the total amounts of earnings of family members (which is the major income source), financial income, real estate income, social insurance benefits, and transfer income (see Table 3.C in the Appendix). With regard to merging issues, as KLIPS data is divided into household, individual, and job data, a merging technique is very often used to produce the data for analysis. In the thesis, spouse factors like spouse's pay, employment status and hours worked are taken from the sample for married men and merged into each study wave. Similarly, for the study sample restricted by job experience, data of job experience is extracted from the job history data and merged into each study wave.

3.6 Research Framework

As far as the data allows, it is very important to put contextual factors along with the children factor into the analysis of maternal employment: as feminist critics of Hakim's preference theory emphasize, contextual factors need to be counted in the analysis of the determinants of women's choices between paid work and looking after the family. By including the contextual factors – both cultural and socio-economic (that is, 'cultural gender norms' and 'class identity') in the analysis – this thesis will be able to provide a more comprehensive understanding of maternal employment in Korea. In addition, regarding how best to approach women's employment research, O'Reilly (1996:19) suggests that employment-systems analysis coupled with a gender perspective is a useful analytical framework. Thus, this research framework is a quantitative approach incorporating micro-level and macro-level analysis coupled with a gender perspective, which permits an inclusive analysis, counting individual human capital as well as cultural and structural factors without gender bias. In short, bearing in mind the limitations arising from the statistical techniques selected, the KLIPS data, and the statistical issues discussed above, the thesis provides three analytical chapters based on the hypotheses.

Firstly, Chapter 4 examines the first and second hypothesis through the one way-ANOVA analysis and linear-regression analysis; that is, whether there is any difference in work commitment by gender. As well as paying attention to education, the chapter discusses further whether labour market behaviour or employment interruption are related to the age cohorts of dependent children and whether married women tend to be in the job market as their children become older, as reflected in the M-shaped pattern of Korean women's life-course careers, using a series of logistic-regression and linear-regression analyses across the selected waves. With the supplementary analysis of situational factors, the chapter discusses whether the male spouse factor (the presence of a spouse, his type of employment status and wage) is associated with their wives' labour force participation.

Chapter 5 addresses the third and fourth hypotheses. First of all, the third hypothesis

examines culturally-specific workplace practices, discrimination experiences and work-hours, using multiple-response analysis, cross-tabulation analysis and linear-regression analysis. The chapter poses the question of whether these practices differ according to gender, especially by employment status. In particular, to supplement the analysis of discrimination practices, the chapter analyzes the promotion experience surveys provided in the KLIPS 3rd wave, based on a cross-tabulation analysis. Furthermore, the results of the logistic and linear regression models of the experience of discrimination with other covariates are discussed. With regard to the fourth hypothesis, parental welfare is analyzed, mainly by cross-tabulation analysis and a linear-regression model. Cross-tabulation analysis of firm welfare examines whether the Korean welfare regime is gendered or not. Furthermore, the linear-regression model identifies whether or not working hours and parental welfare are significantly associated with mothers' employment interruptions as well as whether there is any gender difference in the statistical association. In particular, in relation to the long work-hours culture, a cross-tabulation analysis of the hours worked and overtime work is presented by gender in order to examine whether there is a gender difference. Through the analysis, the thesis discusses the potential impact of the long work-hour culture on mothers continuing their careers.

In Chapter 6, the last analysis examines the fifth hypothesis concerned with class-differentiated mothering and labour market participation and whether there is any difference between the classes in their social mobility beliefs and their expenditure on children's education, through recursive analyses with the logistic-regression model over 4 KLIPS waves collected in 2000, 2002, 2005 and 2006, with a supplementary analysis of cross-tabulation including the chi-square test.

Chapter 4

Individual factors and mothers' labour market participation

Korean women's labour force participation is still low, showing a clear M-shaped employment pattern, despite their educational attainment level now reaching men's and at a time when the country has achieved rapid economic success. In the agricultural society before industrialisation in the 1960s, the majority of women stayed at home, while some working women were mostly non-paid family workers. That is, paid work was not typical for women. Since industrialisation, more women have entered the labour market, as the Korean economy has required women's employment. Despite the dramatic increase in women's employment, however, women's employment continuity (after marriage and childbirths) has not improved much even though their education level is similar to men's. Therefore, women's life course employment pattern is still left dissimilar to men's in Korea. Why is this so? This question has been addressed in the individualist theories and debates as discussed at length in Chapter 2. It is necessary to reiterate them briefly, in order to develop the arguments by questioning the individual factors again in this chapter.

The prominent theory about the sexual division of labour, the human capital theory (Becker, 1985), explains the problem by attributing it to men's and women's different allocation of time and investment in human capital. The argument is that the division of labour has arisen from the differently specialized human capital of married men and married women. Similarly, Hakim (2000, 2002) explains the gender division of labour in terms of the preference theory, that is, women choose between home and paid work according to their lifestyle preferences, under the assumption that they have different work attitudes, values and aspirations from men (Hakim, 2002:428). In short, these theories are both based on the rational choice theory; that is, women make a rational decision between paid work and caring for the family, in order to be either economically optimised or to conform to their lifestyle preferences. However, these neoclassical arguments have been challenged by the idea that individual choices are still culturally ingrained and respond to culturally predetermined gender norms. Duncan and Irwin (2004:391) refute these assumptions by arguing that the rational choices women make between family and paid work are not separable from their social and moral decisions, as these are negotiated within wider social norms. Which of these conflicting arguments best explains the characteristics of Korean women's employment patterns throughout their lives is, indeed, an issue in this thesis. In the human capital theory, married

women's lower education investment in their careers, shorter work experience and interrupted careers are seen as the main factors sustaining the gender division of labour or sex segregation in the labour market. Based on this perspective, this chapter attempts to examine how far these human capital factors – educational attainment, job experience, career interruptions, as well as work commitment – are associated with Korean mothers' labour market behaviour when taking into account their children's ages and spouse-related factors. Furthermore, this chapter provides discussions as to what extent these factors explain Korean mothers' labour market behaviour, along with a greater understanding of Korean cultural-specific motherhood, in particular from a gender perspective.

4.1 Human capital factors

4.1.1 Age, education and employment

In the analysis of married women's labour market participation, the formation of the family and the child rearing period are seen as central. Having said that, the statistical analyses in this thesis have mainly focused on mothers with children aged less than 19 years old and fathers in the same situation, to permit a comparison between the genders. To begin with, as people's labour force participation is generally affected by their age or by the stage in their life that they are at, in particular, women's labour force participation in the form of an analysis of employment from a life course perspective according to age or age cohort is necessary. Although Koreans can legally marry at 18 years of age, marriage has been increasingly delayed: on average, it was 28 for women and 31 for men in 2008 (Shin, 2009), along with more years in education for both sexes. Consequently, the family formation period is likely to be between the late 20s and mid 30s for women, as shown in the Korean women's M-shaped participation pattern observed by the previous literature.

Table 4.1 shows the basic information on average age and economic activity status by gender for the years 2000, 2002, 2005 and 2006. The average age in 2000 was 37 for

mothers and 40 for fathers. Both mothers' and fathers' employment levels have slightly increased over these years, showing a clear gender difference. The difference between mothers and fathers was nearly 50 percent in the studied years. The unemployment rates for mothers stayed at less than 1.8 per cent for the years 2000, 2002 and 2005 until a sharp rise in 2006 (2.2 per cent), rapidly catching up that for fathers (2.1 per cent). On the other hand, the unemployment rates for fathers stayed around 2.0 per cent, except for their high unemployment (2.4 per cent) in 2000, which showed the largest difference from mothers (1.6 per cent).

Table 4.2 Average age and economic activity status over the years by gender in 2000, 2002, 2005 and 2006 (percentage)

	Mother				Father			
	2000	2002	2005	2006	2000	2002	2005	2006
Average age (total N*)	37.2 (1929)	37.1 (1848)	37.4 (1909)	37.6 (1874)	40.4 (1786)	40.5 (1792)	40.4 (1830)	41.8 (1545)
Employment % of total N	45.4	47.7	46.1	47.5	91.3	93.4	93.3	93.7
Unemployment % of total N	1.6	1.4	1.7	2.2	2.4	1.8	2.0	2.1
Non-working % of total N	53.0	50.9	52.1	50.2	6.3	4.9	4.7	4.3
Row-total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: the 3rd, 5th, 8th and 9th waves, KLIPS. Note: * N refers to the number of cases (the same hereafter).

Employment by age cohort shows a very clear gender difference, as presented in Figure 4.1 (as for unemployment by age cohort, see Table 4.A in the Appendix). Comparing the employment levels within the age cohort, there was around a 30 per cent gap by gender in all the age cohorts except the lowest age, 24, although the lifetime employment patterns were similar between the genders due to the characteristics of panel data (a clearer M-shaped pattern for women with cross-sectional data). While the gap between married women and married men could be explained by women's withdrawal from the labour market to rear children and the continuing impact of this on their careers afterwards, the gender gap still leaves the question as to why this gap is over-represented in Korea compared with Western developed economies (as discussed in

Chapter 2), and furthermore, whether it can be better explained by human capital factors or by structural factors.

Figure 4.1 The gender difference in employment throughout life over the years, 2000, 2002, 2005 and 2006 (per cent within age cohort)



Source: the 3rd, 5th, 8th and 9th waves, KLIPS. Note: Statistics for this chart are provided in Table 4.B in the Appendix.

From the perspective of economists as well as human capital theorists, educational attainment level is a key factor in explaining differences in the labour market such as individual differences in earnings, job mobility, and job entry. Thus, it is necessary to find out whether there is a notable gender difference in education and whether it is associated with employment patterns. First of all, Table 4.2 shows the different distributions in education level between mothers and fathers, with the number of highly educated individuals, both mothers and fathers, increasing over the years. Overall, mothers' education attainment has fast approached that of fathers over the years; the proportion of mothers with upper secondary education is around 50 per cent, and roughly 45 per cent for fathers in the four years. The number of college and university graduates among fathers is around 10 per cent higher than those for mothers between 2000 and 2005; however, the proportions of mothers are similar to those of fathers by 2006, narrowing the gap to around 4 per cent. Nonetheless, the biggest gap between the genders is at post-graduate level: in 2000 there were four times more fathers with postgraduate qualifications than mothers despite the gap narrowing steadily over the years.

Table 4.3 The distribution by education level and gender over the years 2000, 2002, 2005 and 2006 (percentage)

% of total N	Mother				Father			
	2000	2002	2005	2006	2000	2002	2005	2006
Primary and under	8.2	8.2	4.2	3.7	5.5	4.5	2.5	2.4
Lower secondary	16.9	13.6	9.1	8.1	12.9	11.0	7.6	8.1
Upper secondary	55.8	54.0	53.0	51.4	48.3	46.9	42.8	45.2
College/University	18.3	22.9	31.8	34.5	28.8	32.7	41.4	38.9
Postgraduate	0.7	1.2	1.9	2.2	4.5	4.9	5.8	5.4
Row-total N %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	(1929)	(1949)	(1909)	(1874)	(1786)	(1792)	(1830)	(1545)

Source: the 3rd, 5th, 8th, and 9th waves, KLIPS.

Looking at the employment rate by education level (percentages of the total cases), according to Table 4.3, employed mothers and fathers with upper secondary education were predominant, reflecting the greatest numbers of both mothers and fathers completing upper secondary education, while the proportions for both genders were relatively stable over the years. The overall proportions for the employed fathers with upper secondary education and over were more than double those of mothers.

Table 4.4 Employment by education level and gender in 2000, 2002, 2005 and 2006 (percentage)

Employed % of total N	Mother				Father			
	2000	2002	2005	2006	2000	2002	2005	2006
Primary and under	4.7	4.4	1.9	1.7	4.6	3.5	2.0	1.9
Lower secondary	10.2	8.5	5.7	5.2	11.6	10.2	6.8	7.5
Upper secondary	22.4	24.1	23.7	23.7	44.6	43.9	39.9	42.0
College/University	7.6	10.0	13.8	15.7	26.3	31.1	39.1	37.0
Postgraduate	0.5	0.6	1.0	1.3	4.1	4.7	5.6	5.2
Total N (cases)	1929	1949	1909	1874	1786	1792	1830	1545

Source: the 3rd, 5th, 8th and 9th waves, KLIPS.

Apart from the gender difference in the absolute numbers overall, the employment trend in the studied years was a complete contrast between the lower and the higher educated,

as shown in Figure 4.2; the employment of both mothers and fathers with secondary education and under declined steadily, whereas those with college/university education and above increased over the years. These trends parallel the trend of increased numbers of highly educated people and the decrease in less educated people over the sample years as shown in Table 4.2.

Figure 4.2 Gender difference in employment by education level and gender in 2000, 2002, 2005 and 2006 (percentage)



Source: the 3rd, 5th, 8th and 9th waves, KLIPS.

The employment during the data years in terms of education and gender is well illustrated by the employment rate within each education level (the proportions of employed people with the same education level) as shown in Table 4.4 and Figure 4.3. Overall, for both sexes, there is no big difference between years in employment levels within the same education level. For mothers, the number of employed upper secondary completers and college/university graduates was the lowest group, accounting for below 50 per cent, while that of mothers with lower secondary education was highest, at over 60 per cent in all the study years, followed by that of postgraduates, which declined sharply from 71 per cent in 2000 to 52 per cent in 2002, but recovered to 59.5 in 2006. In contrast, fathers' employment was not so differentiated by their education level, and remained relatively stable at over 90 per cent over the studied years, although the lowest educated fathers' employment rate was the least (around 80 per cent) in all the years and

college/university and postgraduates increased steadily.

Table 4.5 Employment proportions within education level by gender in 2000, 2002, 2005 and 2006 (percentage)

Employed % within education level	Mother				Father			
	2000	2002	2005	2006	2000	2002	2005	2006
Primary and under	56.6	53.9	46.3	44.3	83.7	77.8	80.0	81.1
Lower secondary	60.4	62.3	63.0	64.2	90.4	91.9	89.9	92.8
Upper secondary	40.2	44.7	44.7	46.1	92.3	93.7	93.2	92.8
College/University	41.4	43.6	43.3	45.4	91.3	95.1	94.5	95.0
Postgraduate	71.4	52.2	55.6	59.5	91.4	96.6	96.2	97.6

Source: the 3rd , 5th , 8th and 9th waves, KLIPS.

Figure 4.3 Employment share within education level by gender (mother and father) in 2000, 2002, 2005 and 2006 (percentage)



Source: statistics based on Table 4.4 above.

Comparing employment levels by gender, it seems that college/university education does not advance married women's employment as much as married men's, while postgraduate education enhances both mothers and fathers' employment, even though to a different degree (around 60 per cent for mothers and 97 per cent for fathers in 2006). Indeed, the employment of both mothers and fathers with postgraduate education increased most over the study years, implying that the highly educated might return to

the labour market more quickly than those with lower education levels. However, there is still a considerable gender gap in employment of more than 40 per cent difference, in accordance with the notable gender gap in postgraduate education. From this aspect, the neoclassical economist argument appears to have support in that sex segregation in the labour market has occurred due to the gender difference in human capital, in this case, due to women's overall lower education level than men's. Nonetheless, it does not explain why married women college/university graduates have lower employment levels than those with upper secondary education and under, and postgraduate education.

In this regard, Hakim (2000:94-96, 159-163) sees that education has a function not in the labour market but in the marriage market, arguing that higher education does not change women's preference for paid work over marriage (in effect, it does not lead to an egalitarian model of family roles), but that women use it as a means of upward social mobility through the marriage market rather than through the labour market (according to Hakim (2000:203), the 'educational homogamy of spouses'). In this case, highly educated women differ little in their preferences from non-graduate women who prefer a lifestyle shared between home and career or marriage as a career. The above statistics for Korean mothers with upper secondary and college/university education employment levels (more than half mothers in this group stay at home) appear to support Hakim's argument. However, Hakim does not consider whether the better educated women return to the labour market (as the lower educated women do); that is, the probability of them changing their lifestyle preference after their children reach school age. Special attention is paid to this issue by this thesis providing further discussions concerning it in this chapter, and looking at the analysis by child age cohort, rather than women's age cohort as Hakim did.

4.1.2. Work experience and career interruption

Together with educational attainment, the number of years of work experience is considered important as human capital, particularly in human resource management like recruitment and assessment schemes. From the perspective of human capital theory, employers assume women will leave their jobs when they have children. This is the basis of sex segregation and discrimination in the labour market. Disruption to careers

has been a big issue in the discourses surrounding women's labour force participation. Thus, this thesis also attempts to examine whether work experience and interruptions to careers have a link to mothers' employment and whether there is a gender difference in this statistical association, for which logistic and linear regression analyses are used. First, the average years of work experience and the number of employment break-offs that occurred during the years under study, including a retrospective work history is presented in Table 4.5.

The number of employment break-offs refers to how many times intermittency occurred in the employment that workers have had during their career, regardless of the duration of unemployment or non-employment, implying career interruption or intermittency. As for work experience before 1998 when the survey started, mothers had about 7 years on average, which is half the fathers' average work experience of 14 years. Looking at the work experience accrued between 1998 and 2006, there was a gender gap between mothers and fathers, of 4.5 years experience for mothers and 8 years for fathers. In the absolute number of employment break-offs, mothers had on average 2.03 over the years before 1998 and 1.11 for the years under study, while fathers had on average 2.7 over the years before 1998 and 2.59 for the years under study. These statistics do not permit a comparison between the two because the genders have different average years of work experience.

Table 4.6 Average years of work experience and numbers of employment break-offs in career by gender

		Mother		Father	
		Job exp. (years)	Employment break-offs	Job exp. (years)	Employment break-offs
Before 1998[a]		6.9	2.03	13.9	2.70
1998-2006		4.6	1.11	8	2.59
Ratio of employment break-offs per year	during total career[b]	0.27		0.24	
	during 1998-2006	0.24		0.32	

Source: the 3rd (2000) and 9th (2006) waves, KLIPS. Note: [a] statistics based on retrospective jobs held before 1998. [b] refers to all job history before 1998 and between 1998 and 2006.

Consequently, it is necessary to calculate the number of employment break-offs per year

for each gender in order to compare them, as provided in Table 4.5. During their careers, including all the pre-1998 and recent years' employment, mothers had more interruptions to their careers than fathers, 0.27 vs 0.24 respectively. However, in employment between 1998 and 2006, fathers had more interruptions to their careers than mothers, 0.32 vs 0.24, implying that fathers' employment has become more unstable since the end of the1990s with the financial crisis in the Korean economy. In short, career interruptions were more pronounced for mothers, and were highly likely to be due to childbirth and childrearing as expected, and it is also notable that fathers' interrupted careers also appear to have increased, highly likely due to the increasing economic instabilities in recent years. Neoclassical theorists have argued that women have more interruptions to their careers than men, suggesting that their work attitude is different from men's and consequently this explains the sex segregation of the labour market. However, what does it mean if men's career interruptions are also increasing? Could it be understood that men's career aspirations are decreasing in the same way as understanding women's simply from the employment interruptions? Now, along with the above analysis of career interruptions by gender, workers' work commitment is to be analyzed by gender and the analysis results to be discussed.

4.1.3. Work commitment

In neoclassical theories, work commitment is considered an important aspect of human capital and work commitment is seen closely linked with workers' performance, productivity, etc. In light of the neoclassical economics, Kim (2008) measures work commitment using the surveys of organizational commitment and job satisfaction, although Kim does not provide a gender comparative analysis. As explained in Chapter 3, this thesis is not to address work attitude or work orientation due to the unavailability of work attitude-related data in the thesis dataset, KLIPS. Instead, this chapter attempts to provide a gender comparative analysis of workers' work commitment (organizational commitment and job commitment at the present job), querying that there is gender difference. It is also noted that as work commitment for non-employed mothers is not available (the data is restricted to a present job), this thesis is not able to provide a comparison of work commitment between employed and non-employed mothers.

To reiterate the measurement of work commitment from the methodology chapter, work commitment is scaled by totalling all the response scores given to the sub-surveys (10 questions) of both organisational commitment (5 questions) and job commitment (5 questions). By giving a score 0 for strongly disagree, 1 for disagree, 2 for neutral, 3 for agree and 4 for strongly agree, work commitment scores will vary from 0 at the minimum to 40 at the maximum theoretically. Actually, from the descriptive analysis, the scores vary from 0 at the minimum to 30 at the maximum, along with 11.8 in average for all respondents (both mothers and fathers). The score '0' refers to 'no commitment at all' and '30' to 'the greatest work commitment', along with 'having more or less work commitment' referred to scores between the two. The work commitment measurement is based on the comparisons of average scores between groups concerned.

Before the multivariate analysis, the descriptive statistics for work commitment were presented by gender, and furthermore, the statistical associations were examined by the one-way ANOVA test (Table 4.6). The means for the work commitment of mothers and fathers were very similar: 11.9 for mothers and 11.7 for fathers. The statistical association between gender and work commitment was confirmed by the ANOVA test, which found that work commitment was not significantly associated with gender (in other words, it was not different by gender).

Table 4.7 Work commitment by gender (2006)

	Mother	Father
Mean	11.9041	11.7355
Std. Deviation	6.29760	6.35855
N	886	1346
One-Way ANOVA	F=.378 (df1=1, df2=2230, mean square=15.179, sig.=.539)	

Source: the 9th wave (2006), KLIPS. Note: N refers to the number of cases (included in this analysis).
Legend: * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

In addition, mothers' labour market participation is often assumed to be restricted – perhaps even more so than their own human capital – by situational factors such as their children's ages and spouse factors (for instance, a spouse's earnings may be considered

as an individual's human capital), by virtue of the common phenomenon in many countries whereby women tend to work less than men during the period of childbirth and child rearing. Thus, any analyses which do not take into account children's ages and spouse factors will be meaningless in the study of married women's labour market participation.

4.2 Situational factors

4.2.1. Reasons for non-employment and the effect of children on the household

An OECD paper points out the marital and child barriers to Korean women's labour market participation: 'Many women withdraw from the labour market at the time of marriage or childbirth and encounter difficulties when returning to the labour market after childrearing' (Grubb et al., 2007:57). This argument is supported by the analysis of the results of the survey about the reasons for being non-working, as shown in Table 4.7. Non-employment due to child rearing was the dominant reason given by mothers (about 57 per cent), while no fathers gave the reason as child rearing. It is also notable that non-employment due to being responsible for housework was reported by about 30 per cent of mothers, whereas none of the fathers stated this.

Table 4.8 Reasons for non-employment (percentage of total N, 2000)

	Study	Child rearing	House -work	Retire-ment	Old age	Health problem	Taking a break	Other reasons	Column-total % (N)
Mother	0.5%	56.7%	29.9%	0.1%	0.1%	7.8%	2.2%	2.7%	100% (860)
Father	8.2%	0%	0%	1.4%	2.7%	50.7%	17.8%	19.2%	100% (73)

Source: the 3rd wave (2000), KLIPS.

In the discussions of married women's employment issues, children are always taken into account. Past research has found that children, especially younger ones, are significantly associated with married women's interrupted careers. Looking at the

surveys of children in the KLIPS household data, these were limited to children aged between 0 and 18 years old (Table 4.8), the average age was 9.5 and the average number of children per household was 1.7, indicating that only a small number of Korean families have more than two children. Presuming that women's labour market behaviour is differentiated according to the ages of their children, in particular those of school age, for instance, between age 6 to age 12 (compulsory schooling in Korea is from 6 to 18), it is very important to analyze this by the children's age cohort. Previous research of British women like Hakim's (2004:103) observed that before their children reached school age, most mothers tended to stay at home whilst as their children became older and started school, mothers tended to return to the labour market. Furthermore, Gornick et al. (1997:49) argue that age 11 is critical to mothers' employment (in the European countries) because it marks the end of primary schooling for children. Is this the case for Korean mothers' labour market participation?

Table 4.9 The percentages of having children by age group and the average number of children in the household* in 2000, 2002, 2005 and 2005

% for the age group against other age groups	2000	2002	2005	2006
The presence of children aged 0 to 5	34.2	36.1	37.7	37.8
The presence of children aged 6 to 11	41.5	43.7	40.2	39.8
The presence of children aged 12 to 18	48.4	46.4	45.9	45.8
Average child age (under 19)	9.6	9.5	9.4	9.4
Average number (total N)	1.7 (2174)	1.7 (1933)	1.7 (2061)	1.7 (2041)

Source: the 3rd, 5th, 8th and 9th waves, KLIPS. * See Table 4.C in the Appendix: The number of children in the household by age cohort.

As shown in Table 4.8, this thesis divides children into three cohorts by age; that is, before and after primary school age and those of secondary school age in Korea; that is, children aged less than 6, children aged between 6 and 11, and children aged between 12 and 18. Table 4.8 shows the percentage of children per age group and number of children per household. Households with children aged under 6 account for roughly one third of all households, while around 40 per cent of households have primary school children aged between 6 and 11 and around 45 per cent of households have secondary school children aged more than 11 (see also the number of children by age cohort over

the study years, provided in Table 4.C of Appendix).

4.2.2. Mothers' labour market participation, and situational factors

The next question to be considered, focusing on mothers, is how mothers' employment is associated with situational factors such as their children's age and spouse factors? First of all, looking at employment by children's age cohort, as shown in Table 4.9: overall throughout the years studied, mothers's employment rate was getting higher as children ages get higher, although a small percentage of mothers were employed when their children were aged under 6 (around 10 to 13 per cent). When their children reach primary school and secondary school age, mothers' employment steadily increases; for instance, in 2006 it went up to 18 and 27 per cent respectively, while mothers' employment was, roughly speaking, stable in the research years. In short, the evidence suggests that mothers' employment was very much restricted by the presence of young children but that mothers are more likely to take up paid work as their children reach primary schooling ages and over.

Table 4.10 Mothers' employment by children's age cohort in 2000, 2002, 2005 and 2006 (percentage)

Employed % of total N		2000	2002	2005	2006
By children's age cohort	with children aged 0 to 5	10.4	11.6	12.7	13.4
	with children aged 6 to 11	19.4	20.9	18.2	18.0
	with children aged 12 to 18	26.9	27.7	26.4	27.1
Total N (the number of mothers)		1929	1848	1909	1874

Source: the 3rd, 5th, 8th and 9th waves, KLIPS.

Furthermore, the question of whether mothers' employment with younger children is different according to their education level was examined. As provided in the cross-tabulation analysis of Table 4.10, the employment of highly educated mothers is overall higher than that of the less educated in all children's age groups (but similar in children's age group 12 to 18), and in addition, regardless of education level, the employment proportions of mothers were higher with children of school age; among

mothers with children under school age, employment rates differed most by education level: 27 per cent for less educated mothers and 40 per cent for better educated mothers. Among mothers with primary school children, the employment rate for the lower educated mothers and for the higher educated mothers was about 40 per cent and 50 per cent respectively. However, among mothers with secondary school children, the employment rate increased to nearly 60 per cent for both education groups. What is most important here is that there is a remarkable difference between the higher and lower educated groups in terms of mothers' employment with the presence of younger children before school age.

Table 4.11 Mothers' employment by child age cohort and mothers' education levels in 2006 (percentage)

Employment % 'within' children's age cohort	children under age 6	children age 6 to 11	children age 12 to 18
upper secondary, under-	27.4	42.5	61.1
graduate and postgraduate	39.7	49.8	58.9

Source: the 9th wave, KLIPS.

This suggests that higher education does make a difference to mothers' labour market behaviour, especially those with younger children, although it seems that the children's age cohort is the most important factor in maternal employment. In this, Hakim's argument discussed above is not fully supported by the statistical evidence that the difference in employment rates between highly educated mothers and less educated mothers is highest with children under school age, and also that the difference between mothers of different education levels is negligible (1.2 per cent) once their children finish primary school.

As for spouse factors, it has been well documented that the presence of a spouse has a link to married women's labour market participation; in general, without a spouse, single parents are more likely to work. However, little attention has been paid to a potential link with the spouse's pay and employment status. Presumably, a mother's labour market behaviour is likely to have some relations with her spouse's pay and job status. When a spouse earns enough to maintain a good standard of living, the other

spouse may be less likely to work, and couples might both prefer to work in case one becomes jobless or has a lower income or perhaps when one spouse's job is more precarious if they are in irregular work or self-employed. Consequently, these spouse factors must be looked into as well. According to the analysis of mothers' employment when there is a male spouse, and that spouse's employment status (Table 4.11), it can be observed that mothers without a male spouse are more likely to be employed; that is, 60 per cent (2006) compared with less than 50 per cent for mothers with a male spouse, suggesting that many mothers without a spouse have to work for a living, as expected. Furthermore, mothers with a male spouse employed in a permanent-contract job were less likely to be employed (under 40 per cent) than other mothers – nearly 48 per cent with a male spouse in irregular employment and about 58 per cent with a self-employed male spouse.

Table 4.12 Mothers' employment when they have a spouse and spouse's employment status and earnings' contribution to the household income in 2000, 2002, 2005 and 2006 (percentage)

			2000	2002	2005	2006
Mothers employed % (against non-employed %)	By the presence of spouse (% of total N)	with spouse	44.9	48.2	46.1	47.1
		without spouse	53.0	59.0	60.9	60.3
	By spouse's employment status (% within employment status)	permanent job	35.6	39.2	37.6	39.3
		irregular job	43.4	49.4	48.3	46.9
		self-employed job	43.5	58.0	56.4	58.5
Proportions (%) out of total household income *		the share of male spouse earnings	81.9	74.9	79.2	76.8
		the share of mothers' earnings	46.2	42.6	46.0	44.5

Source: the 3rd, 5th, 8th and 9th waves, KLIPS. Note: * Refer to Table 4.D in the Appendix; Average earnings and household income by year.

Notably, mothers' employment levels were far higher when their male spouses were self-employed, perhaps because mothers are more likely to be unpaid family workers in their spouse's self-employed business or due to it being a low-earning business. Finally, looking at how much families depend on the male spouse's earnings, along with the contribution (share) of mothers' earnings to the household income, on average the male spouse's earnings accounted for over 75 or 80 per cent of the total household income in

the years studied, while the mothers' earnings share was around 43 or 46 per cent of the total household income. Overall, it is clear that the earnings of Korean families mostly come from the male spouses, while the female spouses' contributions are less than half that of males. As suggested by the cross-tabulation analysis, spouse factors are important for understanding mothers' labour market behaviour, along with children factors.

In addition, as financial reasons are also likely to affect mothers' labour market behaviour, the financial situation needs to be reviewed. The financial situation of households and the employment of mothers with financial difficulties over the years were examined by cross-tabulation analysis, as shown in Table 4.12. The financial situation reported by mothers was worst in 2000 and since then seems to have improved overall. Mothers' employment when they were in a financially difficult situation peaked in 2000, suggesting that many of them had to work due to financial difficulties rather than for any other reason, further implying that many families were affected by the financial crisis at the end of the 1990s in Korea. However, employment figures of mothers in financial difficulty fell sharply by 17 per cent from 63 per cent in 2000 to 47 per cent in 2002, suggesting that the financial situation of households improved in 2002.

Table 4.13 Mothers' employment due to financial difficulties and the financial situation in the study years reported by mothers in 2000, 2002, 2005 and 2006 (percentage)

		2000*	2002	2005	2006
Employment % within financial status	financially coping	36.8	53.1	45.2	47.9
	financially difficult	63.2	46.9	54.8	52.1
	Row-total %	100	100	100	100
Financial situation (% of all mothers)	all right	40.8	54	49.3	50.7
	difficult	59.2	46	50.7	49.3
	Row-total %	100	100	100	100

Source: the 3rd, 5th, 8th and 9th waves, KLIPS. Note: *in 2000, the financial situation was surveyed by two categories, 'financially difficult' and 'not difficult', while in the other years, it was surveyed by five categories, 'very affordable', 'affordable', 'all right', 'somewhat difficult' and 'very difficult'.

Subsequently, the difference between mothers in employment who are coping and those

who have financial difficulties appeared to have levelled out in 2005 (55 per cent) and 2006 (52 per cent), implying that employment due to financial reasons was decreasing. Indeed, Baek (2008:2) describes how the economic situation of East Asia (NIEs) had rapidly declined since the 1997 financial crisis and was still in difficulties until the early 2000s but improved around mid 2000s. The Korean economic situation in the early and mid 2000s appears to be reflected in the statistics of Table 4.12: the higher percentage of employment of mothers with financial difficulties in 2000 and the lower percentage in 2006. Considering that the study dataset is a panel data collected yearly from the same respondants, it is most probably that mothers' employment due to financial difficulties peaked in 2000 along with the national economic decline.

In short, from the above analysis, Korean mothers' labour market participation varies according to their children's age cohort and their spouses' earning capacity including financial difficulties. Thus, mothers' labour market behaviour must take these factors into account as well as the human capital ones, and this needs further examination through an advanced statistical model: a multivariate analysis.

4.3 Findings from the multivariate analysis

Considering all the individual factors, mothers' personal human capital and the situational factors discussed above, the thesis examined whether these factors were statistically associated with mothers' labour market participation, along with providing a gender comparison. First of all, from the logistic regression analysis of mothers (Table 4.13 & 4.14), education was not significant in 2000, 2002 and 2006, though it was in 2005 (however, it was significant in 2002, 2005 and 2006 in the model without household income, provided in Table 4.G in the Appendix, implying that the difference has arisen from controlling the household income variable). Based on these results, it seems that more educated mothers are likely to be employed in 2005. Presumably, this is because higher education helps to secure employment especially during the job market instability (perhaps in the years between 2004 and 2005) since the 'credit crisis' in 2003 (Keum et al., 2006:45-46, 2009:7-9). Children's age cohorts of 0 to 5 and 12 to

18 were significantly associated in the models across the selected years, while the age cohort of 6 to 11 was not significant in 2000, 2002 and 2005 though it was in 2006. Children's age cohort of 6 to 11 became significant at the final step in 2006, while children's age cohorts of 0 to 5 and 6 to 11 were negatively associated and children's age cohort of 12 to 18 was positively associated. Mothers with young children under the age of 6 were most likely to stay at home (as the odds ratios were less than 1 and the significance was highest among the three age cohorts) whereas mothers with children of secondary school age were more likely to work (as the odds ratios were more than 1). It is very clear that the presence of pre-school children is the main barrier to mothers' labour market participation in Korea.

In all the models across the selected years for mothers, previous work experience was very significant, implying that the longer the work experience, the more likely mothers are to remain in the labour market and also that the past work experience is an important factor in women's re-entry into the labour market. Household income works as a predictor of who is more likely to be in employment, reflecting the contribution that mothers' earnings make to the household income. In particular, all spouse factors were significantly associated with mothers' employment in all the models: mothers with a spouse who earned a high salary were less likely to be employed, and when the male spouse was self-employed (possibly including irregular workers) rather than having a permanent job, mothers were more likely to work (the p-value for male spouse's irregular employment was 0.051 in 2000 as shown in Table 4.14). From the overall results of the age factor across the years, older mothers are more likely to stay at home: this supports the OECD statistics (2011), as indicated in Chapter 2, that fewer older women of working age are employed in Korea compared with other OECD countries, with the result that married older women are doubly disadvantaged by the cultural attitude to age and the gender system. However, when their financial situation was taken into account in this research, it was not such a good predictor of mothers' labour market behaviour; the predictor, the financially difficult situation, was insignificant throughout the years studied.

Table 4.14 Logistic regression on whether employed or not for mothers (individual/situational factors) – stepwise analysis (See Table 4.E in the Appendix for 'enter-method' analysis models)

Statistics: odds ratios - Exp(B)	Step1	Step2	Step3	Step4	Step5	Step6	Step7	Step8
Children aged 0 to 5							.669**	.506***
Children aged 6 to11								.711**
Children aged 12 to18	1.612***	1.535***	1.540***	1.595***	1.518***	1.730***	1.592***	1.289*
Job experience (retrospective)		1.076***	1.071***	1.063***	1.056***	1.076***	1.078***	1.084***
Spouse pay (logged)			1.639***	.096***	.078***	.073***	.071***	.075***
Household income (logged)				9.715***	12.054***	13.205***	13.320***	12.978***
Spouse employment status (permanent is base case)					***	***	***	***
irregular employment					1.364	1.425	1.414	1.473
self-employment					2.189***	2.310***	2.398***	2.454***
Age						.960**	.945***	.934***
Education (year)								
Financially difficult								
N[a]	1874	1874	1874	1874	1874	1874	1874	1874
-2 Log likelihood	1563.55	1535.65	1513.29	1371.84	1343.65	1335.92	1327.53	1319.14
Model Chi-square (goodness-of-fit)[b]	43.2***	71.0***	93.4***	234.9***	263.1***	270.8***	279.2***	287.6***

Source: the 9th wave (2006), KLIPS. Note: statistics are rounded off; [a] N refers to the number of cases included in the analysis (the same hereafter); [b] the models for Step 2 & 3 are insignificant in the Hosmer&Lemeshow goodness-fit-test within 90%. Legend: * p<0.05 (sig. at 95%), ** p<0.01 (sig. at 99%), *** p<0.001 (sig. at 99.9%)

In short, the presence of pre-school age children and a spouse's higher pay level have a negative association with mothers' labour market participation, whereas more years of previous work experience helps mothers to remain in the labour market. In addition, older women tended to be non-employed. The question arises here as to whether the situation is the same for fathers.

Table 4.15 Logistic regression (stepwise) analyses on whether employed or not by year and by gender (individual/situational factors) – statistics presented for the last step only (See Table 4.F in the Appendix for all the steps and Table 4.G for the other model without the variable household income)

Statistics: odds ratios - Ex(B)	Mother			By gender (2006)	
	2000	2002	2005	Mother	Father
Children aged 0 to 5	.590***	.480***	.535***	.506***	
Children aged 6 to11				.711**	
Children aged 12 to18	1.462***	1.326**	1.663***	1.289*	
Job experience retrospective)	1.098***	1.085***	1.077***	1.084***	
Spouse pay (logged)	.162***	.178***	.081***	.075***	.327**
Household income (logged)	7.640***	4.310***	8.859***	12.978***	12.185***
Spouse employment status (permanent is base)	***	***	***	***	
irregular employment	1.542(.051)!	1.348	1.453	1.473	
self-employment	2.363***	2.410***	2.054***	2.454***	
Age	.971*	.975*	.946***	.934***	
Education (year)			1.154*		
Financially difficult					
N	1382	1404	1379	1329	582
Model Chi-square (goodness-of-fit)	337.47***	300.62***	312.03***	287.55***	58.75***
-2 Log likelihood	1559.41	1641.58	1582.69	1319.14	251.24
Hosmer&Lemeshow test x^2 *(sig.)*	21.56**	22.05**	52.13***	41.27***	20.01!

Source: the 3rd, 5th, 8th and 9th waves, KLIPS. Note: statistics are rounded off.
Legend: * p<0.05 (sig. at 95%), ** p<0.01 (sig. at 99%), *** p<0.001 (sig. at 99.9%), ! p<0.10 (sig. at 90%)

According to Table 4.14, for the gender comparison, the picture is quite different. For fathers, their children's age and wife's job status were not significantly associated with their labour market participation, suggesting that regardless of whether they had children or not, and the status of their spouse's job, they were highly likely to be employed. Also, there was no link between age, education and past job experience for fathers, while household income worked as a predictor, reflecting the contribution that fathers' earnings make to the household's income as in the case of mothers. What does this suggest? It is highly likely that nearly all fathers work regardless of their age,

education or work experience, as also shown in the cross-tabulation analysis concerned. However, as with mothers, the spouse's earnings was a significant factor. The observation that both mothers and fathers tend to have negative associations with their spouse's pay is most important, suggesting that the male spouse's pay does not necessarily have more significance. In addition, in order to examine whether children factors are associated with interrupted careers and work commitment, a linear regression model was used, as shown in Table 4.15 and Table 4.16.

Table 4.16 Linear regression on the number of employment break-offs[a] by gender (individual/situational factors) – stepwise analysis (See Table 4.H for the model without job experience in the Appendix)

Statistics: standardized coefficients *B*	Mother			Father		
	Step1	Step2	Step3	Step1	Step2	Step3
The number of children						
Age						
Education (year)			-.123*			
Household income (logged)	-.223***	-.239***	-.185***			
Job experience (retrospective before 1998)		.154**	.136**	.259***	.240***	.236***
Pay (logged)					-.214***	-.162***
Work commitment						-.111**
Irregular employment (dummy)						
Married and living with spouse						
N	1874	1874	1874	1545	1545	1545
F	24.36	18.34	14.41	59.36	52.24	38.19
Adjusted R-square	.05***	.07***	.08***	.07***	.11***	.12***

Source: the 9th wave (2006), KLIPS in the year 2006. Note: statistics are rounded off; [a] employment break-offs refer to the number of employment failures including job transitions during the career for all the recent and retrospective ones. Legend : * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.

First of all, the factors associated with interruptions to the career by the number of employment break-offs during the career were examined by the linear regression analysis in Table 4.15. From the gender comparative analysis, a different result (at the final steps) was observed. For mothers, their work commitment was not significantly

associated with the number of employment failures, that is, interruptions to their career. Education level and household income were negatively associated; higher education and higher household income reduced the number of interruptions to mothers' careers. In contrast, for fathers, work commitment (within the 1 per cent significance level) and their pay (within the 0.1 per cent significance level) were negatively associated with employment interruptions; that is, higher work commitment and pay have a negative link with employment interruptions. For both mothers and fathers, the spouse factor and the number of children were not significant, while (past) work experience was significant and positively associated with their employment interruptions, impling that for both mothers and fathers their employment interruptions increased with more years of work experience. It is important to note here that work commitment was not a good predictor of maternal employment, whereas it was very accurate in the case of fathers.

Table 4.17 Gender difference in the results of linear regression analyses on work commitment – statistics presented for the last step only (See Table 4.I for all the steps and also Table 4.J for enter-method analysis models in the Appendix)

Statistics: standardized coefficients *B*	Mother	Father
The number of children[1]		
Age	-.113**	
Education (years)	.150**	.087*
Pay	.356***	.351***
Irregular employment (dummy)		-.133***
Discrimination experiences	-.097*	-.069*
The number of employment break-offs[2]		-.067*
Job experience[2]		
Household income (logged)		
N	1874	1545
F	44.30	54.43
Adjusted R-square	.26***	.26***

Source: the 9th wave, KLIPS (2006). Note: [1] statistics with the number of children were very similar to those with the three children's age cohorts (see Table 4.J in the Appendix). [2] during the career for the recent years between 1998 and 2006. Legend: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.

Lastly, from Table 4.16, it was found that mothers' work commitment was significantly associated with age, education, their pay and discrimination experiences. That is, older mothers have lower level of work commitment, which is different from the general findings of previous studies that as people become older, work commitment increases (Kim, 2008; Bang and Kim, 2009). The more educated and the higher paid they were, the higher their work commitment was while discrimination experiences had a negative link to work commitment. However, the number of children they had, irregular employment, the number of employment breaks, work experience and household income were not significantly associated with mothers' work commitment. For fathers, education and pay were positively associated with their work commitment (just as for mothers), while the children factor was not associated with work commitment for either gender. However, unlike mothers, irregular (casual) employment and the number of employment break-offs (which refers to either interruptions to their career or the number of job transitions) were significant and negatively associated with fathers' work commitment. As with mothers, discrimination experiences were negatively associated with fathers' work commitment.

4.4 Further discussions from the statistical analyses

Firstly, from the cross-tabulation analyses of human capital factors, it can be observed that there is a gender difference in employment by age, education, work experience and career interruptions, whereas there is no gender difference in work commitment between married people with children under the age of 19. Notably, based on the analysis of employment break-offs, interruptions to their career was not specific to mothers. Rather, fathers seemed to have had their careers increasingly interrupted in recent years (over the studied years), although the duration (of unemployment) might be shorter than that for mothers. Furthermore, an important finding regarding education is that higher education has not improved Korean mothers' employment chances, particularly the college/university educated mothers, as much as those of fathers. Regarding the statistical results of the relatively low employment of Korean mothers

who are college/university graduates, this appears to be explained by Hakim's argument (2000:94-96) that women use education as a marriage market tool; that is, women achieve upward social mobility more through the marriage market, and higher education gives them access to more successful partners than the labour market does, and hence higher education does not make a difference to married women's preferences between career and home. Furthermore, mainly based on cohort studies to show whether there are any generational differences, by paying special attention to the age cohort of women aged 25 to 39, Hakim found that there was little difference in sex role attitudes by generation.

From Hakim's perspective, Korean mothers appear to use college/university education as a means for a marriage career (staying at home), from the finding that most Korean mothers with graduate level education are more likely to stay home after giving birth. However, Hakim has failed to address the issue of whether higher education makes a difference to mothers' employment, especially where there are younger children, and also whether married women, regardless of their education level, tend to change their lifestyle preference after their children reach school age, as Crompton and Harris (1999:128-130) pointed out. Moreover, Hakim has failed to offer any suggestions as to why some women might change later, from staying at home to working or vice versa. This thesis finds that there is a remarkable difference between the higher and lower educated groups in mothers' employment where there are pre-school-age children, along with the observation that mothers tend to be employed regardless of education level as children reach school age.

Therefore, Hakim's view regarding the function of higher education in the labour market and seeing a considerable number of women as home-centered is not sustainable from the thesis observations using a different analytical approach, by child age cohort, rather than by women's age cohort and the presence of children, which Hakim (2004:91, 132) used. Indeed, women's lower employment levels from their late 20s to mid-30s is hardly likely to change dramatically over a few or even several decades, because the majority of women will continue to give birth at approximately those ages (even delaying to the late 30s) and hence having a child will continue to affect women's employment in the future. Thus, this strongly suggests that a different analytical

approach, taking into account children's schooling ages, rather than simply the presence of children, seems necessary in researching women's, and particularly mothers' labour market participation. Secondly, also from the multivariate analyses including child age cohort factors, it was found that their children's ages are statistically critical to mothers' labour market participation. Mothers tended to stay home while they had young children, but as their children reach school age, they are more likely to be employed. In addition, it is suggested that past work experience is very important for mothers by helping them join the labour market, and that higher education has a negative link to employment interruptions. More importantly, it was observed that there was no statistical difference in work commitment between the genders and also that mothers' work commitment was not associated with children, irregular employment, household income, work experience or employment break-offs either. Rather, it was associated with age, education and experiences of discrimination.

The overall observations here appear to support the arguments of the human capital theorists in the broadest sense, in particular from the statistical results that work experience was significant and that mothers had more employment interruptions than fathers. Generally, married women's intermittent labour force participation is seen to be critical from the neoclassical perspective, in that neoclassical theorists see it as an indication of married women's work attitude. However, based on the statistical analysis of work commitment and employment interruptions, there is a strong suggestion that work commitment was not associated with the children factor and that interruptions to mothers' careers are associated with mothers who receive less pay and have more discrimination experiences rather than linked to their job commitment. Also, fathers' career interruptions have also been increasing in the more recent years of the study (from the descriptive analysis), most probably due to the increased economic instabilities and labour market restructuring in Korea. Without taking into account these contexts (perhaps family life cycle for women and the labour market and national economy situation for men), some may interpret both male and female workers' work aspirations as being decreased, simply from the increased employment interruptions. This contrasts with the arguments of human capital theory or preference theory, which assume that women make less effort to work, implicitly due to their having lower work aspirations (Polacheck, 1976, 1981:68; Hakim, 1991:101-121). In this regard, a

previous study (Johnson, 2001: 315-345) argued that job values change in response to the attainment of valued rewards, but not in response to their family roles, along with the observation that gender differences in job values narrow over time, for both males and females.

In particular, Bielby and Bielby criticized the way neo-classical economists such as Becker (1976) and Polacheck (1976) address women's work commitment and sex-role attitudes. The criticism is that they inferred inadequately operationalised work commitment from their data. That is, they inferred subjective work orientation from the (intermittent) patterns of labour force participation, where commitment was not at all operationalised and they also inferred opinions about sex roles simply from the employment patterns (Bielby and Bielby, 1984:234-235). Furthermore, the authors found that intermittent employment was not a consequence of unstable work commitment, but a consequence of 'adjusting' their labour market behaviour to accommodate the demands of bringing up children (Bielby and Bielby, 1984:234). This is well supported by the finding in this thesis that the *children's age cohort is critical* and that *Korean mothers tend to be employed as their children reach school age,* suggesting clearly that married women adjust their labour market behaviour to the family life cycle. This phenomenon cannot be explained by the preference theory, which lacks analysis from the life course perspective using panel data. That is, lifestyle preferences adapt (change) in accordance with women's life course, not because the majority of women simply *prefer* to stay at home or combine paid work with looking after the family. In short, the situation of Korean mothers cannot be explained fully either by the human capital theory or by the preference theory.

On the other hand, the question is still unanswered as to why Korean mothers' labour market behaviour is closely linked to the presence of young children in general (which has not changed much compared with mothers in the past, despite increased employment opportunities for women with economic success). Regarding this, some scholars argue that there is an association with culturally ingrained normative motherhood, which places a strong emphasis on women as the main carers of children (Won and Pascall, 2004:274). Won and Pascall (2004:283) argued that due to the unchanging traditional gender norms held in Korean families, mothers often withdraw

from paid work while fathers strengthen their breadwinning roles. Ridgeway and Correll (2004:511-512) indicated there is a gender system within widely held cultural beliefs where gender acts as a background identity. On the other hand, arguing against the grand theory of economic rationalisation, Duncan and Irwin (2004:391-399) demonstrated that mothers made decisions within socially negotiated accounts of what was morally appropriate, using 'moral reasoning', and also that their allocation of time to child care was usually subject to gendered expectations of what was psychologically or socially most suitable for men and women. The over-representation, in the non-working sector, of Korean mothers with younger dependent children could be understood in terms of the culture-specific and socially patterned moral role of mothering.

4.5 Conclusion

In short, considering the empirical evidence of Korean fathers' increasing number of employment interruptions and also no link between mothers' work commitment and their career interruption, married women's labour force participation cannot be fully explained from neoclassical perspectives, either by the human capital theory or by the preference theory. Importantly, the observation that mothers' labour market participation is closely related to their children's age supports strongly the argument that married women's intermittent or interrupted careers are not a consequence of poor work commitment, but a consequence of adjusting to the family life cycle. Therefore, to conclude, it is important to understand or explain married women's labour market behaviour from the life course perspective with panel data, as the overall trends of the labour force participation of married women from the cross-sectional data as well as from the women's age cohort data show only what is skin deep, or the appearance, rather than the content or the reality of women's work over the course of their lives.

Chapter 5

Gender regime and mothers' labour market participation

Previous studies have documented the labour market regime in terms of the concentration of women in irregular employment due to discriminatory practices in the workplace such as employing women for 'female-type' low-paid precarious work. Many consider the Korean labour market and welfare regime as gendered (Tesch-Romer et al., 2008; Pascall and Won, 2004; Keum, 2002). Presumably, the gender regime reflects cultural-specific gender norms which may affect the labour market behaviour of married women, especially Korean mothers, because of either discriminatory practices against employing mothers or a lack of social childcare support. With this assumption, this chapter attempts to identify whether there are gender differences in terms of labour force status, pay, promotion, discrimination experience, work-hours and welfare entitlement, and also whether the assumption can be supported 'within the statistical significance levels' using multivariate analysis models. Based on the statistical analysis results, this chapter provides gender comparative discussions by focusing on mothers and fathers with children aged less than 19 years old.

5.1 Mothers' labour market status

The characteristics of the Korean labour market regime show that Korean women have a lower status within the labour force, which is 'gender segmented'. The literature suggests that women, in particular married women, are over-represented in irregular employment (Grubb et al., 2007:22) and also that long-term temporary workers account for over 52 per cent of women compared to 27 per cent of men (Jang, 2001:68). The low labour market status of women is linked to their working conditions; for instance, pay, promotion, corporate welfare benefits and work-hours. Therefore, these areas all need consideration in more detail. Unlike most of the previous literature, this thesis focuses on mothers along with a gender comparative analysis, that is, between mothers and fathers.

First of all, looking at mothers' and fathers' employment status (Table 5.1), the proportions of mothers in permanent employment increased from 43 per cent in 2000 to 49 per cent in 2006, along with a steady decrease in unpaid family employment, from

22 per cent in 2000 to 15 per cent in 2006. There appears to be a trade-off between permanent and unpaid family employment in the case of mothers. The statistics for self-employed mothers stayed around 18 per cent and those for mothers in temporary and daily employment were respectively about 12 per cent and 7 per cent overall, remaining stable throughout the period. On the other hand, the proportion of fathers in permanent employment was over 50 per cent despite a steady decrease from 56 per cent to 51 per cent in 2006, while the proportion of temporary, daily employed and self-employed fathers remained relatively stable over the period, at about 3 per cent, 7 or 8 per cent and 36 per cent, respectively. In general, for both sexes, the share of self-employed and unpaid family employment was very high, reflecting the characteristics of the Korean job market; in other words, self-employment accounts for around a third of total employment, compared with less than 15 per cent in 2000 in European developed countries (Keum et al., 2009:9, 14).

Table 5.2 Gender difference in employment status between mothers and fathers in 2000, 2002, 2005 and 2006 (percentage)

% of total N*	Mother				Father			
	2000	2002	2005	2006	2000	2002	2005	2006
Permanent	42.6	46.3	46.7	48.9	55.8	50.8	51.0	50.8
Temporary	10.1	10.4	11.7	11.8	2.9	3.8	3.4	3.2
Daily	7.4	7.3	5.9	6.4	6.9	7.3	7.9	8.7
Self-employed	17.5	16.0	19.2	17.7	33.8	36.6	36.7	36.0
Unpaid family worker	22.4	20.1	16.6	15.2	0.6	1.5	1.0	1.3
Row-total % (total N)	100 (1929)	100 (1848)	100 (1909)	100 (1874)	100 (1786)	100 (1792)	100 (1830)	100 (1545)

Source: the 3rd, 5th, 8th, and 9th wave, KLIPS. Note: * N refers to the number of cases.

Importantly, the gender contrast was most notable in the percentage of unpaid family employment, followed by temporary employment; unpaid family employment was predominantly done by mothers and three or four times more mothers than fathers were employed in temporary work. The percentage of self-employed fathers was double that of mothers. In addition, the higher level of participation in unpaid family work by mothers could be explained by the reality that married women are highly likely to

participate as unpaid family workers in self-employed businesses, especially those run by their spouses. Overall, the concentration in temporary and unpaid family work by mothers shows clearly what Korean married women's, in particular, mothers', labour market status is.

Along with mothers' employment status in Korea, the payment gap is also considered a structural issue. Table 5.2 shows clearly that there was a considerable gender gap in the overall ratio between mothers and fathers, although there was a steady decrease over the period. More specifically, looking at the gender pay gap by employment status, the gap was greater in irregular jobs. Interestingly, the gender difference in self-employed work became much smaller in 2005 and 2006, implying that women in their own businesses seem to do as well as men, but those working for organizations might be disadvantaged by a biased wage structure. For instance, the seniority-based management system in Korea might have contributed to the gender pay gap, as married men tend to have more years in work than married women, who are more likely to have intermittent career breaks due to family care responsibilities.

Table 5.3 The earnings ratio of mothers compared to fathers* in 2000, 2002, 2005 and 2006

The gender ratio of earnings	2000	2002	2005	2006
Permanent	0.58	0.60	0.60	0.59
Temporary/daily	0.49	0.45	0.53	0.54
Self-employed and employer	0.58	0.60	0.71	0.71
Overall ratio of mothers compared to fathers	0.53	0.53	0.58	0.57

Source: the 3rd, 4th, 5th and 9th waves, KLIPS. Note: * the earnings ratio is calculated by the ratio of average earnings of the mother group compared to the father group.

As a result, married men are better paid than married women according to seniority-based payment schemes, as pointed out in Chapter 2, in the study of Korean labour market duality by Grubb et al. (2007). Furthermore, it relates to the pay gap between regular and irregular work, as also discussed in Chapter 2. In Kim's study of the pay gap by employment status (Kim, 2006:68), it was observed that the pay gap between regular

and irregular work was much greater among female workers – double that of male workers. This suggests strongly that women are doubly disadvantaged by gender and by lower employment status. The gender pay gap between regular and irregular work is presumed to be because mothers are far more likely than fathers to be in low-paid irregular jobs, due to child rearing.

Why do gender pay differences occur? It appears that this is closely related to the devaluation of female work and occupational segregation by sex (female-type work and male-type work). As discussed in Chapter 1, a move to female-type work (the kind traditionally done by females) usually involves downward mobility for both men and women, particularly for mothers with dependent children (Blackwell, 2001:159-160), and female-type work tends to be flexible jobs such as temporary, part-time and other casual employment, especially in small-sized firms, where married women are predominantly employed (Jang, 2001:90). In this situation, mothers take up flexible employment 'involuntarily' to find some balance between paid work and family commitments, while employers benefit from cheap labour by allocating such women to low paid jobs. When considering the low pay of female-dominated jobs, which is especially true in Korea, paid work might therefore have little attraction for Korean mothers. Unlike the expectation from the perspective of neoclassical theorists, Korean mothers might choose to stay at home because the jobs offered are more likely to be low-paid and also because such jobs do not give them much room for a better work-life balance. In short, this suggests that without understanding the labour market situation faced by mothers, we cannot fully understand Korean mothers' behaviour or attitudes to work.

5.2 Gender-biased workplace practices

Together with married women's low-paid and low-status employment, gender-biased workplace practices such as sex discrimination and the glass-ceiling phenomenon in the establishment, as long argued by feminists, may affect mothers' labour market behaviour.

Experience of discrimination was surveyed just once, in 2004 (the 7th wave) in KLIPS, using a multiple-choice measurement. Based on the multiple-response analysis, as shown in Table 5.3, it was observed that discrimination experience was differentiated by gender. Mothers and fathers both reported mostly about sex, education and age discrimination. A gender difference was clear in the experience of sex discrimination. A majority of mothers (57 per cent) reported sex discrimination experiences, whereas only 4 per cent of fathers did. The above results suggest that sex discrimination has a potential link to mothers' labour market behaviour.

Table 5.4 Discrimination experience by gender (percentage, 2004)

% of total N	Sex	Education	Age	Disability	Region	Other	Total % (N)
Mother	57	25	14	0	1	2	100
	(121)	(53)	(29)	(1)	(3)	(5)	(212)
Father	4	62	24	2	5	2	100
	(29)	(506)	(198)	(19)	(43)	(17)	(812)

Source: Surveys of discrimination experience, KLIPS 7th wave, 2004.

In addition, gender-biased workplace practices were clear in the gender differences in promotion-related experience. According to the percentage obtaining promotion and the likelihood of promotion in Table 5.4, below, there was a gender difference between mothers and fathers in promotion or the likelihood of being promoted.

Table 5.5 Promotion and likelihood of promotion reported by group (percentage, 2000)

Wage-earners	Promotion		Total % (N)	The probability of future promotion		Total % (N)
	Yes	No		Yes	No	
Mother	12.5	87.5	100 (527)	16	84	100 (457)
Father	36.4	63.6	100 (1069)	31.8	68.2	100(679)

Source: the 3rd wave, KLIPS.

Among mothers with children aged less than 19, about 13 per cent had been promoted whereas for fathers, the figure was more than 36 per cent. In the likelihood of future promotion, 16 per cent of mothers reported positively, whereas about 32 per cent of

fathers did so. In sum, roughly about three times more promotions were reported by fathers than mothers. The number of fathers who reported the probability of future promotion in their jobs was double that of mothers. In short, considering all the statistical results of sex discrimination and promotion-related experience by gender, it seems obvious that gender-biased practices are still at a considerable level in the Korean labour market. Thus, gender-biased workplace practices cannot be ignored in the employment issues of Korean married women, particularly of mothers with school age children.

5.3 Long work-hour culture

As well as the labour market situation disadvantaging married women, as discussed above, the long work-hour culture – including after-work extended social activities with workmates – may have an association with married women's, particularly mothers', labour market behaviour. It is highly possible that long work-hours cause work-life balance problems for mothers with school-age children. Previous studies in Korea were mainly about the time poverty of working families and mothers' involvement (time) in their children's school activities, which differed according to their employment status. However, not much attention has been paid by academics to any correlation between long work-hours and mothers' withdrawal from the labour market. Therefore, this thesis attempts to raise the issue of the long work-hour culture as the main barrier to balancing work and family life for mothers. Taking into account the little change in average work-hours during the period of economic recovery after the financial crisis at the end of the 1990s, as shown in Table 5.5, long work-hours seem to be taken for granted in Korean culture. Since the 2004 legislation reducing the working week from 44 to 40 hours, there has been no dramatic fall in the actual average working hours, despite a steady decrease to around 50 hours, far more than the legal work hours, by 2005 and 2006. In the case of working mothers with young children in particular, this long work-hour culture may be the main barrier to continuing in their jobs.

Table 5.6 Average work-hours and overtime per week by gender in 2000, 2002, 2005 and 2006

	Average work-hours				Average overtime*			
	2000	2002	2005	2006	2000	2002	2005	2006
Mother	53.0	51.1	49.3	47.9	17.4	17.8	14.1	14.1
Father	56.8	56.2	53.3	53.1	15.0	16.0	15.0	14.9

Source: the 3rd, 5th, 8th and 9th waves, KLIPS. Note: *overtime is calculated by subtracting legal work-hours from the reported work-hours. The legal working week was 44 hours before 2004 and was reduced to 40 hours from Sept. 2004.

Korean women work longer on average than Western women, in the situation of workers who have regulated work hours (refer to the work-hours in OECD, 2010), which suggests strongly that this influence cannot be ignored. An important point to note is that there was no significant difference in the average weekly work-hours between the genders, although mothers tended to work 4 or 5 hours less than fathers. In addition, there was no significant difference in the overtime work between mothers and fathers. This is problematic because the long work-hours culture is a problem for mothers, not fathers; mothers have time pressure due to their greater commitment to childcare and housework than that of fathers, as indicated in Chapter 2. In addition, the average work-hours in irregular (temporary/daily) and part-time jobs, often considered as flexible jobs – either numerically or functionally or both – is very informative as an indication of a long work-hour culture. As shown in Table 5.6, the average work-hours of the temporary and daily jobs taken by mothers were over 40 hours per week overall, with no significant difference from permanent jobs.

Table 5.7 Average weekly work-hours of casual jobs taken by mothers in 2000, 2002, 2005 and 2006

	2000	2002	2005	2006
Permanent	50.4	48.1	48.3	47.4
Temporary workers	42.2	44.1	42.9	41.3
Daily workers	40.2	41.0	47.6	40.3
Part-time workers	33.9	34.5	37.0	37.4

Source: the 3rd, 5th, 8th and 9th waves, KLIPS.

The average work-hours of part-time workers also reached 37 hours, increasing over the years, which are similar to the average work-hours of full-time employees in developed Western countries; for instance, 37 hours on average per week is the legal working time in the UK and the Netherlands (OECD, 2010; Kim, 2006; Jeong, 2007:70). This implies that irregular or part-time employment in Korea seems less of a flexible arrangement (in the context of numerical flexibility) for working mothers who are most likely to take it in the hoping of creating a balance between family life and paid work. On the other hand, the long work-hour culture of Korea appears to be related to less work-hour flexibility (giving employees the authority to decide their work-hours) and the low incidence of part-time work in the labour market in general, based on the analysis of the work-hour flexibility offered to employees that follows. According to Table 5.7, for employment status, most self-employed and family workers of both sexes (over 80 per cent of them) reported that they had considerable work-hour flexibility, whereas permanent workers had the least flexibility. For work-hour type, for both mothers and fathers, part-timers had more flexibility in their working hours than full-timers had.

Table 5.8 Work-hour flexibility by employment status and work-hour type (percentage, 2000)

% within employment	% able to decide hours worked	
	Mother	Father
Permanent workers	7.2	3.5
Temporary workers	27.3	8.3
Daily workers	23.1	10.7
Self-employed/employer	88.9	85.1
Non-paid family workers	83.2	100.0
% of total employment	41.7	32.3
Part-time workers	27.9	24.3
Full-time workers	8.5	3.7

Source: the 3rd wave, KLIPS.

However, although mothers employed in irregular (casual) jobs as well as part-time jobs tended to have more flexibility than fathers overall, it seems that irregular jobs and part-time jobs do not offer much flexibility for the mothers who need it most. Compared to self-employed workers, of the over 80 per cent who responded, only a third of mothers

employed in these jobs had work-hour flexibility. Considering all the situations suggested by the above analysis (long work-hours as well as relatively low flexibility in irregular jobs and part-time jobs), flexible jobs in Korea do not seem to play a strong role in flexible work arrangements, because even though employers offer mothers reduced work-hours in the form of irregular, including part-time, work, such jobs in Korea do not allow employees to decide their work-hours by themselves. Furthermore, such work must be quite limited, as the incidence of part-time employment in Korean is very low, at around 10 per cent of total employment in 2009, half the average in OECD countries (OECD, 2011). In this regard, Grubb et al. (2007:22), focusing on temporary jobs, concluded that in Korea the temporary work taken by women is less related to the need to secure work flexibility in that the incidence of part-time work by temporary workers in Korea is very low compared to the over one-third of temporary workers in 10 OECD countries and over half the workers in two OECD countries working part-time.

5.4 Parental welfare

To reiterate the discussions of the welfare regime in Chapter 1, regarding any association between married women's lifestyle preferences and childcare support, McRae (2003:331) suggested that, 'a major structural constraint on women's enactment of their work-family lifestyle preferences in Britain is the cost of childcare'. Moreover, Gornick et al. (1997:65) argued from the comparative family policy study of western European countries that '*many women workers faced stiff penalties for work absences due to childbirth; without publicly subsidized childcare, many had few viable alternatives to the full-time maternal care of children'.* In response to inadequate childcare support, Gornick et al. (1997:65) suggested it is more likely that women workers exit the labour force temporarily and/or repeatedly. Therefore, it seems necessary to examine the characteristics of the Korean welfare regime first. In a previous study of the coverage of compulsory welfare in Korea, as elaborated in Chapter 2, it was found that there was a considerable difference in the actual coverage of compulsory welfare such as social insurance as well as in the coverage of non-

compulsory benefits by employment status, between permanent workers and irregular (casual) workers (Ban, 2006:33). However, little attention was paid to any *gender* differences in non-compulsory welfare. Therefore, this thesis pays attention to this issue by analyzing corporate welfare (employee benefits) by gender. Corporate welfare is defined commonly as workplace welfare or indirect compensation/remuneration, and consists of compulsory and provisional (voluntary) benefits (Ban, 2006:29-30).

Compulsory benefits include such items as social insurance, severance pay and paid leave, while non-compulsory (provisional) benefits include housing support, private insurance support, tuition fees support, childcare support, support for meals and transport, and mutual aid. This thesis assumes that the gender difference in coverage would be much higher for the voluntary, non-compulsory benefits than the compulsory ones. According to the analysis of the corporate welfare benefits (Table 5.8), the proportion of employed mothers entitled to corporate welfare increased considerably from 36 per cent in 2000 to 55 per cent in 2006, but with a relatively small increase for fathers from 53 per cent in 2000 to 62 per cent in 2006. The gap between mothers and fathers decreased from 17 per cent in 2001 to 7 per cent in 2006. Despite mothers' welfare coverage fast approaching fathers' in recent years, a gender difference (of about 7 per cent) is still observable in the coverage of corporate welfare benefits, suggesting that fewer mothers were employed in firms with fair working conditions.

Table 5.9 Gender difference in the proportion of employees entitled to corporate welfare including fringe benefits (per cent having at least one such benefit) over the years, 2000, 2003, 2005 and 2006

% of the employed	2000*	2002	2005	2006
Mother	36.2	43.1	52.5	55.2
Father	53.0	60.8	63.1	62.1

Source: the 4th, 5th, 8th and 9th waves, KLIPS. Note: * data for 2000 is replaced by the data of 2001 due to the very limited surveys (some surveys are missing) in 2000.

In addition, the analysis needs to focus on parent-related benefits which support the most needy mothers. According to Table 5.9, the percentage of employed mothers with entitlement to at least one of three parental welfare benefits – maternity leave, parental

leave and childcare support – was less than 25 per cent during the study period but steadily increased, nearly doubling from 13 per cent in 2001 to 24 per cent in 2006, as shown in Figure 5.1. However, the percentages of mothers with parental leave and childcare expense support, 17 per cent and 9 per cent respectively in 2006, suggests that jobs providing support to mothers for childcare after childbirth are in short supply and that parental welfare schemes remain at a low level in Korea.

Table 5.10 Mothers with corporate parental welfare entitlement[a] in 2000, 2002, 2005 and 2006 (percentage)

% of employed mothers[b]	2000 (2001)[c]	2002	2005	2006
Maternity leave	11.3	13.2	19.3	23.3
Parental leave	7.0	9.1	12.2	17.1
Support for childcare expenses	3.0	2.9	5.9	9.0
Having at least one of these	13.0	20.4	23.0	24.2

Source: the 4th, 5th, 8th and 9th waves, KLIPS. Note: [a] statistics are not the percentages of beneficiaries; [b] the number of employed mothers was 890 in 2001, 882 in 2002, 882 in 2005, and 873 in 2006 ; [c] data for 2000 is replaced by the data of 2001 due to the very limited surveys (some surveys are missing) in 2000.

Figure 5.1 Working mothers with access to parental welfare over the years, 2001, 2002, 2005 and 2006 (percentage)



Source: Table 5.9 above, KLIPS.

In addition to parental leave, further legislation concerning work-life balance schemes was introduced in Korea in 2008. However, it is far from being available to the majority of mothers. Work-life balance support schemes, including leave of absence for child rearing (KDI, 2008:76), are available to mothers with children aged under 3 (KDI, 2008:79-80) but only at their employers' discretion. Thus, mothers with pre-school age children or primary school children at level one who attend school for half a day are excluded. This suggests that most mothers are highly likely to be excluded from any benefits. Crompton (1998:85) suggests that modern welfare regimes are gendered, in that women (housewives) are often excluded from welfare schemes because they receive welfare benefits via their male spouses, and as such, the Korean welfare regime is based on the male breadwinner model and thus seems neglectful of working mothers, including the potentially returning work force, despite the steady increase in dual-earner households (You, 2008:58).

Furthermore, previous studies have observed a considerable gap in social welfare coverage between regular permanent employees and casual employees in firms. According to an analysis of KLIPS welfare datasets, there was around a 50 percent difference between permanent and casual/non-standard workers in social insurance coverage, and around 60 per cent difference in such items as severance pay, fringe benefits or paid leave (Ban, 2006:28). This has been an salient issue in the literature and policy discourses concerning the weak function of corporate welfare, as indirect compensation means that the pay gap between regular and irregular employment has grown, to the detriment of casual/non-standard workers, resulting in their 'marginalization' in the labour market (Ban, 2006:28). In this respect, looking at welfare coverage by employment status, as shown in Table 5.10, in comparison with permanent employees a very small percentage of temporary workers received any parental welfare benefit entitlement and almost no parental welfare benefit entitlements are given to daily workers. This clearly shows the large gap in welfare provisions between those in regular, permanent jobs and those in temporary/casual work, despite the steady increase in temporary employment over the years studied.

Comparing the share of temporary and daily workers with parental welfare with that of permanent workers, as presented in Figure 5.2, it seems that casual workers, especially

mothers, have little or no access to parental welfare provision. Regarding the low level of corporate support for casual workers, Ban (2006:38) suggested that businesses have little concern for casual workers' welfare and voluntary efforts were severely limited. This issue needs more attention, with more focus on mothers, because it also contributes to Korean women's low employment status (in terms of jobs with low childcare support), as most casual jobs are performed by women (Jang, 2001:79; Grubb et al., 2007:22; Kim, 2007:39).

Table 5.11 Corporate parental welfare (entitlement) by employment status[1] over the years, 2000, 2002, 2005 and 2006 (percentage out of all employed mothers)

	Maternity				Parental leave				Childcare support			
	2000[2]	2002	2005	2006	2000	2002	2005	2006	2000	2002	2005	2006
Perm[3]	11.2	12.8	18.5	21.9	6.9	9.1	11.9	16.2	3.0	2.8	5.9	8.8
Temp[4]	0.1	0.2	0.8	1.4	0.1	0	0.3	0.9	0	0.1	0	0.2
Daily[5]	0	0.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Row-total%	11.3	13.2	19.3	23.3	7.0	9.1	12.2	17.1	3.0	2.9	5.9	9.0

Source: the 4th, 5th, 8th and 9th waves, KLIPS. Note: 1. except self-employed/employers/non-paid family workers; 2. statistics for 2000 are replaced by those of 2001 due to the limited availability of the data; 3. 'Perm' refers to permanent workers; 4. 'Temp' refers to temporary workers; 5. 'Daily' refers to daily (casual) workers.

Figure 5.2 Casual employment share of parental welfare benefits compared with permanent employees by year (percetage, 2001, 2002, 2005 and 2006)



Source: Table 5.10, above.

5.5 The use of child minders and the burden of costs

In Korean culture, childcare responsibilities rest with the family, especially the mother. Mothers' different economic situations may affect their labour market behaviour, especially when the cost of childcare is expensive and public support is low, as indicated by McRae (2003:329, 334) and Gornick et al. (1997:60). For instance, childcare costs may affect mothers' attitudes to work in two ways: on the one hand, they may take up paid work because they want to be able to afford the cost of childcare; on the other hand, they may stay at home or reduce their work hours because they prefer to look after their own children rather than pay expensive childminders. Particularly in residual welfare regimes such as in Korea, where the family is seen as the main childcarer (Jang and Bu, 2003:1-5; Shin, 2001:102-104), childcare costs can be an important predictor. As expected, mothers with children less than six years old are most likely to use childminders, day nurseries or other childcare facilities in Korea, so special attention needs to be paid to this group of mothers. Children aged under 6 are dependent infants before they start formal schooling, and thus they need the most childcare, which is why childcare costs included in the analysis were restricted to children aged less than 6. Also, surveys of childminder costs for children aged between 0 and 11 are available only in 2000 and 2001 household data because surveys of childminder costs were integrated into the surveys of private childcare and education from 2002 onwards. Thus, childminder costs can only be analyzed in 2000 and 2001, and then overall childcare costs (for children under age 6) for the years 2002, 2005 and 2006 are analyzed and presented here.

From the statistics in Table 5.11, it seems that childminders, including other family members or relatives, are not popular in Korea, perhaps due to the high cost or due to the fact that very few families live with their parents or other relatives. The use of childminders for children aged between 0 and 11 is very low, at less than 5 per cent, and costs the equivalent of an average of 120 to 150 pounds sterling per month. Furthermore, the amounts spent as a proportion of monthly household income were about 14 per cent in 2000 and 17 per cent in 2001.

Table 5.12 The use of childminders and childminding costs as a percentage of household income in 2000 and 2001

	2000	2001
The % use for children aged between 0 and 11 (cases)	2.3 (50 of total 2,216)	4.3 (78 of total 2,105)
The cost of childminders (average per month)*	£120	£150
Spending proportions of household income (%)	14.4	16.9

Source: the 3rd and 4th waves, KLIPS. Note: * approximate currency exchange rate £1 per 2,000 Korean Won.

In addition, as shown in Table 5.12, a considerable number of mothers see childminding costs as a burden, and this number showed a notable increase by about 14 per cent (39 in 2000 and 53 per cent in 2001). The high financial burden of using childminders suggests the reality of the Korean welfare regime is that childcare is assumed to be a family responsibility, particularly for infants under the age of 6. Presumably, either due to the expense of using childminders or the difficulty in getting a good quality childminder from outside the family, mothers are more likely to use less expensive private institutions which combine childcare and education.

Table 5.13 The percentages of mothers who see childminding costs as a burden in 2000 and 2001

% of mothers using childminders	A burden	All right	Not a burden	Column-total%
2000	38.5	28.2	33.3	100
2001	53.1	26.6	20.3	100

Source: the 3rd and 4th wave, KLIPS.

According to the average childcare costs for children aged under 6, from 2002 to 2006, as shown in Table 5.13, the overall childcare costs of Korean families was the equivalent of around 110 or 120 pounds sterling per month in 2002, 2005 and 2006. On the other hand, for households with children under 6, the average share of the monthly household income spent on childcare went down from 10 per cent to about 6 per cent, which seems to reflect the increase in household income in the mid 2000s. However, a small number of lower income families are supported by the government, based on a

means-tested benefit scheme which excludes applicants who earn more than the average wage of all urban workers and have children under 5 (KDI, 2008:72-73).

Table 5.14 Childcare costs including childminder costs for children aged under 6

	2002			2005			2006		
	Min.	Max.	Mean	Min.	Max.	Mean	Min.	Max.	Mean
Childcare costs(£)	0	£1,115	£123.3	0	£850	£109.6	0	£795	£122.9
Expenditure(%) of household income	0	90	9.9%	0	160	5.6%	0	118	5.9%

Source: 5th, 8th and 9th waves, KLIPS. Note: * approximating currency exchange rate £1 against 2,000 Korean Won.

This implies that a higher childcare cost share of household income was experienced by lower income families, especially those receiving little or no childcare package for such families. As indicated by Grubb et al. (2007:57-58), childcare costs may be a barrier to starting or resuming employment, particularly for low-paid working families, and expensive childcare costs or a lack of good quality childcare in Korea may be the main difficulties faced by mothers wishing to resume their careers. It should be noted that the analysis of the burden of childcare costs is not provided, because surveys concerning the financial burden in KLIPS were restricted to child 'education' costs, thus excluding childcare costs.

5.6 Findings from the multivariate analysis models

The thesis has identified the Korean labour market and welfare regime as being gendered, and this is based on cross-tabulation (including frequency) analysis, in terms of women's low employment status, higher sex discrimination experience reported by women, low parental welfare provision, long work-hours and a higher burden of childcare expenses. Furthermore, using multivariate analysis models, the logistic regression and linear regression analyses, this chapter examined whether these gender-

bias related factors were associated significantly with mothers' labour market behaviour, along with providing a comparative analysis by gender. From the logistic regression analysis model for 2006, the thesis has found, as shown in Table 5.14, that children's ages and childcare costs were very significantly associated with mothers' employment, but not associated with fathers' employment. Household income was very significant across the steps for both genders as reflecting their earnings. In particular, as with the childcare cost factor, the statistical results for 2005 and 2006 in Table 5.15 show that the higher the childcare costs, the more likely mothers are to be employed.

Table 5.15 Logistic regression (stepwise) analysis on whether employed or not by gender – gender regime factors (See Table 5.A for 'enter-method' analysis)

Statistics: odds ratios - Exp(B)	Mother					Father	
	Step1	Step2	Step3	Step4	Step5	Step1	Step2
Children aged 0 to 5			.648***	.676**	.511***		
Children aged 6 to11					.727*		
Children aged 12 to18				1.885**	1.851*		
Education (year)							
Age							.944***
Household income (logged)	2.270***	1.944***	1.908***	1.916***	1.923***	17.182***	17.614***
Childcare costs (for children under 6[1])		1.013**	1.014***	1.015***	1.017***		
Discrimination experience							
N	757	757	757	757	757	1575	1575
-2 Log likelihood	965.84	953.35	940.48	933.21	928.02	644.03	631.19
Model Chi-square (goodness-of-fit)	37.92***	50.40***	63.27***	70.54***	75.74***	51.52***	64.35***
Hosmer & Lemeshow goodness-fit-test x^2 (sig.)	34.12***	7.38	20.16	16.14*	5.07	18.59*	27.20**

Source: the 9th wave (2006), KLIPS. Note: statistics are rounded off; [1] statistics for fathers are replaced by child costs for all age cohorts according to the goodness-of-fit model.
Legend : * p<0.05 (sig. at 95%), ** p<0.01 (sig. at 99%), *** p<0.001 (sig. at 99.9%), ! p<0.10 (sig. at 90%).

However, this does not necessarily mean that childcare costs have improved mothers' employment, because this may reflect the fact that employed mothers are more likely to pay for childcare. Nonetheless, it must be noted that childcare costs are significantly

associated with mothers' employment, but not that of fathers. Furthermore, this model did not observe any significant association between discrimination and mothers' labour market behaviour. As for the question that repeating the surveys might affect the statistical results, it was found that there were no notable statistical differences across the selected years *with or without* discrimination experience variable (see Tables 5.C and 5.D in the Appendix). Although repeating data is disputable, it could on the other hand be negligible, in that the surveys are panel data, as mentioned earlier in the methodology chapter. In addition, it is noted that the results of the logistic regression for 2000 and 2006 were not significant in the fit to the Hosmer & Lemeshow test with these explanatory variables, whereas they were significant in the other (enter-method, not stepwise) analysis model (see Table 5.A in the Appendix).

Table 5.16 Logistic regression (stepwise) analyses on whether employed or not for mothers by year (gender regime factors) – statistics presented for the last step only (See also Table 5.B in the Appendix for all the steps)

Statistics: odds ratios - Ex(B)	2000	2002	2005	2006
Children aged 0 to 5		.713*	.522***	.511***
Children aged 6 to11			.687*	.727*
Children aged 12 to18				1.851*
Education (year)				
Age				
Household income (logged)	2.003! (.050)	2.999***	1.529**	1.923***
Childcare costs (for children under 6)			1.019***	1.017***
Discrimination experience				
N	194	531	809	757
Model Chi-square (goodness-of-fit)	25.50***	48.76***	70.70***	75.74***
-2 Log likelihood	205.84	657.66	977.92	928.02
Hosmer&Lemeshow test x^2 *(sig.)*	7.65	15.93*	17.73*	5.07

Source: the 3rd , 5th, 8th and 9th waves, KLIPS. Note: statistics are rounded off.
Legend: * p<0.05 (sig. at 95%), ** p<0.01 (sig. at 99%), *** p<0.001 (sig. at 99.9%), ! p<0.10 (sig. at 90%)

Irregular employment, pay, parental welfare and work-hour variables were not dealt with in the logistic regression analysis because data for these variables for the non-

employed are unavailable, so a different model for these variables is necessary. For this reason, linear regression analysis models were chosen to examine these factors, but with a different dependent variable, the number of failures in employment (which refers to the incidences of career breakage, regardless of its duration), as shown in Table 5.16.

Table 5.17 Linear regression analyses on the number of failures in employment during the career by gender – statistics presented for the last step only (See also Tables 5.E and 5.F in the Appendix for all the steps)

Statistics: standardized coefficients *B*	Model 1[1] (without pay & irregular employment)		Model 2[2] (without overtime)		Model 3[1] (all the list variables)		
	Mother	Father	Mother	Father	Mother[1]	Mother[2]	Father
Children aged 0 to 5				-.066*			
Children aged 6 to 11							
Children aged 12 to 18							
Age		.143***		.165***			.158***
Education (year)		-.199***		-.114***			-.173***
Household income (logged)	-.084*			-.104**			
Discrimination experience	.114**			.079**			
Parental welfare	-.140***	-.195***		-.112***	-.235**		-.184***
Overtime work [3]	.176***						
Pay (logged)			-.182***				-.092*
Irregular employment (dummy)			.120**			.173*	
N	1874	1545	1874	1545	1874	1874	1545
F	10.88	31.21	22.00	25.34	12.01	5.00	24.99
Adjusted R-square	.05***	.13***	.06***	.12***	.05**	.03*	.14***

Source: the 9th waves (2006), KLIPS. Note: statistics are rounded off; [1] 'employment failure during career' refers to the number of breaks between jobs including retrospective ones; [2] 'employment failure during career' is replaced by the number of breaks between jobs held *from 1998 to 2006* due to the goodness-fit-model for mothers (not for fathers); [3] overtime work refers to 'whether they had overtime work or not' for Model 1 and 3 (dummy) and average overtime work for fathers.
Legend: * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

The number of employment break-offs (that is, how many times workers have been out of the labour market) in the models for both mothers and fathers, during their careers

including the years before 1998 (or during the period between 1998 and 2006), is used as an indicator of career interruptions or intermittent careers. First of all, from the linear regression analysis model 1 in Table 5.16, it was found that household income, discrimination, parental welfare and overtime work were significant for mothers. Parental welfare benefits and household income are negatively associated with mothers' career interruptions, while overtime work and discrimination are positively associated. That is, mothers with greater parental welfare – often offered by better jobs – tended to have less employment interruptions, and those with more overtime hours and discrimination experiences tended to have more employment interruptions. As for household income, mothers with higher household income (in other words, upper class mothers) tended to have fewer employment interruptions. For fathers, on the other hand, age, education and parental welfare were significant. While age was positively associated, education and parental welfare were negatively associated with interruptions to fathers' employment. That is, while older fathers tended to have more number of employment break-offs, fathers with higher education and greater access to parental welfare tended to have fewer interruptions to their employment.

Secondly, from model 2, mothers' pay and irregular employment were very significantly associated with the number of employment break-offs; that is, lower-paid jobs and low-status jobs were more significantly associated with interruptions to mothers' careers than any other factors. By contrast, children's age cohort of 0 to 5, age, education, household income, discrimination and parental welfare were significantly associated with interruptions to fathers' employment. With older ages and more experiences of discrimination, fathers tended to have higher numbers of employment break-offs. However, pre-school children, education, household income and parental welfare were negatively associated with interruptions to fathers' employment, meaning that fathers with younger children, higher education and higher income (in other words, upper class) as well as greater access to welfare benefits tended to have less employment break-offs. Thirdly, from model 3 with all the list variables, mothers' career interruption was significantly associated with parental welfare (negative) or irregular employment (positive). For fathers: age, education, parental welfare and pay were significant; age was positively associated with their employment interruptions while education, parental welfare and pay were negatively associated. Considering all the models 1, 2 and 3,

overtime work and irregular employment were not associated with employment interruptions for fathers (in contrast to mothers) while education was significantly associated with fathers' employment interruptions, but, not with those of mothers. However, as with mothers, parental welfare and pay were less associated with interruptions to fathers' employment. Overall, these results suggest that if women are employed in regular work (paid fairly, and with greater access to welfare benefits) rather than casual work, and if they have less overtime work, they enter and leave the labour market less often.

In sum, the statistically significant results for pay, casual employment, overtime work, discrimination and parental welfare for mothers, strongly suggest that mothers could be re-oriented towards employment if working conditions were improved, especially in casual work, in terms of pay, working hours and welfare, along with addressing discrimination issues. It must be noted, however, that although all the statistical results from these linear regression models for mothers were very informative, the regression R-square (adjusted) was low, meaning that it is difficult to generalize from this to the population as a whole – the low explanation levels for models for mothers as seen in the adjusted R^2 means that the models are problematic to apply to the population as a whole – and hence the results could be limited to the study sample only (Field, 2005:214).

5.7 Further discussions from the statistical findings

Based on the above cross-tabulation analyses and the multivariate analysis results for mothers' employment behaviour, the results and discussion converged mainly on three issues: inequality in the labour market, lack of childcare support, and the long working hour culture in Korea. Firstly, inequality in the labour market is revealed by the gender difference (between mothers and fathers, in this case) in the payment; and the take-up of low-paid and low status jobs (as shown by the frequency analysis), along with discrimination, clearly tell us that mothers' employment behaviour bears some relationship to the gender-bias characteristics of the Korean labour market. Along with the frequency analyses of promotion and discrimination experience, the multivariate

analysis (model 1) found a significant association between discrimination and mothers' employment interruptions. Furthermore, the multivariate analysis (model 2 & 3) showed that the low employment status of mothers, as also seen by their concentration in low-paid and irregular employment (from the frequency analysis), was more strongly associated with mothers' interrupted careers than any other factors, implying that gender norms, especially about motherhood, exist in the Korean labour market.

To reiterate the discussion in Chapter 2, when explaining sex discrimination and gender segregation phenomena in the labour market, human capital theorists and economists have related them to women's child care responsibilities; that is, employers' sex discrimination against women occurs because of the assumption that women are more likely to leave their jobs and have less concern about human capital investment than they have for rearing their children (England, 2005:273). However, England (2005:280-281) emphasized that sex discrimination (in pay and jobs) as well as gender segregation is 'not linked to motherhood', but more linked to social norms on the supply and demand sides – workers' cultural beliefs about which jobs are considered appropriate for women and employers' preferences or gender beliefs which can devalue work done by women, both leading to a depreciation of female jobs in the organizations. Which explains the Korean case best? Based on the statistical results discussed above, the explanations in terms of cultural gender beliefs appear to be supported in the case of Korean mothers. Tesch-Romer et al.'s study (2008:346) discussed in Chapter 2 also provides evidence, by showing that in Korea, gender inequality in the labour market is widely accepted, along with the observation that gender-biased norms are prevalent in the East Asian labour markets, in contrast to Western countries. In short, the evidence strongly suggests that gender-biased workplace practices (in terms of pay, promotion, and discrimination) in Korea are closely correlated with Korean mothers' labour market participation.

Secondly, regarding the welfare regime, from the cross-tabulation analysis it seems that childcare costs are associated with mothers' labour market participation in terms of the higher burden of childcare costs relative to household income, particularly among low-income families. The assumption that the burden of childcare costs may have a negative association with mothers' employment was examined by the logistic regression analysis.

However, childcare costs were positively associated with the likelihood of mothers being employed, rather than having a negative link to mothers' employment. That is to say, the multivariate analysis models did not reveal much about the association of the childcare costs burden with mothers' employment behaviour, apart from suggesting that more childcare expenses were paid by working mothers who needed childcare. However, an earlier study of Korean married women's unemployment, using the Cox-hazard analysis (Jang and Kim, 2001:15-16) suggested that childcare costs were a problem faced by lower-income women in particular. Even though the multivariate analysis models have failed to show any association between the burden of childcare costs and mothers' job take-up, it must be not be forgotten that mothers, particularly those with dependent children aged under 6, are more likely to have high burden of childcare costs in Korea where public childcare support is very limited and the family's responsibility for childcare is taken for granted rather than considered a societal responsibility. However, parental welfare is observed to be closely related to mothers' labour market participation from the linear regression analysis models.

It seems clear that corporate parental welfare has a positive link to mothers continuing to work, as well documented in previous studies. Fraser (1994:601-602) emphasized the role of welfare schemes as employment-enabling services; for instance, day care for children and the elderly is crucial in order to help women take up full-time employment. Furthermore, the frequency analysis of corporate welfare by gender shows a gender difference in the entitlement to workplace welfare. As indicated by Fraser (1994:606-607), mentioned in the literature in Chapter 2, *comparable worth* in a social insurance programme is required to bring women's entitlement up to parity with men's and to redress widespread devaluation of feminine skills and jobs including care-giving, which is central to workplace reforms for gender equality. In short, all the statistical results indicate that women bear a higher burden of childcare costs and there is a low level of support for parental welfare in the workplace, suggesting that the gendered welfare regime plays an important role in mothers' employment behaviour by restricting mothers' decision toward continuing their careers, particularly with dependent children. This could explain at least in part – but it is an important part – why Korean mothers' labour market participation is relatively low compared to other Western countries. Thirdly, regarding the long work-hour culture, the statistical analyses, including the

frequency analysis and linear regression, show a significant association between the long work-hour culture and mothers' labour market participation. From the frequency analysis, mothers worked almost as long as fathers and their work-hours were not much shorter, even in more flexible jobs such as casual and part-time jobs. In particular, the evidence of no great gender difference in work-hours suggests that long work-hours is a problem faced by mothers but not by fathers, because the pressure on mothers' time rises with family care in addition to paid work. As a result, mothers are more likely to reduce their paid working hours or withdraw from the labour market, while fathers tend to remain in employment without reducing their working hours.

The multivariate analysis confirms this by showing that long work-hours contribute to mother's interrupted employment but not fathers'. Similarly, previous studies have also found a gender differentiated effect of long working hours. You (2008:56-58) found that a couple's long working days impact on the employment behaviour of Korean couples differently: in the case of households with children, male spouses tend to increase their work-hours and female spouses tend to reduce them. Jacobs and Gerson (2001:46, 60-61) also pointed out that long working hours have important implications for family welfare and gender equality, increased workloads and cultural pressures. Overall, the implication is that problems arising from Korea's long work-hour culture – such as difficulty in achieving a good work-life balance – are more likely to be faced by mothers rather than fathers, and thus Korean mothers with young children have little choice but to withdraw temporarily from the labour market.

5.8 Conclusion

The statistical analysis results showed that a considerable number of mothers, particularly those in low-status employment, reported having experienced discrimination, compared with their male counterparts, suggesting that gender inequality persists in the Korean labour market. Also, the statistical results indicate that women bear a higher burden of childcare costs, although the statistical models failed to find any significant association between the burden of childcare costs and mothers'

labour market participation. Furthermore, there was a low level of support for parental welfare in the workplace and parental welfare was positively associated with mothers' labour market participation. Lastly, the long work-hour culture was negatively associated with mothers' labour market behaviour.

Overall, the findings show that gender-biased workplace practices (in terms of pay, promotion and discrimination), low parental welfare support in the workplace and the long work-hour culture in Korea correlate negatively with Korean mothers' labour market participation, thus suggesting that the gender welfare regime plays a significant role in mothers' employment behaviour. To conclude, considering all the statistical results for mothers' employment, there are three issues regarding Korean institutions which are relevant for policy makers: *Inequality in the labour market is widely accepted; there is a lack of parental welfare including support for childcare expenses; problems arising from the long work-hours are faced by mothers but not by fathers.*

Chapter 6

Class identity and mothers' labour market participation

As feminist scholars have pointed out, employment (occupation)-based class analysis is problematic because it 'excludes' women who are not in employment, and thus an alternative comprehensive measurement needs to be devised (Crompton, 1998:92-98). Taking this into account, in order to include all women, whether working outside or in the home, this thesis takes a social status identity-based approach to examine whether women's social status identity is closely linked to their labour market behaviour, focusing on mothers in particular. In this thesis, class refers to socio-economic status within three nominal categories of upper, middle and lower status for analytical convenience. From the perspective that subjective class identification is considered important as a mediator to connect social structure and human behaviour (Kim, 2000:262), this thesis assumes that women's labour market behaviour is differentiated according to their class identity.

It is an attempt to understand the ways in which class identity has an association with an individual's labour market behaviour, just as class location impacts on the potential to sell one's labour (commoditisation) in the labour market (Wright, 2005:20-1). Importantly, there is no Korean literature on class identification focusing on mothers. This chapter pays special attention to mothers with children less than 19 years old, along with a comparative analysis by gender. In short, the chapter sets out to explore the correlation between social class identity and mothers' labour market participation, along with further examination of any association between children's education in relation to social mobility and labour market behaviour.

6.1 Class identification by gender

As discussed in Chapter 2, the class Koreans see themselves belonging to has been well documented; generally, it was found that Korean married women tended to borrow or share their spouse's social status, even when they were employed, whereas a female spouse's status did not seem to affect her husband's status identification (Lee and Shin, 2009:285-286). Furthermore, in relation to employment status and class identification, Korean married men and women tended to report their class status as lower if their own

or their spouse's employment status was a non-permanent contract, reflecting the fact that irregular employment jobs are placed in the lower hierarchy of the Korean labour market (Lee and Shin, 2009:285-286). Further to the previous observations of the characteristics of Korean married people's class identification, this chapter provides a gender-comparative analysis of class identification between mothers and fathers, with a special focus on parenthood where there are dependent and school age children under 19 years old, unlike the previous literature, which included all married individuals.

First of all, looking at class identification by employment status (Table 6.1), the majority of mothers in permanent or self-employed work tended to identify themselves as middle class, compared with only 44 per cent of mothers in irregular employment. Also, lower class identification was the lowest among self-employed mothers (about 27 per cent) than the others, even lower than permanent workers: 32.3 per cent for permanent workers and 56 per cent for irregular workers. As for fathers, permanent (about 75 per cent) and self-employed workers (about 69 per cent) identified their class as middle class, while only 41 per cent of irregular workers did so. Unlike mothers, more self-employed fathers tended to report themselves as lower class (about 29 per cent) than did permanent workers (about 24 per cent).

Table 6.1 Mothers' and fathers' class identification by employment status[a] (percentage, 2006)

% within employment status (the number of cases, N)		upper class	middle class	lower class
Mother	Workers in permanent employment	1.4 (6)	66.4 (288)	32.3 (140)
	Irregular(nonstandard) workers	0.6 (1)	43.5 (70)	55.9 (90)
	Self-employed and unpaid family workers	2.4 (7)	70.4 (205)	27.1 (79)
	Sub-total % (N)	1.6 (14)	63.5 (563)	34.9 (309)
Father	Workers in permanent employment	1.9 (19)	74.5 (757)	23.6 (240)
	Irregular(nonstandard) workers	0.0 (0)	40.7 (59)	59.3 (86)
	Self-employed and unpaid family workers	2.2 (11)	69.2 (352)	28.7 (146)
	Sub-total % (N)	1.8 (30)	69.9 (1168)	28.3 (472)

Source: the 9th wave, KLIPS. Note: [a] see also Table 6.A in the Appendix.

Therefore, middle class self-identification was higher among permanent workers than in any other group. Like mothers, fathers in irregular employment reported themselves as predominantly lower class. Overall, the class self-identification of both mothers and fathers clearly shows that irregular employment negatively influences workers' perceived class identity. Previous studies regarding class identification mostly concentrated on employment or occupation based class identity like the above analysis of class identification by employment status, which provides only information from those who are employed, excluding non-working people, who are predominantly women. Nonetheless, Lee and Shin's study of Korean married men's and married women's class self-identification (2009) paid attention to the 'transition' to being non-working although it was mainly an employment aggregate based analysis including all ages of married individuals.

To reiterate, Lee and Shin (2009:281) found that married women tended to upwardly report their status when their employment status changes from irregular employment to being non-working. Married men did the same when their spouse's employment status changed from being irregular to being non-working. This implies that female spouses' non-employment, as stay-at-home mothers, is considered a 'legitimate culture' in Korea. Although the study found that both married men and married women tended to report upwardly when the female spouse's employment status changed from irregular employment to being non-working, there was no implication in the study that social class identity might correlate with mothers' different labour market behaviour; that is, making a decision between paid work and staying at home. Furthermore, neither did the study show any variations between the employed and non-working, and in particular, it gave no indication as to whether mothers' class identification might be associated with their spouses' occupations or income rather than their own employment status, due to their (probably) interrupted careers. None of these issues have been examined in the literature; thus, they need to be examined in this thesis. Therefore, an inclusive analysis of class identification by both the employed and the non-working, and also both sexes, follows.

As shown in Table 6.2 and Figure 6.1 of this chapter, class identification by economic activity status (either being employed or non-working, apart from unemployed) was

quite different between mothers and fathers. It was clear that mothers tended to identify their status as middle class, overall, regardless of their economic activity status. Interestingly, there was a tendency by non-working mothers to upwardly report more than employed mothers; nearly 70 per cent of non-working mothers reported themselves as middle class, while only 64 per cent of employed mothers did so. On the other hand, there was a clear difference between non-working and employed fathers: only 38 per cent of non-working fathers identified their status as middle class, whereas the majority of employed fathers, 70 per cent, saw themselves as middle-class. Comparing the class identification by gender of employed mothers and fathers, for those who saw themselves as lower class the proportions were higher among mothers than fathers. Furthermore, between non-working mothers and fathers, there was a clearer contrast both in middle class and lower class self-identification: most mothers, 70 per cent, identified themselves as middle class while only 38 per cent of fathers did so; while the number of mothers who identified themselves as lower class was half that of fathers. Presumably, this is due to the fact that although mothers are more likely to occupy the lower hierarchy of the labour market, they see themselves in class terms through their husband's occupation.

Table 6.2 Mothers and fathers' class identification by economic activity status (percentage, 2006)

% within economic activity status (the number of cases, N)		Upper class	Middle class	Lower class
Mother[a]	Non-working	1.7 (17)	69.9 (681)	28.3 (276)
	Employed	1.6 (14)	63.5 (563)	34.9 (309)
	Sub-total % (N)	1.7 (31)	66.9 (1244)	31.5 (585)
Father	Non-working	0.9 (1)	38.2 (42)	60.9 (67)
	Employed	1.8 (30)	69.9 (1168)	28.3 (472)
	Sub-total % (N)	1.7 (31)	68.0 (1210)	30.3 (539)

Source: the 9th wave, KLIPS. Note: [a] see Tables 6.B & 6.C in the Appendix.

In short, from this statistical result, it is evident that mothers' class identification is not affected much by their economic activity status, by contrast with that of fathers. Also,

the tendency to identify their class with reference to their own occupation or labour force status is stronger among employed mothers than among non-working mothers who seemingly borrow their spouse's status. That is, the tendency to identify themselves through their spouse's social status is more apparent among non-working mothers. Figure 6.1 shows more clearly the gender difference in class identification by economic activity status, with a particularly notable contrast between non-working mothers and fathers.

Figure 6.1 Gender difference in class identification by economic activity status (percentage, 2006)



Source: the 9th wave, KLIPS.

6.2 Why have middle class status perceptions decreased sharply since 2005?

In the past, members of the middle class in Korea in the 1980s were defined by their occupations; for instance, self-employed workers included unpaid family workers, service job workers, bureaucrats and rich agriculturalists (Seo, 1987:108-112). As capitalist industrial output became highly developed, the number of workers forming

the middle area of the hierarchy between labourers and capital owners has been increasing since the 1980s and contributing to the considerable expansion of the middle class. Along with the dramatic growth of this class, middle class identity or consciousness has become popular in contemporary Korean society, and as a result, class identity rather than class structure has been paid more attention than ever before. Class identity seems to be formed by a complicated mixture of elements; that is, economic and social status plus other variables such as education, occupation, living space (housing), disposable resources, age, parents' education and occupation, regions, and culture (consumption) (Choi, 2008:73-74).

As shown below in Figure 6.2, the middle class and lower class accounted respectively for over 80 per cent and under 20 per cent, until 2002, while since 2005 the middle class has been reduced to 66 percent and the lower class has risen sharply to over 30 per cent of the total. The most likely reason is the different measures used to determine class identity in the KLIPS waves. In relation to the measurement issue, past research has found that middle class identification or lower class identification differed according to the number and terminology of the categories used for class measurement (Kim, 2000:243-244, 250).

Figure 6.2 The sudden changes in class identification in 2005 and 2006 (percentage, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2005 and 2006)



Source: the 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 8th, and 9th wave, KLIPS

That is to say, middle class identification decreased when a fourth 'working class' category was added to the original three class categories of upper, middle and lower class, dividing the lower class into *working class* and *low or underclass*, while middle class identification increased again when an upper middle class category was added to the basic three categories, thus dividing middle class into upper and lower. In the previous social surveys of class (1981, 1988, 1991, 1994), using a six-category measurement (upper/lower upper class, upper/lower middle class, and upper/lower lower class), the proportions of those seeing themselves as middle class stayed around 60 percent (Kim, 2000:250). The statistics observed by Kim's study (2000) were similar to those of the KLIPS 2005 and 2006 surveys, using a six-category measurement, where middle class perceptions stayed around 66 percent. Regarding upper class identification, past studies also observed similar results to the KLIPS class data, that the proportion of people who identified themselves as upper class was very small (Kim, 2000:251).

More specifically, the measurements of class identity used in KLIPS were different over the five years, as shown in Table 6.3. There were 4 categories in the 2nd, 3rd and 5th waves, and 6 categories were used to measure class perceptions in the 8th and 9th waves. Whether this was due to inserting 'middle middle class' or dropping 'upper lower class', the size of the middle class grew in the years 1999, 2000, and 2002.

Table 6.3 Differing measurements (sub-categories) of class identity by year (percentage, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2005 and 2006)

% for self-defined class		1999	2000[a]	2002[b]	2005	2006
Upper class	Upper	0.2	0.2 (0.1)	0.3 (0.1)	0.3	0.3
	Lower				0.8	1.4
Middle class	Upper	19.6	3.8 (2.8)	4.1 (3.0)	22.3	21.6
	Middle	.	35.6 (32.4)	45.8 (42.5)	.	.
	Lower	60.9	40.2 (42.8)	36.5 (40.1)	44.3	45.3
Lower class	Upper	19.3	20.2 (21.9)	13.3 (14.3)	21.1	21.7
	Lower				11.3	9.7

Source: the 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 8th, and 9th wave, KLIPS. Note: in the 2000 and 2002 waves (a, b) subjective class identity is divided into two, giving social status first and then economic status in brackets.

In addition, by adding ‘upper low class’, the size of the lower class increased dramatically in 2005 and 2006. This suggests strongly that perceived class size can be different according to different measurements. However, Kim (2000:252) also suggested that the proportion of people perceiving themselves to be middle class declined due to rapid socioeconomic change. For instance, middle class identification in 1998 shrank considerably after the currency crisis at the end of 1997 (Kim, 2000:252; Hong and Kim, 2006:8-9). This is closely associated with the labour market restructuring in the early 2000s. Self-employed businesses increased steadily along with the increase in early-retirement, resulting from the restructuring of businesses after the financial crisis at the end of 1997 (the currency bailouts); however, the number of businesses declined after the credit crisis in 2003 and has continued to do so since then (Keum et al., 2006:45-46, 2009:7-9). The proportion of non-wage earners (employer, self-employed and unpaid family workers) declined by 3.1 per cent between 2003 and 2007 while remaining around 30 percent of the total employment share (Keum et al., 2009:14). With the collapse of small and poor self-employed businesses, unpaid family workers as well as self-employed workers became unemployed or entered irregular (temporary or daily) employment (Keum et al., 2009:7-9). Thus, the influence of socio-economic change on class identification cannot be ignored.

On the other hand, people’s class identity perceptions may be associated with their life cycle, because people lose their labour market power as they grow older. ‘Panel’ data from KLIPS showed that Korean married women’s class identity moved downwards as they aged. Most importantly, it should be noted that older women tended to have lower class identity due to their weaker labour market status, or because for most of their lives they had been outside the labour market, suggesting that women’s social class is more likely to drop in old age. In relation to this phenomenon, Lee and Shin (2009:281-282)’s study found that Korean married men and women identified their class status as going downwards in their 40s and 50s. According to the study, the recent restructuring practices of businesses and the recent dramatic collapses of self-employed businesses have contributed to the increase in middle-aged men’s job instability, causing them consequent downward economic status.

6.3 Misidentification of class

The very small percentage of people who see themselves as upper class may simply be associated with the popularity of the middle class. Middle class is the preferred perceived class status, especially by the upper class and (upper) lower class, leading to misidentification issues. To examine respondents' misidentification of their socio-economic class, an objective economic measure (for instance, household income) is used, although it is disputable as people's class is identified here in reference to their social status as well as economic status. That is, respondents' subjective class identification was compared with their economic class, divided into higher, middle and lower income class in terms of the median income of the study population, in accordance with Choi's definition of middle class (2008) as a group whose income accounts for between 150 per cent and 50 per cent of the median income. By the cross-tabulation analysis, throughout the 5 waves, the proportions of those seeing themselves as upper class were very small, as shown in Figure 6.2. According to Table 6.4, under-reporting was evident in the higher and middle income groups. In particular, higher income people identifying themselves as middle class reached over 80 per cent, and also middle income people reporting themselves downwardly accounted for nearly 40 per cent. Upper-reporting by lower income groups was also notable; around 22 percent of lower income group people identified themselves as middle class.

Table 6.4 The percentages of subjective class identification by three income groups as defined by their household income* (percentage, 2006)

	Subjective social class identity			% of total N (1874)
	Upper class	Middle class	Lower class	
Higher income class	3.8	84.3	11.9	39.0
Middle income class	0.2	60.9	38.9	53.6
Lower income class	1.5	22.2	76.3	7.3
% of total N (1874)	1.7	67.2	31.1	100

Source: the 9th wave, KLIPS (mothers only). * Note: income class groups are divided into three by median household income. According to Choi (2008), middle income class is defined by a group whose income accounts for between 150 per cent and 50 per cent of the median income (25,800,000 Korean won).

Under-reporting of upper class respondents is explained by Granovetter (1988)'s class identification in terms of a reference group (Jang, 1996:190). That is, people identify their socio-economic status with reference to their social group rather than their income. Upper class people are more likely to interact with lower than upper class people and thus, they tend to place themselves in between the upper class and middle class because their reference group tends to be upper middle or lower middle class. That is why upper class people tend to identify themselves as middle class. Conversely, the higher-reporting phenomenon occurs because lower class people tend to identify themselves as middle class because their reference group is more likely to be middle or upper class (Jang, 1996:190-191). However, Bourdieu (1984) explains this by the dynamics of distinction; that is, individuals' dispositions are defined by the hierarchy of social structures, and hence individuals or groups tend to place their subjective class higher than their economic class to distinguish themselves from others. This can also be explained psychologically, in that most people tend to place themselves in the middle as a psychological self-defence mechanism (Jang, 1996:190; Hong and Kim, 2006:8). Keeping in mind the characteristics of Korean people's class identification, class measurement issues, and class misidentification issues as discussed above, I now turn to the statistical analysis to explore any association between Korean mothers' class identity (hereafter, 'class') and their labour market behaviour.

6.4 Class and maternity divisions in labour market participation

The charts below show that the percentage differences between the non-working (non-employed) and the employed (calculated by subtracting the employed percentage from the non-employed percentage) over the years were very different when comparing all married women and mothers and were also different according to each class (see also Tables 6.B and 6.C in the Appendix). The difference between the non-working and the employed shares was highly positive for middle class mothers (Figure 6.3-2) and it was highly negative for working class mothers (Figure 6.3-1) throughout the five years. This

clearly suggests that the non-employment is over-represented among middle class mothers and also that middle class identity is strongly associated with non-working, while working class identity is strongly associated with being in work. Overall, these charts indicate that there are class divisions in mothers' labour market behaviour.

Figure 6.3 The difference between non-employment and employment for all married women (6.3-1) / only for mothers (6.3-2) by class over the years, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2005 and 2006



Source: the 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 8th and 9th waves of KLIPS.

Table 6.5 Mothers' labour market activity by their class identity in 2005 (percentage, cases)

% of Total N (4016)	Work	Family & work	Non-working (family)	Row-total %
Upper class	0.4 (17)	0.0 (0)	0.9 (38)	1.4 (55)
Middle class	22.1 (887)	4.5 (180)	32.3 (1298)	58.9 (2365)
Lower class	17.2 (689)	3.4 (138)	19.1 (769)	39.7 (1596)
Column-total %	39.7 (1593)	7.9 (318)	52.4 (2105)	100.0 (4016)

Note: Divisions between work and family are based on the survey question 'What was your main activity during the last week?' in the 8th wave of KLIPS. Pearson $x^2(4)$: 25.616, ***p<0001

Table 6.5 also shows clearly that the shares of non-working and employed people were greater in the upper and middle classes than in the lower class, where the share was

nearly equal. It also gives a broad picture of mothers' low labour market participation overall, along with the low percentages of people who combine paid work and caring for their family. The class difference in mothers' labour market activity was statistically supported by the chi-square test, which was highly significant. Based on these simple statistical analyses, this thesis now attempts to examine whether there is a significant association between class and mothers' labour market behaviour in terms of a logistic regression model, along with providing a comparison between mothers and fathers.

6.5 Gender and class divisions in labour market participation

The stepwise logistic regression model for 2006 in Table 6.6 shows the odds ratios for mothers being employed, with class variable included. With strong significance at the model goodness-of-fit at the final step, children's age cohorts, class identity, household income and education were significantly associated with the probability of mothers being employed. Of particular note here is that class identity was very significant; upper and middle classes were negatively associated, meaning that upper and middle class mothers tend to stay at home compared with lower class mothers. This model also shows that education was positively associated with the probability of being employed.

The logistic regression models in Table 6.7 show the statistically different results between mothers and fathers and the results for mothers across the selected years. First of all, class identity was very significantly associated with both mothers' and fathers' labour market participation, indicating class-distinct labour market behaviour. Importantly, the contrast between middle class mothers and fathers is more apparent; that is, compared with lower class mothers, middle class ones are more likely to stay at home, whereas middle class fathers are more likely to work. As for children's age cohorts, those of 0 to 5 and 12 to 18 were significantly associated with mothers' labour market participation compared with the insignificance of its association with fathers' behaviour, while the children's age cohort of 6 to 11 was significantly (negatively) associated with both mothers and fathers. Furthermore, this gender comparative analysis shows that education was significant for mothers, but not for fathers, while age was

significant for fathers, but not for mothers. In short, middle class identity was negatively associated with mothers' labour market behaviour, but positively associated with fathers' labour market behaviour.

Table 6.6 Logistic regression (stepwise) analysis on whether employed or not for mothers – class factors

Statistics: odds ratios - Exp(B)	Step1	Step2	Step3	Step4	Step5	Step6
Children aged 0 to 5	.446***	.546***	.544***	.555***	.599*	.579***
Children aged 6 to11					.821**	.822*
Children aged 12 to18		1.362***	1.358***	1.346***	1.300**	1.320**
Social class (Lower class is base)				**	***	***
upper class				.520	.432*	.401*
middle class				.574***	.584***	.554***
Household income (logged)			1.280**	1.422***	1.651***	1.599***
Education (year)						1.109*
Age						
N	1844	1844	1844	1844	1844	1844
-2 Log likelihood	2460.43	2438.45	2418.07	2396.54	2390.99	2386.23
Model improvement (Chi-square)[a]	92.47***	114.41***	134.79***	156.32***	161.87***	166.63***

Source: the 9th wave (2006), KLIPS. Note: statistics are rounded off; [a] the models for Step 2 & 5 are insignificant in the Hosmer&Lemeshow goodness-fit-test within 10% p-value.
Legend : * p<0.05 (sig. at 95%), ** p<0.01 (sig. at 99%), *** p<0.001 (sig. at 99.9%)

Apart from gender differences or gender inequality, is there any difference between the years, considering that the percentages of people perceiving themselves to belong to each class has changed over time, as discussed above? Looking at the statistical results of mothers' class identity over time through recursive tests over four selected years (Table 6.7), there was not much variation in the results (except 2000), showing no significant correlation between class identity and employment probability. Nonetheless, notably, the association between being upper class and employed (which is negative) became significant in 2006 and that between being middle class and employed holds the high significance (p value) across the selected years. To conclude, from the logistic

regression results throughout the studied years it is evident that class is strongly associated with Korean mothers' labour market behaviour.

Table 6.7 Logistic regression (stepwise) analyses on whether employed or not by year and by gender (class factors) – statistics presented for the last step only (See Table 6.D for 'enter-method' analysis model with child costs and Table 6.E for all the steps in the Appendix)

Statistics: odds ratios - Ex(B)	Mother			By gender (2006)	
	2000	2002	2005	Mother	Father[1]
Children aged 0 to 5	.529***	.555***	.613***	.579***	
Children aged 6 to11				.822*	.722*
Children aged 12 to18	1.344***	1.346***	1.355***	1.320**	
Social class (Lower class is base)		**	**	***	**
upper class		.520	.418	.401*	1.098
middle class		.574***	.647***	.554***	2.378***
Household income (logged)	1.257**	1.422***	1.457***	1.599***	2.754***
Education (year)				1.109*	
Age					.928***
N	1851	1828	1885	1844	1522
Model Chi-square (goodness-of-fit)	154.80***	159.65***	145.03***	166.63***	95.44***
-2 Log likelihood	2396.86	2371.17	2457.58	2386.23	610.11
Hosmer&Lemeshow test x^2*(sig.)*	24.52**	30.34***	21.09**	22.22**	21.08**

Source: the 3rd, 5th, 8th and 9th waves, KLIPS. Note: statistics are rounded off; [1] children age cohort of 6 to 11 for fathers was not significant in the 'enter-method' analysis models (see Table 6.D in the Appendix).
Legend: * p<0.05 (sig. at 95%), ** p<0.01 (sig. at 99%), *** p<0.001 (sig. at 99.9%), ! p<0.10 (sig. at 90%)

In addition to the above statistical results showing the over-representation of middle class mothers in the non-working sector in Korea, a further analysis of Korean mothers' labour market behaviour predicted by the interaction between class and children's age cohorts provided far more interesting and important observations. The statistical results were consistently similar throughout the four periods, as shown in Table 6.8. When there were young children aged less than 6, Korean mothers tended to stay at home regardless of their class identity, whether middle or lower class. As to the interaction

between class and the children's age cohort 6 to 11 (primary school age) there were negative associations for middle class mothers, whereas this was not the case for lower class mothers. The statistics for the middle class were very significant and negatively associated in 2005 and 2006 whereas those for the lower class were not significant overall, except 2002 which shows a positive and significant association. It suggests that lower class mothers tend to remain in the labour market when their children reach primary-school age (note also that statistics for the middle class are less than 0, whereas those for the lower class are more than 1).

Table 6.8 Korean mothers' labour market behaviour predictions from the interaction between social class and child age cohorts by year – statistics presented for the last step only (See Table 6.F for all the steps in the Appendix)

Statistics: odds ratios - Ex(B) Logistic regression (stepwise) analysis on whether employed or not	Mother			
	2000	2002	2005	2006
Children aged 0 to 5 by middle class[1]	.532***	.564***	.535***	.529***
Children aged 6 to 11 by middle class			.705***	.688***
Children aged 12 to 18 by middle class	1.247**	1.307**		
Children aged 0 to 5 by lower class[1]	.539**	.589*	.439***	.517***
Children aged 6 to 11 by lower class		1.402*		
Children aged 12 to 18 by lower class	1.752***	2.060***	1.478***	1.578***
Household income (logged)	1.344***	1.415***	1.446***	1.643***
Age				
Education (year)				
N	1851	1828	1885	1844
Model Chi-square (goodness-of-fit)	162.39***	162.60***	157.98***	168.23***
-2 Log likelihood	2389.27	2368.22	2444.63	2384.63
Hosmer&Lemeshow test x^2 *(sig.)*	22.40**	30.98***	12.73	16.54*

Source: the 3rd , 5th, 8th and 9th waves, KLIPS. Note: statistics are rounded off; [1] class variables are dummy. Legend : * p<0.05 (sig. at 95%), ** p<0.01 (sig. at 99%), *** p<0.001 (sig. at 99.9%)

Finally, when there are children aged over 11, Korean mothers from both the middle and lower classes are more likely to be in work; statistics for middle class were insignificant in 2005 and 2006, and furthermore, the significance levels were greater for lower class

mothers than middle class ones (note that the odds ratios for the lower class were greater than those for the middle class in 2000 and 2002). The statistical results reveal more about Korean mothers' labour market behaviour; that is, mothers' labour market behaviour is likely to be differentiated by the interaction between children's ages and class. Furthermore, the statistical evidence that Korean mothers tend to be employed after childrearing strongly suggests that married women's labour market behaviour cannot be fully explained without considering family life cycle (reflected by children's age cohorts in this thesis, instead of women's age cohorts).

Mothers' labour market behaviour may be explained by the traditional Confucian gender norms, which put greater emphasis on mothers' responsibilities for rearing children, as more fully discussed in Chapter 4. Won and Pascall (2004:274) believe the traditional Confucian assumptions about gender relations still hold good in Korean families, based on the contrasting roles of motherhood and fatherhood: 'motherhood frequently brings withdrawal from paid work while fatherhood strengthens men's role as breadwinners' (Won and Pascall, 2004:273). However, this does not explain fully the over-representation of middle class mothers' withdrawal from the labour market and their later return (as shown in Tables 6.6, 6.7 and 6.8) in Korea, where gender equality ideas have become widespread with the narrowing of the gender gap in education. Thus, a 'classful' perspective (according to Duncan's terminology, 2005:73) seems useful to explain Korean mothers' labour market behaviour; for instance, McRae (2003) indicated the importance of structural constraints such as class. McRae (2003:334) argued that women's employment after childbirth depended greatly on how they understood the constraints and on their ability to overcome these constraints, which were patterned by social structures manifested through differing qualifications, social networks or income levels. That is, women's interpretations of the courses of action open to them could differ according to their class location (McRae, 2003:330). Nonetheless, McRae did not provide any further explanations as to why class-differentiated behaviour occurs. Therefore, the reasons why class-differentiated behaviour occurs, particularly that of the 'middle class', need to be explained in this chapter and are elaborated next.

6.6 Children's education expenditure, social mobility beliefs and mothers' labour market participation

From the above statistical results, it is clear that Korean mothers' labour market behaviour cannot be fully understood without taking class into account. So why does Korean mothers' behaviour differ according to their class perceptions? It appears to be associated with cultural-specific concerns or investment in children's education. In the Korean cultural context, their children's education is always important for parents, especially for mothers. Apart from state schooling, private education – which refers to extra courses through crammers and catch-up classes after regular attendance at state school – is always a concern for Korean parents, as are social issues such as the burden of the expense and inequality in private education between classes. The popularity of private education in Korea seems unrelated to the quality of state education (although there are arguments about the failure of state schooling) in that parents want to support their children's academic ability through private education to improve the academic performance from attending state schools alone. As mothers are seen as the children's education managers (Shin, 2001:97) and also bear the burden of education expenses, this is likely to have a link to mothers' behaviour or attitude in their daily lives. For instance, they may take up paid work in order to be able to afford the costs of private education for their children. Alternatively, they may stay at home to devote themselves to caring for their children and helping their education. This explanation needs examining because it could reveal more about mothers' class-differentiated labour market behaviour.

First of all, in KLIPS the data for children's education is combined with childcare data. Thus, childcare costs need to be excluded from the surveys of child care/education costs in KLIPS. In order to restrict the data analysis to child education costs alone, children's age is restricted to those aged over 6 because that is when children start primary school and when they do not need so much childcare so are more likely to take private 'catch-up' classes in addition to formal state education. The statistics in Table 6.9 below show the amounts spent on each child's education and its percentage of the total household

income. It shows that the monthly average expenditure on private education in a family has more than doubled over the years, increasing from the equivalent of 85 pounds sterling in 2000 to 198 pounds sterling in 2006. Looking at the share of household income, the proportion remained at over 10 per cent throughout 2000 to 2006. Speculating about the large proportion of the total household income, especially from the indications that some families have spent most of their income on private education, and even taking into account that some of them may have reported their household income inaccurately, it reveals a great deal about how much concern Korean families have for their children's education.

Table 6.9 Private education costs for children per household and the proportion of household income spent (monthly average costs for households with children aged between 6 and 18) in 2000, 2002, 2005 and 2006

	2000[a]			2002			2005			2006		
	Min	Max	mean	Min	Max	mean	Min	Max	Mean	Min	Max	mean
Education costs (£[b])	0	2,400	£85	0	3,500	£171	0	1,175	£178	0	1,215	£198
Spending (%) out of household income	0	120	10.0 %	0	138	13.5 %	0	92	10.6 %	0	150	10.6 %

Source: the 3rd, 5th, 8th, and 9th wave, KLIPS. Note: [a] statistics for 2000 were calculated from the 2001 data due to the data availability; [b] pounds were computed by an approximate currency exchange rate £1: 2,000 Korean won, and pounds and percentages are rounded off.

Looking at the spending on private education by class (Figure 6.4), the upper class spends far more than the other classes, on average around 930,000 Korean won (£465), compared to around 588,000 Korean won (£294) by the middle class and around 223,000 Korean won (£112) by the lower class. The upper class and middle class spent respectively more than four times and nearly three times as much as the lower class. The box-plot analysis shows clearly the considerable difference between the classes and the range was widest in the upper class and smallest in the lower class. The fact that lower class spending was concentrated at the bottom tells us that many lower class families did not spend any money on education or only a little, implying that either they could not afford to do so, or were not much concerned about it.

Figure 6.4 Spending on children's private education by class in 2006 (10,000 Korean Won)



Source: Statistics for spending on children's private education, the 9th wave, KLIPS.

The proportion of the household monthly income spent on children's private education has more implications for differences between the classes. According to Table 6.10, below, the upper class spent on average 14 per cent in 2005 and 10 per cent in 2006 of their household income, while the middle class spent around 13 per cent (both in 2005 and 2006), while the lower class spent about 11 per cent in 2005 and 10 per cent in 2006.

Table 6.10 The percentage of household monthly income spent on children's private education by perceived class identification [a] (percentage, 2005 and 2006[b])

% out of household income	2005			2006		
	Min.	Max.	Mean	Min.	Max.	Mean
Upper class	3.7	40.3	14.4	0	41.9	10.4
Middle class	0	86.0	12.5	0	63.4	13.3
Lower class	0	92.0	11.2	0	60.0	9.8

Source: the 3rd, 5th, 8th and 9th waves, KLIPS. Note: [a] statistics for households with children of primary school age and above (aged between 6 and 18) and are rounded off; [b] statistics for 2000 and 2002 were not provided, due to the different class categorisation from2005 and 2006.

The difference in the percentage of household income spent looks small between the

classes. However, considering their financial situation, the relative actual amount from their total income might be much greater for the middle class and even more so for the lower class, compared to the upper class; for instance, if the same amount was spent by families from the three different classes, the burden would be very different for each class; in other words, in terms of total household income level, it is a small sum for upper class people, but greater for the middle class and greatest for the lower class. The statistics of the amounts spent on children's education per class suggests strongly that class divisions are highly likely to be sustained or reinforced by the different amounts invested in children's private education in Korea.

Having seen the differences in the amounts spent by each class, how did mothers from the different classes feel about the burden of costs? Table 6.11 shows how the expense was considered by each class. First of all, overall, around half the mothers (54 per cent) reported the costs of private education to be a burden, while 23 per cent of mothers did not use any private education institutes for their children's education. Secondly, more middle class mothers (57 per cent) reported the costs a burden compared with the women in other classes (33 per cent of upper class and 43 per cent of lower class). Lastly, the percentage not spending any money on private education was highest in the lower class (38 per cent), while the percentages for middle class and upper class accounted for 19 per cent and 0 per cent respectively. That is, in the study population, nearly 40 per cent of the lower class spent no money at all on private education whereas most of the middle class (over 80 per cent) and all the upper class spent some money on their children's education.

Table 6.11 The percentages of mothers who see children's education costs [a] as a burden, by class (percentage, 2001)

		A burden	All right	Not a burden	No spending (no use)	Column-total%
Overall %		54.4	18.8	4.1	22.8	100
% within class	Upper class	33.3	33.3	33.3	0.0	100
	Middle class	57.2	19.5	4.5	18.8	100
	Lower class	43.8	15.8	2.1	38.3	100

Source: the 4th wave, KLIPS. Note: [a] statistics are for children aged more than 5 (between 6 and 18).

This suggests a wide gap between the classes in investment in their children's education, as well as suggesting that many children from the lower class are excluded from private schooling – which is extremely popular in Korea – after attending state schooling. However, the most important thing to note is that more than half of the lower class use at least one private institute (while 38 per cent of the lower class do not use any), suggesting that they spend some money on their children's private education even though it is presumed they have limited funds. From this, it seems that lower class mothers' attitude toward their children's education is divided, rather than uniform. In this regard, a study found evidence that working class people have high aspirations for upward class mobility as do the middle class (Hatcher, 1998:15). It seems that many Korean mothers of the lower class are also under the Korean cultural-specific emphasis on children's education, while it is highly likely that many of the lower class just cannot afford to pay extra for their children's education. The statistical results raise the question: Why do Korean mothers spend money on their children's education, especially private education, despite the burden it places on the family income?

To recapitulate the literature discussion in Chapter 2, in Korea private education is perceived as a strategy for class reproduction and a means of upward social mobility (Kim and Yeom, 2009:31). The desire for social mobility through educational attainment is still quite strong in Korean society (Shin, 2001:234-235). Again, the desire for upward mobility has led to an interest in private education, sometimes causing excessive expense on it, especially amongst upper *and middle* class parents, as shown in the above statistics. As to why upper class families have an interest in private education, this is explained by a (British) study finding that 'affluent middle class parents believe that paying for private education would provide their children with an edge in the competitive world of academic success and high-status careers' (Hatcher, 1998:13). Likewise, Korean families from the higher classes have a greater interest in private education; that is, as educational opportunities have expanded in Korea, more children seek higher education as well as higher status occupations, and hence the competition becomes greater. As a result, parents from the higher classes need more secure (from downward mobility) measurements through greater investment in informal private education as distinct from formal education. This explains also why class differences have remained in Korea, perhaps worsened by the increasing gap in private education

investment between the different classes.

On the other hand, Kim and Yeom (2009:31) explain Korean parents' great interest in private education as being due to the fear of downward mobility, rather than from the perspective of state education failure or Confucian-cultural specific traditions with a strong emphasis on education. Kim and Yeom (2009:34) argue that families from all classes try to avoid downward mobility but families' responses to the risk of downward mobility differ according to class. This is why there are class differences in private education investment, although the difference in access to material resources seems most likely (Kim and Yeom, 2009:35). This argument is also supported by a Western study conducted by Gillies (2005:849-850), finding that 'a deep-seated fear of failure or downward mobility' was identified among middle-class families. Similarly, Hong and Kim (2006:14) also found that both the fear of downward mobility and the strong desire for upward mobility were greater among middle class families in Korea than among upper or lower class families, and argued that for this reason, middle class families were strongly committed to investing in their children's education, even at the sacrifice of themselves. Further, this may be reflected in middle class mothers' labour market behaviour, many of them tending to stay at home (perhaps, temporarily during the period of child rearing) rather than continuing their career.

In addition to children's education expenditure, whether or not women perceive there is a possibility of upward social mobility is an important factor to be addressed here. Looking at whether there is a belief that upward social mobility is possible by class in the years 2005 and 2006 (surveyed in these two years only), the overall positive view of both mothers and fathers increased by around 5 or 7 per cent from 2005 to 2006 (Table 6.12). Middle class mothers (increasing from 36 to 42 per cent in the two years) tended to believe in the probability of upward social mobility, compared to the lower class mothers who tended not to believe in it. The class differences in this belief are very similar between mothers and fathers. The important thing to note here is that there is a class difference in social mobility beliefs. It is highly likely to be related to different class concerns or inclinations about investing in private education for upward mobility. This may also explain why lower class families spent less on private education while upper and middle class families spent comparatively more.

Table 6.12 Social mobility beliefs by gender according to class identity (percentage, 2005 and 2006)

% of total N	Class identity	2005		2006	
		Believe	Don't believe	Believe	Don't believe
Mother	Upper class	0.8	0.2	1.2	0.5
	Middle class	36.3	30.2	41.7	25.2
	Lower class	10.9	21.5	12.5	18.9
	Row-total %	48.1	51.9	55.4	44.6
Father	Upper class	0.8	0.2	1.6	0.1
	Middle class	37.5	28.6	40.2	25.7
	Lower class	10.9	22.1	11.7	20.8
	Row-total %	49.1	50.9	53.5	46.5

Note: for mothers, in 2005, Pearson $x^2(2)$ =80.852, sig. =.000 ***; in 2006, Pearson $x^2(2)$ =84.980, sig.=.000 ***; for fathers, in 2005, Pearson $x^2(2)$ =95.666, sig. =.000 ***; in 2006 Pearson $x^2(2)$=102.342, sig.=.000 ***

Based on the findings of class-differentiated children's education spending and social mobility beliefs, this thesis assumes that these are associated with mothers' labour market behaviour somehow. Therefore, the thesis next examines whether there were any links between these variables and upper and middle class mothers' labour market participation when taking children's ages into account (Tables 6.13 & 6.14). The logistic regression (stepwise) analyses of mothers' labour market participation in Table 6.13 and in Table 6.14 show that child education costs and social mobility beliefs were significantly associated with the probability of mothers being employed (note models for 2002 which were significant – though not significant in the rest years – in the Hosmer & Lemeshow test). Child education costs were negatively associated in 2005 and 2006 from Model A (Table 6.13) and in 2002 from Model B (Table 6.14), and social mobility beliefs were also negatively associated in the years 2001 and 2002 from Model A (Table 6.13), and in 2006 from Model B (Table 6.14).

Roughly, mothers' labour market participation was negatively associated with child education costs and also with social mobility beliefs; that is, mothers who spend more on private education for their children and believe in social mobility are more likely to stay at home than those who do neither of these. It should be noted that the analysis

results for lower class women ('within lower class') are not presented here, due to the insignificance in the Hosmer & Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test for all the years of study. It should also be noted that there were no correlations between the social mobility factors and lower class mothers' labour market behaviour in the study years (See Table 6.J in the Appendix).

Table 6.13 Logistic regression (stepwise) analyses on whether employed or not for mothers by year (social mobility factors) – statistics presented for the last step only (See Table 6.G for all the steps)

Model A Statistics: odds ratios - Ex(B)	Mother (including all classes)			
	2000[1]	2002	2005	2006
Children aged 0 to 5	.516***	.391***	.567***	.590**
Children aged 6 to11		.769**		
Children aged 12 to18	1.322***		1.392***	1.504***
Social class (Lower class is base)		***	**	***
upper class				.242**
middle class[1]	.744*	.377***	.632**	.574***
Household income (logged)	1.354**	1.580***	1.317**	1.493***
Age		.963**		
Education (year)				
Child education costs (for children over 6) [2]			.995*	.996*
Social mobility belief (positive)	.794*	.649**		
N	1851	1828	1885	1844
Model Chi-square (goodness-of-fit)	142.12***	76.96***	73.83***	96.21***
-2 Log likelihood	1925.16	1308.87	1793.18	1746.22
Hosmer&Lemeshow test x^2*(sig.)*	3.66	15.07! (.058)	10.72	12.42

Source: the 3rd, 5th, 8th and 9th waves, KLIPS. Note: statistics are rounded off; [1] statistics for social class in 2000 are replaced by those for middle class (dummy) due to the goodness-of-fit model; [2] statistics for child education costs in 2000 are replaced by those for total child costs including children under 6, according to the goodness-of-fit model.

Legend: * p<0.05 (sig. at 95%), ** p<0.01 (sig. at 99%), *** p<0.001 (sig. at 99.9%), ! p<0.10 (sig. at 90%)

Table 6.14 The probability of being employed, for mothers within the upper/middle class – statistics presented for the last step only (See Table 6.H for the 'enter-method' analysis and Table 6.I for all the steps in the Appendix)

Model B Statistics: odds ratios - Ex(B)	Upper/middle class mother			
	2000	2002	2005	2006
Children aged 0 to 5	.606***	.386***	.646*	.607*
Children aged 6 to 11		.758**		
Children aged 12 to 18	1.400***		1.424***	1.561***
Age		.959**		
Education (year)				
Household income (logged)		1.490**		1.651***
Child education costs [1] (for children aged over 6)		.996*		
Social mobility belief (positive)				.627**
Interaction between education costs and social mobility				
N	645	885	882	882
Model Chi-square (x^2)	37.00***	58.34***	31.04***	61.16***
-2 Log likelihood	851.77	1165.73	1168.45	1133.60
Hosmer&Lemeshow test x^2*(sig.)* [2]	1.43	21.31**	1.75	6.66

Source: the 3rd, 5th, 8th and 9th waves, KLIPS. Note: statistics are rounded off; [1,2] in Table 6.H for the 'enter-method' analysis model, child costs include both childcare and child education costs and the models for 2002, 2005 and 2006 were significant following the Hosmer&Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test.
Legend : * p<0.05 (sig. at 95%), ** p<0.01 (sig. at 99%), *** p<0.001 (sig. at 99.9%)

Overall, the analysis results concerning child education and social mobility beliefs indicate that upper and middle class mothers' labour market behaviour is closely associated with children's education and social mobility beliefs, which explains rather clearly why upper/middle class women are more likely to stay at home, reflecting the tendency to buy time for social mobility-related activities such as arranging and managing their children's education by trading off time for this against reduced work hours.

6.7 What can we learn from mothers' class-differentiated labour market participation?

As for the gender difference in labour market participation between the classes, as shown in the above logistic regression analysis Table 6.7, it is best explained by Crompton's (1998:93-94) argument, discussed in Chapter 2, that the interactions between class and the gender system bring different consequences to each gender. This is closely related to Hartmann's (1981) 'dual systems' theory, which sees women as suffering a double disadvantage due to both class and patriarchy systems – by virtue of their sex as well as in their employment (Crompton, 1998:93-94). The statistical results show clearly the consequences of the interaction between class and gender systems. In the middle class, seemingly most evidently, mothers are more likely to stay at home whereas fathers are far more likely to work. Apart from the gender difference by class, the over-representation of non-working mothers in the middle and upper classes rather than in lower class must be explained.

Regarding women's labour market behaviour, the three main explanations are: classless preference theory (2000), class-based rational action theory (1998, 2000), and cultural perspectives. However, Hakim's preference theory (2000), which ignores the class factor, is insufficient here, as my thesis argues that mothers' labour market participation is closely associated with class identity. The statistical results of this thesis show that social class is a significant predictor of mothers' labour market behaviour, which does not support, at least in the case of Korean mothers, Hakim's argument (2002:434) that lifestyle preferences (in modern affluent societies) cut across educational levels and all social classes and that ideal family role models do not impact on women's career choices.

Given that Korean mothers' labour market behaviour cannot be fully understood without taking class into account, why different classes behave differently and the over-representation of middle class non-working mothers needs to be explained. When it comes to class-differentiated behaviour, Goldthorpe (1998)'s rational action theory (RAT) seems to provide one answer, although its methodological approach of focusing

on utilitarian individuals has been subject to a similar critique to Hakim's neoclassical individualist approach because it attempts to reconcile the individualist and structuralist approaches; that is, it links the economic explanation of micro-level, individual actions to macro-level, class structure (Duncan, 2005:61). According to RAT, people are assumed to behave rationally on the basis of cost-benefit calculations to maximise the utility of their decisions, and these rational utilitarian choices differ according to class level (Hatcher, 1998:10-20). In the case of mothers making a decision between family and paid work, mothers will behave according to their cost-benefit calculations (the opportunity costs of child care) between paid work and looking after the home. However, the opportunities and constraints that mothers face are different according to their class. More specifically, due to the different job opportunities and career prospects of the classes, their decisions between staying at home to look after the family and following a career are different. If married women's work is likely to be in low-paid and low-status jobs with long working-hours, as in the case of Korea, the rewards for continuing their career will not be high, particularly, for lower class women.

This is also supported by Hartmann's argument (1981a:391) that 'given women's restricted access to decent jobs and wages, women maintain their interests in men's continued contribution to family support'. For lower class mothers, staying at home could be a more rational option because the opportunity costs of childcare will not be very worthwhile for them, considering their limited socio-economic capital (for example, lower educational attainment). For instance, good quality childcare might be out of their reach, due to their low income from low-status jobs or from low-paid or irregular work, which is most likely to pay a similar rate to the job they did before they had children or married. However, most lower class mothers tend to work after giving birth compared to middle class mothers, as shown in Table 6.8.

Furthermore, middle-class mothers, who are more likely to have started their career in better paid jobs before giving birth, due to their better human or economic capital and who therefore can afford to pay for good quality childcare, will have more benefits or rewards from continuing their career than lower class women. In other words, the opportunity costs of child care would be much better for middle class mothers compared with lower class mothers. However, in reality (in the statistical evidence) the opposite

appears to be true. Middle class mothers are more likely to stay at home until their children reach secondary school age, as shown in Table 6.8. Korean mothers' labour market behaviour, both lower class and middle class, was found overall to go against the expectations of Goldthorpe's version of class-differentiated utilitarian RAT. If Korean mothers' labour market behaviour contradicts class-based RAT, this suggests strongly that RAT does not explain fully Korean mothers' labour market behaviour. Therefore, a more appropriate explanation seems necessary.

In relation to this, Duncan (2005:73) argues that the cultural perspective is more fruitful in explaining mothers' behaviour as a response to their class conditioning. Duncan (2005:62) questions how to explain the 'primarily' mothering role taken by most high-income middle class wives despite their higher human capital, and further doubts whether these groups of mothers act rationally, based on his qualitative research observation of British case that although middle and upper class mothers, with their greater ability to obtain higher paid and more satisfying jobs under better conditions, had a far greater choice of employment than the working class, many of them stayed at home. Most importantly, Duncan (2005:68) pointed out that the traditional class hierarchy was disrupted in terms of career orientation, from the evidence that a considerable number of mothers from the working class had higher career orientation than middle class (high-income) wives. This suggests strongly that 'the class patterning of values and choices do[es] not always follow the class patterning of resources' (Duncan, 2005:62). Consequently, Duncan (2005:68) argued that gendered moral rationalities about combining paid work with mothering were over-represented in the middle class rather than in the lower class. In this respect, Vincent and Ball (2006:163) also found in their research that traditional gendered division of domestic responsibility seems more apparent amongst middle class women.

In short, the gender difference being more evident in the middle class could be seen as the result of the interaction between gender norms and the class system. This explains why middle class women tend to stay at home, because they value mothers' own care more than continuing their careers through paying for market-based childcare, whereas middle class men carry on with their careers. However, the question of why middle class women are over-represented in the non-working group remains unanswered.

Regarding this, Duncan's class-differentiated 'cultural construction' understanding of motherhood's underlying preferences and rationality seems more fruitful than theories focusing on classless individualised preference (Hakim) and class-based rationalities (Goldthorpe). Duncan's class-based culturally bound motherhood explains more adequately Korean middle class mothers' labour market behaviour.

6.8 Conclusion

From the frequency analyses and recursive cross-sectional logistic regression analyses over the sample years, it was found that there are gender inequalities and class divisions in labour market participation. Firstly, middle class mothers were more likely to stay at home while their partners – fathers – engage in paid work. Secondly, middle class mothers were more likely to stay at home compared to lower class mothers, whereas middle class fathers were more likely to be employed than lower class fathers. Lastly, it was observed that there was class-differentiated investment in children's education and the belief in social mobility. Upper class and middle class mothers spent more money on their children's education, whereas the majority of lower class mothers did not pay for any private education for their children, reflecting their lack of available funds to do this. Most importantly, middle class women tended to believe in the possibility of upward social mobility whereas lower class women tended not to. In addition, it was observed that the greater the spending on children's education and the greater the belief in social mobility, the more likely they were to stay at home. The statistics from the logistic regression analysis was significant only for the upper/middle classes, not the lower class, which implies that it is the middle class mothers, rather than the lower class ones, whose behaviour seems more related to social mobility efforts.

In sum, there was 'class-differentiated' labour market behaviour among Korean mothers and also middle class mothers' labour market behaviour was found to be closely associated with upward social mobility efforts. It seems that socially and culturally bound normative motherhood is more evident in the middle class in Korea. Overall, the

analysis of Korean mothers' class-based labour market behaviour clearly contradicts the expectation that middle class women with better human capital expect to combine motherhood with substantial employment opportunities. This behaviour is explained by the class-based culturalist perspective; that is, the class-specific cultural construction of the understanding of motherhood.

Chapter 7

Conclusion

This thesis applied a quantitative approach, using large-scale survey data, the Korea Labor and Income Panel Study (KLIPS), to examine the research question: what factors account for the low level of maternal employment in Korea? The literature review revealed that that has been little research taking a comprehensive approach through incorporating individual factors such as human capital and the spouse's job, in addition to children, and structural factors including class, in particular. Thus, this thesis explored the research question from a theoretical basis and developed hypotheses accommodating both individual and structural factors to permit an enquiry into which factors – individual or cultural/structural – offer the best explainations and finally set out to provide an understanding of maternal employment in Korean-specific cultural and structural contexts, in line with the structuralist perspectives.

Chapter 2 illuminated individual factors such as work attitudes and culturally-specific gender-role attitudes, and structural factors such as labour market, welfare regimes and class difference within the Korean context, based on the relevant theoretical debates. In light of structural perspectives, the thesis paid particular attention to Korean-specific developments in the labour market structure, such as the low incidence of part-time employment and high incidence of self-employment, which may have a potential impact on mothers' labour market behaviour, although it is hard to examine whether they are associated with maternal employment, due to the limitations of the KLIPS where no related questions are available. Chapter 3 elaborated the survey data and various statistical models chosen for examining the hypotheses regarding the labour force participation by Korean mothers below the age of 65 with work experience and children age under 19. Again, it was acknowledged that there were research limitations arising from the restrictions of the survey data; for instance, the unavailability of questions for assessing gender-role attitude and work attitudes as well as questions for non-working women's work commitment (possibly from a job held previsously), and other statistical issues such as repeating and splitting data and the very low values of the model chi-square.

Chapter 4 examined whether there is any link between individual factors, including situational factors such as human capital, children and spouse's job, and Korean

mothers' labour market participation. Chapters 5 and 6 examined whether structural and cultural factors, measured by workplace practices, corporate welfare (employee benefits) and childcare/education costs, and class identity, are associated with mothers' labour market participation. With the full recognition of the statistical issues mentioned above, as well as the generalization issues in some results from the linear regression models in the analysis chapters – although they are still meaningful to the study sample – Chapter 7 now presents the main findings from Chapters 4 to 6, discusses the implications for the policy debates and the research contributions, and lastly suggests areas for future research.

7.1 Individual factors and mothers' labour market participation

Chapter 4 examined the first and second hypothesis through the one way-ANOVA analysis or logistic and linear regression analyses, whether individual factors such as human capital factors, work commitment, education and job experience, and situational factors such as children's age and spouse's job, were statistically significant and positively or negatively associated with Korean mothers' labour market participation. The chapter also identified whether there was any difference by gender, in terms of motherhood and fatherhood. The statistical results showed that work commitment was not significantly associated with maternal employment, apart from work experience, which was significant throughout the study years. However, situational factors such as spouse's job and children age were significantly associated with maternal employment. Thus, the first hypothesis of human capital factors was not supported fully but only in part, whereas the second hypothesis of situational factors was strongly supported.

Firstly, while there was no gender difference in the work commitment of mothers and fathers from the one-way ANOVA analysis, which found the statistics insignificant, there were gender differences in employment by age, education, job experience and career interruptions, from the cross-tabulation analyses of human capital factors. Mothers with older ages and higher education levels were far more likely to be in non-employment than fathers in the same situation. It was also found that overall, mothers

had less work experience and more career interruptions than fathers. Secondly, the logistic regression analyses throughout the study years found that education and work commitments were not statistically significant overall, but work experience was positively associated with the probability of mothers being employed. With regard to work commitment from the linear regression analysis, it was observed that mothers' work commitment was not significantly associated with the number of children, irregular employment, work experience or employment interruptions. Rather, it was linked to age, education and experiences of discrimination. Also, it was found that work experience and higher education are negatively associated with employment interruptions. More importantly, as seen from the logistic regression analysis, children's age cohorts were found to be statistically critical to mothers' labour market participation.

It appears that regardless of the education level, mothers' labour market behaviour is linked to children's age. Children's age cohorts of 0 to 5 and 12 to 18 were, respectively, negatively and positively associated in the models across the selected years, while the age cohort of 6 to 11 was not significant overall (in 2006, it was significant but negatively associated). That is, mothers were less likely to take up employment while they had younger children under the age of 6, but as their children reach school age, particularly after primary school age, mothers tended to take up employment. This suggests clearly that lifestyle preferences change in accordance with the family's life cycle. With regard to the pre-schooler effects, perhaps more mothers with younger children could keep their employment when adequate childcare leave or flexible work arrangements were provided, considering that they might be willing to leave older dependent children in the care of someone else or the school but might not be willing to leave younger dependent children in the same way. Lastly, all spouse factors were significantly associated with mothers' employment in all the models; male spouse's pay was negatively associated (this is the case with the counterpart) while a spouse in self-employment rather than permanent employment was positively associated, presumably due either to the fact that self-employed businesses are more likely to be precarious in Korea or that both husband and wife work together. The lower paid and precarious employment of the male spouse was more likely to make mothers take up employment, which has class implications.

The rationale for these hypotheses was to provide a critical investigation into the neoclassical individualist arguments, particularly the human capital theory and preference theory. Superficially, the arguments of the human capital theorists appear to be supported, looking from the statistical analysis results that work experience was significant in the take-up of employment and that mothers had more employment interruptions than fathers. However, the regression analysis on work commitment and employment interruptions showed the results that employment interruptions were linked not to mothers' work commitment but to the family life cycle, and this could support the structuralist arguments. These contrast with the arguments of the human capital theory and preference theory, which assume that women make less effort to work, implicitly due to their having lower career aspirations.

In short, their children's age is critical and Korean mothers' lifestyle preferences change according to the family's life cycle. Moreover, the empirical evidence suggests that work commitment is not different between the genders and is not one of the factors closely related to mothers' interrupted careers. Therefore, married women's labour force participation cannot be fully explained from the neoclassical perspective, either by the human capital theory or by the preference theory.

7.2 Gender regime and mothers' labour market participation

Chapter 5 examined the third and fourth hypotheses. First of all, the analysis of the third hypothesis examined whether culturally-specific workplace practices such as the experience of discrimination and work-hours (overtime work in the multivariate analysis) were significantly associated with mothers' labour market parcipation, through a multiple-response analysis, cross-tabulation analysis and linear regression analysis. Chapter 5 paid attention to whether these practices differed according to gender and, in particular, by employment status. In relation to the fourth hypothesis, parental welfare and childcare expenses were analysed, mainly by cross-tabulation analysis and linear-regression analysis. The statistical results confirmed the third and fourth hypotheses to be supported overall, either by logistic or linear regression analysis.

Firstly, the analysis of the third hypothesis from the cross-tabulation analyses found gender differences in the take-up and payment of low-paid and low status jobs, along with discrimination and promotion experiences, strongly suggesting that mothers' employment behaviour bears some relationship to the gender-biased characteristics of the Korean labour market. The multivariate analyses showed that mothers' pay, irregular employment and discrimination experiences were significantly associated with the number of employment break-offs; pay was negatively associated with mothers' employment interruptions while irregular employment and discrimination experiences were positively associated. This suggests that the low employment status of mothers, as seen by their concentration in low-paid and irregular employment, has a negative link to mothers' careers. In other words, if women are paid fairly and employed in regular rather than casual work, they enter and leave the labour market less often.

In addition, the statistical analyses, including the frequency analysis and linear regression, indicated that there was a significant association between the long work-hour culture and mothers' labour market participation. The frequency analysis found that mothers worked almost as long as fathers and the work-hours in flexible work such as casual and part-time jobs where mothers are concentrated were not much shorter than those of full-time jobs. In particular, no great gender difference in work-hours was found, which suggested that long work-hours are likely to be a problem for mothers but not fathers. The multivariate analysis confirmed this by showing that overtime work was positively associated with mothers' career interruptions and that long work-hours contributed to mothers' interrupted employment but not fathers'.

Secondly, concerning the fourth hypothesis, the cross-tabulation analysis of childcare costs found that there is a higher burden on childminding costs and a higher childcare cost share of household income, implying that high childcare costs due to a lack of adequate government support may be a significant barrier faced by mothers wishing to resume their careers. However, the logistic regression analysis models showed that childcare cost was positively associated with mothers' labour market behaviour, unlike the expectation that it might have a potential negative association, while suggesting that more childcare costs were paid by working mothers who needed to pay for childcare.

With regard to parental welfare, the frequency analysis results of corporate welfare showed there was a gender difference in the entitlements to corporate welfare (employee benefits) including parental welfare benefits. According to the linear regression model, parental welfare was significantly associated with mothers' labour market behaviour, finding that parental welfare was negatively associated with mothers' employment interruptions.

In short, the overall analysis results suggest that there *is* inequality in the labour market, as well as higher childcare costs, and a long work-hour culture in Korea. Workplace practices (in terms of pay, promotion, discrimination and low support for parental welfare) were found to be highly gender-biased. It is suggested that these are possibly significant barriers to mothers' labour market participation, and also that mothers could be re-oriented towards employment if working conditions were improved, especially for irregular/casual work, in terms of pay, work-hours and welfare, along with addressing discrimination issues.

7.3 Class differentiated mothering and mothers' labour market participation

The last analysis in Chapter 6 examined the fifth hypothesis – which was concerned with class-differentiated mothering and labour market participation and whether there is any difference between the classes in expenditure on children's education – mainly through a logistic regression analysis, with the supplementary analysis of cross-tabulations, including the chi-square test. The study found that class-differentiated mothering is significantly associated with Korean mothers' labour market participation. Thus, the fifth hypothesis is supportive in that class identity was a strong predictor of the probability of mothers being employed.

Firstly, from the cross-tabulation analyses and cross-sectional logistic regression analyses recursively tested over the study years, it was observed that there are gender

inequalities and class divisions in labour market behaviour. Middle class identity was negatively associated with mothers' labour market behaviour, but positively associated with fathers' labour market behaviour. That is, middle class mothers are more likely to stay at home compared to lower class women, whereas middle class men are more likely to be employed than lower class men. A further analysis of Korean mothers' labour market behaviour predicted by the interaction between class and children's age cohorts observed that all the classes with children aged 0 to 5 were negatively associated with maternal employment, implying that regardless of their class identity, middle class and lower class mothers both tend to stay at home when they have young children under the age of 6. As to the interaction between class and the children's age cohort 6 to 11 (primary school age), middle class mothers' employment tends to have negative association while lower class mothers' employment tends not to, implying that lower class mothers are far more likely than middle class mothers to be employed when their children reach school age. Finally, all the classes with children aged 12 to 18 were positively associated with mothers' labour market participation. Korean mothers from both the middle and lower classes are more likely to be in work; however, the significance level was greater for lower class than middle class mothers. Overall, lower class mothers are fare more likely to be in the labour market after their child reaches primary school age, while middle class mothers tend to delay their employment for longer.

Secondly, class-differentiated investment in children's education and beliefs in the possibility of social mobility were observed from the cross-tabulation analysis. Upper class and middle class mothers spend more money on their children's education, whereas the majority of lower class mothers do not spend or pay for any private education for their children, reflecting their lack of available funds to do so. Most importantly, middle class women tend to believe in the possibility of upward social mobility whereas lower class women tend not to. In addition, from the logistic analyses, it was observed that roughly, child education costs and social mobility beliefs were negatively associated with mothers' labour market behaviour. That is, mothers who spend more on private child education and believe in social mobility are more likely to stay at home than those who do neither. The child education costs and social mobility beliefs may explain rather clearly why upper/middle class women are more likely to

stay at home, reflecting the tendency to buy time for social mobility-related activities such as arranging and managing their children's education.

Overall, the statistical analyses strongly suggested that socially and culturally bound normative motherhood was more evident in the middle class in Korea, providing evidence that Korean mothers' class-based labour market behaviour clearly contradicts the expectation of the rational action theory (RAT) that middle class women with better human capital expect to combine motherhood with substantial employment opportunities. In sum, there is 'class-differentiated' labour market behaviour among Korean mothers and also middle class motherhood seems to be highly associated with upward social mobility efforts. Particular attention was paid to the phenomenon of middle class mothers' over-representation in the non-working sector in Korea, with the argument that this is better explained by Duncan's class-based cultural perspective rather than Goldthorpe's RAT.

7.4 Concluding discussions from the main findings and implications for the policy concerning married women's employment

First of all, to summarize the relevance of the thesis' hypotheses proposed in the method chapter: apart from the first hypothesis of individual factors, the rest were found to be supportive overall; for the first hypothesis of individual factors, it was found that work commitment did not have a significant association with mothers' take-up of employment nor with employment interruptions, apart from work experience. Therefore, the first hypothesis of human capital factors was not fully supported in this thesis. On the other hand, the second, third, fourth and fifth hypotheses of situational and structural factors were found to be supported either by logistic or linear regression analysis: situational factors such as children's age and spouse's job characteristics (the second hypothesis), workplace practices such as discrimination experiences, a long work-hours culture and discriminatory welfare provision by employment status (the third and fourth

hypotheses), and lastly the class factors (the fifth hypothesis) were observed to be significantly associated with mothers' labour market participation.

Synthesizing the observations from the analysis results of Chapters 4, 5 and 6, Korean mothers' labour market behaviour is closely linked to children's ages, particularly, pre-school ages, but this is differentiated by class. Overall, the pre-schooler effects are similar between classes; that is, a non-working tendency is found to be pronounced with mothers across classes who have young children under the age of 6. However, when their child reaches primary school age, lower class mothers tend to be employed afterwards, while middle class mothers tend to be delaying their return for longer, probably due to culturally-constructed middle class motherhood or upward social mobility efforts. Most of all, it is due to the different reality faced by each class; that is, middle class mothers can afford to delay whereas lower class mothers cannot. Furthermore, presuming from the evidence of Korean mothers' careers being interrupted because of unreliable employment conditions and the pressure to work overtime, the gender biased workplace and welfare regimes could be a significant barrier for middle class mothers' taking up jobs, while they are able to delay employment because they are in a better economic situation relative to the lower class. Therefore, Korean mothers' labour market behaviour is closely linked to culturally-bounded motherhood, including class-based motherhood and structural constraints such as gender biased workplace and welfare regimes, and these factors therefore lead to the low level of maternal employment in Korea.

The implications for the policy from the findings of the thesis are largely threefold: firstly, policy mechanisms supporting maternal employment must be developed linked to children's ages, particularly pre-school and primary school ages, and necessarily enhance the currently available nursery school system as well as after-school care schemes. Secondly, a range of workplace reforms are required in order to encourage mothers to continue working or return to work after short breaks to have children by removing the obstacles to equality and enhancing the measures to tackle the long work-hour culture as well as legally reinforcing the right to take up parental welfare packages. Thirdly, the class difference in maternal employment points to a policy that is essential for reducing the class gap in mothering experiences by legally reinforcing the right for

all working mothers to take up parental welfare packages. More specifically, in order to reduce the pre-schooler effects pronounced across classes and on gender, a workplace culture where both mothers and fathers are encouraged to take up childcare leave (leave of absence) or flexible work arrangements is crucial. Extended childcare leave or benefits and flexible work arrangements could be the alternative to one-to-one care on their own, particularly valued by middle class mothers, and could also relieve the work and family conflict of lower class mothers. Furthermore, to help parents with primary school children, measures to extend the school hours of the lower level primary school children or lower the age to start primary school could be significant, as the current situation is that Korean children start primary school at age 7, and children in the 1st and 2nd year who need after-school care finish school earlier in the day than children at the higher level of primary school. With primary school children, therefore, it seems necessary to extend support for families to enable them to access good quality after-school clubs.

In conclusion, the thesis demonstrates a strong implication that culturally constructed class-specific motherhood, emphasizing women as the main childcarers and managers of children's education, has contributed to Korean mothers with younger dependent children being over-represented in the non-working sector and consequently aggravating the social class differences in women's labour force participation and in their children's care and education. Therefore, more attention needs to be paid to the class gap and gender-bias in Korean society today.

7.5 Contribution of this DPhil and possibilities for future research

This thesis is important and unique as the first attempt at a comprehensive research permitting the examinination of both individualist and structuralist perspectives concerning women's labour force participation in Korea, using a quantitative approach without gender bias and using large-scale survey data. Empirically, this thesis carefully

developed a study of maternal employment, taking a different approach from the conventional research into married women's employment by focusing on mothers with dependent children under 19 and providing a comparison between employment and other patterns of mothers and fathers, whereas previous research of women's employment was focused on married women, not on mothers; for instance, the research by Kim (1999) or Jang and Bu (2003), as there are very few mothers in Korea who are not married. Furthermore, the thesis provided a more comprehensive research framework which accommodatd both individual and structural variables, quering which factors best explain Korean mothers' labour market behaviour. Finally, the thesis makes a contribution to the literature by finding evidence more in agreement with the structuralist arguments; that is, identifying that the low level of maternal employment in Korea is closely related to a gendered labour market and welfare regime such as the long work-hour culture and low parental welfare. In particular, the thesis's unique perspective is in linking mothers' labour market behaviour to their class identity, which is rarely explored in the literature, and thereby finding that class identity is a significant predictor of maternal employment.

In short, despite the data limitations, this thesis makes a contribution to the structuralist arguments surrounding women's labour force participation. It also provides a critique of the policy logic of the Korean gender-biased labour market and welfare regimes, and how class works in Korean society, factors which have contributed to the low level of maternal employment in the country overall as well as the class division in mothers' labour market behaviour. Lastly, future work could address the methodological and data limitations encountered by this research as a result of using the quantitative approach (given that coupling the quantitative research with a qualitative approach might better explain women's labour market behaviour) and the limitations of the dataset (the unavailability of questions of attitudes). As noted earlier, national and historical-specific developments in labour market structure have a potential impact on women's labour force participation, and so the research could be extended by exploring whether the availability of employment-flexibility (that is, part-time work) is associated with maternal employment taking a qualitative approach.

In addition, there is an argument to note here for future research: according to Hakim

(2008:87), changes in mainstream industries such as from agriculture to manufacturing, and from manufacturing to service industries, mean that role segregation patterns have also changed from the egalitarian family role model (in the era when agriculture was the main industry) to the sex-segregated role model (in the era of the manufacturing industry), and to a compromising role model (in the era of the service industries). That is, agricultural work allows labourers a considerable amount of flexibility whereas manufacturing work does not, and while service work again allows workers greater flexibility compared with work in the manufacturing industry, it is not as flexible as agricultural work. Under this assumption, further research could examine the relationships (association) between industrial changes and women's gender-role attitudes or the gender division of labour. Such research would be extremely interesting if it were possible to identify whether industrial changes are related to women's labour market behaviour.

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Appendix

Table 2.A Male employment rate by employment status from 1982* (except the farming/fishing sector)

	Non-wage workers			Wage workers			
	Self-employed	Nonpaid family workers	Sub-total	Permanent	Temporary	Casual(daily)	Sub-total
1982	29.5	1.9	31.4	52.0	7.0	9.6	68.6
1988	25.9	1.1	27.1	48.1	15.9	8.8	72.9
1989	25.2	1.2	26.3	48.4	16.5	8.8	73.7
1990	25.0	1.1	26.1	48.3	16.3	9.3	73.9
1997	27.8	0.9	28.7	46.3	16.2	8.9	71.3
1998	28.5	1.0	29.5	45.9	16.6	8.0	70.5
1999	28.4	1.2	29.6	42.5	18.1	9.9	70.4
2000	28.5	1.2	29.6	41.9	18.6	9.8	70.4
2001	29.0	1.3	30.3	42.3	18.4	9.0	69.7
2002	29.1	1.2	30.3	41.2	18.4	10.1	69.7
2003	29.3	1.0	30.2	42.9	18.0	8.9	69.8
2004	28.8	1.0	29.7	43.5	17.9	8.8	70.3

Source: Table <2-4>, Keum et al. (2006 :12-3). Note: * Some years dropped from the original table.

Table 2.B Female employment rates by employment status from 1982* (except the farming/fishing sector)

	Non-waged workers			Waged workers			
	Self-employed	Nonpaid family workers	Sub-total	Permanent	Temporary	Casual(daily)	Sub-total
1982	25.5	19.7	45.2	37.3	12.2	5.3	54.8
1988	21.2	15.1	36.3	26.2	26.7	10.8	63.7
1989	18.0	13.7	31.6	27.1	27.1	14.1	68.4
1990	16.9	13.8	30.8	26.8	28.1	14.3	69.2
1997	18.6	13.4	32.0	26.5	31.0	10.5	68.0
1998	18.2	14.7	32.9	23.7	32.4	11.0	67.1
1999	18.5	13.7	32.2	21.5	31.4	14.9	67.8
2000	17.9	13.3	31.3	21.8	32.3	14.6	68.7
2001	18.2	12.7	30.9	23.3	32.4	13.5	69.1
2002	18.0	12.1	30.0	23.9	32.5	13.6	70.0
2003	16.5	11.9	28.3	25.7	34.5	11.5	71.7
2004	17.4	10.6	27.9	26.9	33.7	11.5	72.1

Source: Table <2-5>, Keum et al. (2006 :14). Note: * Some years dropped from the original table.

Table 2.C Labour force participation rates of older women aged between 55 and 59 in the selected OECD member countries

	2000	2002	2005	2006	2009
Australia	47.1	50.3	54.5	58.2	63.3
Austria	25.8	33.7	39.0	41.9	49.7
Canada	53.1	54.5	60.4	62.3	67.1
Denmark	67.7	73.5	79.9	79.2	78.0
Finland	66.7	71.8	72.5	74.8	79.0
France	52.0	53.3	54.1	54.7	59.4
Germany	55.7	58.2	64.5	65.7	68.9
Iceland	80.2	86.9	87.3	88.6	87.5
Ireland	35.2	37.8	46.0	48.4	52.1
Japan	58.7	58.1	60.0	60.3	62.5
Korea	51.3	49.6	49.1	49.7	51.9
Netherlands	38.6	42.8	47.1	50.9	62.0
New Zealand	59.6	62.4	71.9	71.7	74.6
Norway	71.8	74.6	71.9	71.7	75.2
Portugal	47.7	50.6	53.1	51.4	55.6
Spain	28.2	30.6	37.7	39.6	48.0
Sweden	79.5	79.7	79.7	80.4	81.6
Switzerland	67.1	67.9	70.8	71.9	74.4
United Kingdom	57.6	59.5	63.6	64.3	67.2
United States	61.4	63.8	65.6	66.7	68.5
G7 countries	55.4	57.3	60.1	61.0	64.1
North America	56.0	58.0	60.3	61.4	63.4
OECD countries	49.4	51.1	53.7	54.6	57.7

Source: LFS, OECD Stats (2011).

Table 2.D The expense of private tuition paid by married women (aged in their 30s and 40s) for education, and total household earnings per month (total N: 1,025)

Approximate amount spent by married women's education level		The level of total household earnings (in pounds sterling*)	
Secondary education and lower	£250	Less than £15,000 (lower earning class)	£130
College or university graduates and upper	£300	£15,000 and above but below £25,000 (upper middle class earnings)	£240
		£25,000 and above but below £35,000 (lower middle class earnings)	£320
		£35,000 and above (upper earning class)	£360

Source: derived from Figure 3-17, Choi (2008:39). Note: * applied by Korean and British currency exchange rate (2,000 won: 1 pound)

Table 2.E The use of private education institutes or (state/private) nurseries by employed and non-employed women with pre-school age children (aged under 7)

		Employed (%)	Non-employed (%)	Total cases
Non-using		30.1	44.5	1,047
Using		69.9	55.5	1,490
The number using education institutes or nursery	1	25.2	74.8	1,243
	2	26.3	73.7	173
	3	25.1	74.9	39
	4	75.6	24.4	5
	5	0.0	100.0	1
Total (cases, N)		568	1,969	2,537

Source: <Table V-5-36>, Park et al. (2008:187). Note: 30 respondents refused to answer for the number using institutes or nursery.

Table 2.F The use of private education institutes by children's school level and mothers' employment (percentage, N)

		The number of private education institutes (including private tutors)				Total (cases, N)
		1	2	3	4	
Employed	Children at primary school	55.5%	31.6%	12.1%	0.7%	621
	Children at middle school	80.1%	16.9%	3.0%	0.0%	270
	Children at high school	90.0%	9.6%	0.4%	0.0%	192
	No-school	56.9%	24.9%	18.1%	0.0%	7
Non-employed	Children at primary school	49.4%	37.8%	11.9%	0.9%	1,245
	Children at middle school	85.7%	12.8%	1.6%	0.0%	350
	Children at high school	90.2%	9.8%	0.0%	0.0%	221
	No-school	78.4%	21.6%	0.0%	0.0%	4
Total	Frequency (cases, N)	1,875	796	225	15	2,911
	Percentage	64.4%	27.3%	7.7%	0.5%	100%

Note: 23 respondents refused to give the number of private education institutions used.
Source: p189, <Table V-5-39>, Park, S-M. et al. (2008).

Table 3.A Pearson correlation model 1 for married women with work experience (up to June 1998)

	Employed or not	Age	Educa-tion	Class identity	Child aged 0 to 5	Child aged 6 to11	Child aged 12 to18	Child cost	House-hold income
Employed or not	1[a]								
	3491								
Age	-.171**	1							
	3491	3491							
Education	.118**	-.710**	1						
	3490	3490	3490						
Class Identity [b]	.031	.239**	-.362**	1					
	3450	3450	3449	3450					
Child aged 0 to 5	-.225**	-.360**	.145**	-.067**	1				
	1535	1535	1535	1523	1535				
Child aged 6 to11	-.064*	-.073**	.019	-.013	-.214**	1			
	1535	1535	1535	1523	1535	1535			
Child aged 12 to18	.221**	.305**	-.123**	.069**	-.503**	-.405**	1		
	1535	1535	1535	1523	1535	1535	1535		
Child cost	.069**	.005	.227**	-.330**	-.145**	.161**	.198**	1	
	1535	1535	1535	1523	1535	1535	1535	1535	
Househ'd income	.076**	-.151**	.257**	-.332**	-.076**	.060*	.018	.392**	1
	3295	3295	3294	3260	1521	1521	1521	1521	3295

Note: Pearson correlation coefficient; 2-tailed Sig. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 / Cases (N); a."1" is printed if variables are perfectly correlated (Field, 2005:174); b. class identity category values are: 1 for high class, 2 for middle class, 3 for low class. Source: KLIPS 9th wave (2006)

Continued from Model 1 in Table 3.A...

	Employed or not	Job exp.	N. jobs	Discrimi -nation	Corp. welfare	Metro - area	Soc- mobil	Sp: wt	Sp: pay	Sp: wage job
Employed or not	1[a]									
	3491									
Job exp.	-.034*	1								
	3491	3491								
Discrimi-nation	.011	-.031	.077**	1						
	2991	2991	2991	2991						
Corporate welfare	.[b]	-.027	-.064	-.016	1					
	731	731	731	654	731					
Metro-area	-.037*	-.222**	.075**	-.017	.059	1				
	3491	3491	3491	2991	731	3491				
Social mobility	-.017	.038*	-.008	-.023	.014	-.030	1			
	3491	3491	3491	2991	731	3491	3491			
Spouse work hours	.043*	-.026	.049*	.013	-.032	.002	-.012	1		
	2194	2194	2194	1895	493	2194	2194	2194		
Spouse pay	-.069**	-.115**	-.029	-.042	.194**	.087**	.044*	.016	1	
	2137	2137	2137	1845	488	2137	2137	2132	2137	
Spouse: waged job	-.205**	-.243**	.025	.049*	.035	.073**	.016	-.137**	-.035	1
	2200	2200	2200	1901	494	2200	2200	2194	2137	2200

Note: Pearson correlation coefficient; 2-tailed Sig. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 / Cases (N); a."1" is printed if variables are perfectly correlated (Field, 2005:174); b. "." is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed. Source: KLIPS 9th wave (2006)

Table 3.B Pearson correlation model 2 for married women with job experience (before the 1st survey) and aged under 65

	Employed or not	Age	Education	Class identity	No. of children aged 0 to 5	No. of children aged 6 to11	No. of children aged 12 to18	Child cost	Annual income
Employed or not	1 [a] 2931								
Age	.021 2931	1 2931							
Education	-.033 2931	-.545** 2931	1 2931						
Class identity [b]	.076** 2909	.136** 2909	-.327** 2909	1 2909					
Children aged 0 to 5	-.241** 1474	-.492** 1474	.177** 1474	-.064* 1465	1 1474				
Children aged 6 to11	-.067* 1474	-.148** 1474	.052* 1474	-.010 1465	-.212** 1474	1 1474			
Children aged 12 to18	.233** 1474	.458** 1474	-.173** 1474	.066* 1465	-.507** 1474	-.407** 1474	1 1474		
Child cost	.064* 1474	.080** 1474	.227** 1474	-.312** 1465	-.151** 1474	.158** 1474	.208** 1474	1 1474	
Household income	.047* 2801	-.051** 2801	.277** 2801	-.355** 2781	-.077** 1460	.053* 1460	.021 1460	.384** 1460	1 2801

Note: Pearson correlation coefficient; 2-tailed Sig. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 / Cases (N); a."1" is printed if variables are perfectly correlated (Field, 2005:174); b. Class identity category values are: 1 for high class, 2 for middle class, 3 for low class. Source: KLIPS 9th wave (2006)

Continued from Model 2 in Table 3.B...

	Employed or not	Job exp.	N. jobs	Discrimi-nation	Corp. welfare	Metro - area	Soc-mobil	Sp: wt	Sp: pay	Sp: wage job
Employed or not	1[a] 2931									
Job exp.	.135** 2931	1 2931								
Discrimi-nation	.018 2522	-.012 2522	.089** 2522	1 2522						
Corporate welfare	.[a] 716	-.004 716	-.066 716	-.007 639	1 716					
Metro-area	-.054** 2931	-.116** 2931	.047* 2931	-.008 2522	.049 716	1 2931				
Social mobility	-.020 2931	.017 2931	-.007 2931	-.029 2522	.020 716	-.019 2931	1 2931			
Spouse work hours	.035 2101	.006 2101	.047* 2101	.010 1817	-.033 492	-.008 2101	-.001 2101	1 2101		
Spouse pay	-.073** 2049	-.078** 2049	-.037 2049	-.056* 1772	.193** 487	.071** 2049	.043 2049	.006 2045	1 2049	
Spouse: wage job	-.204** 2106	-.213** 2106	.004 2106	.048* 1822	.036 493	.048* 2106	.022 2106	-.154** 2101	-.051* 2049	1 2106

Note: Pearson correlation coefficient; 2-tailed Sig. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 / Cases (N); a."1" is printed if variables are perfectly correlated (Field, 2005:174); b. "." is printed if a coefficient cannot be computed. Source: KLIPS 9th wave (2006)

Table 3.C The components of household income and the share (proportion) of each component (by household in the 9th wave)

Household income components	Case (N)	% of N total	The share (%) of total household income
Earning income	4266	66.2	81.2
Monetary income	504	7.8	1.4
Premium income	498	7.7	5.2
Social insurance/benefit income	694	10.8	2.2
Tax income	2520	39.1	4.7
Other income	545	8.5	5.2
Total	6449	100	100

Source: the author's analysis of KLIPS, 2005.

Table 4.A The number of unemployment by age cohorts and gender

Age cohort		Lowest to 24	25 to 34	35 to 44	45 to 54	55 to 64	Total N
Mother	2000	0	10	17	4	0	31
	2002	0	8	14	4	0	26
	2005	1	10	17	4	0	32
	2006	1	12	23	6	0	42
Father	2000	0	11	27	4	1	43
	2002	0	7	17	8	1	33
	2005	0	11	18	7	0	36
	2006	0	2	23	7	0	32

Source: the 3rd, 5th, 8th and 9th waves, KLIPS.

Table 4.B The proportions of employment within age cohorts by gender (percentage)

% within age cohort	Mother				Father			
	2000	2002	2005	2006	2000	2002	2005	2006
Lowest to 24	28.0	28.0	24.4	36.5	14.0	16.3	13.3	13.0
25 to 34	42.6	48.1	48.9	50.8	77.8	78.2	77.5	76.9
35 to 44	55.5	58.1	55.4	55.1	90.7	92.0	91.6	92.2
45 to 55	52.8	58.6	56.5	57.7	86.1	90.0	87.2	87.9
56 to 64	35.2	37.6	36.5	38.2	64.0	68.8	70.0	70.6

Source: the 3rd, 5th, 8th and 9th waves, KLIPS.

Table 4.C The number of children in the household by age cohort (percentage, N)

% (cases, N)		2000	2002	2005	2006
The number of children aged 0 to 5	0	64.4 (1243)	62.7 (1159)	60.7 (1159)	60.7 (1138)
	1	24.7 (477)	28.0 (518)	29.4 (562)	29.9 (561)
	2	10.3 (198)	9.0 (166)	9.6 (184)	9.1 (171)
	3	0.6 (11)	0.3 (5)	0.3 (5)	0.2 (4)
The number of children aged 6 to 11	0	57.5 (1110)	56.0 (1034)	59.9 (1145)	60.0 (1124)
	1	27.0 (521)	29.8 (551)	27.1 (518)	27.1 (508)
	2	14.5 (280)	13.7 (253)	12.3 (235)	12.0 (225)
	3	0.9 (17)	0.5 (10)	0.6 (12)	0.9 (17)
	4	0.1 (1)	.	.	.
The number of children aged 12 to 18	0	52.8 (1019)	54.4 (1006)	55.1 (1053)	55.4 (1038)
	1	29.7 (573)	28.7 (530)	26.9 (513)	26.1 (489)
	2	16.6 (321)	16.1 (297)	17.1 (326)	17.2 (322)
	3	0.7 (14)	0.8 (15)	0.9 (18)	1.3 (25)
	4	0.1 (2)	.	.	.

Source: the 3rd, 5th, 8th and 9th waves, KLIPS.

Table 4.D Average earnings and household income by year (unit: 10,000 Korean Won)

	2000	2002	2005	2006
Male spouse's earnings (monthly average)	160.7341	211.0352	251.8770	265.3719
Mothers' earnings (monthly average)	85.1545	109.7321	145.8000	151.7135
Household income (yearly average)	2291.8597	3133.4125	3642.3465	4006.3929

Source: the 3rd, 5th, 8th and 9th waves, KLIPS.

Table 4.E Logistic regression analyses on whether employed or not for mothers by year (individual/situational factors) - 'enter-method' models

Statistics: odds ratios - Exp(B)	2000		2002	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
The number of children aged 0 to 5	.603***	.60***	.454***	.454***
The number of children aged 6 to11	1.041	1.02	.930	.930
The number of children aged 12 to18	1.514**	1.49**	1.272*	1.274*
Age	.974	.97!	.975!	.976!
Education (year)	1.054	1.06	1.027	1.025
Household income (logged)	7.528***	7.87***	4.274***	4.205***
Job experience (retrospective)	1.099***	1.10***	1.085***	1.084***
Spouse pay (logged)	.157***	.16***	.178***	.176***
Spouse employment status (permanent is base case)	***	***	***	***
irregular employment	1.568*	1.54!	1.356	1.379
self-employment	2.366***	2.30***	2.435***	2.449***
Financial difficulty (yes)		1.26		.929
N	1382	1382	1404	1402
-2 Log likelihood	1558.65	1555.77	1642.32	1640.54
Model Chi-square (goodness-of-fit)	338.18***	341.06***	302.53***	301.66***

Source: the 3rd wave, KLIPS. Legend : * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, !<.06

2000, Model 1: Hosmer&Lemeshow test x^2 (8) =15.07, sig. =.058 ; Model 2: Hosmer&Lemeshow test x^2 (8) =21.22, sig. =.005

2002, Model 1: Hosmer&Lemeshow test x^2 (8) =20.27, sig. =.009 ; Model 2: H*osmer*&Lemeshow test x^2 (8) =18.81, sig. =.016

Continued from Table 4.E

Statistics: odds ratios - Exp(B)	2005		2006	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
The number of children aged 0 to 5	.490***	.489***	.495***	.493***
The number of children aged 6 to11	.897	.900	.707**	.702**
The number of children aged 12 to18	1.564***	1.546***	1.301*	1.280*
Age	.945***	.943***	.939***	.938***
Education (year)	1.155*	1.153*	1.145	1.149
Household income (logged)	8.890***	9.124***	12.357***	12.780***
Job experience (retrospective)	1.078***	1.078***	1.086***	1.087***
Spouse pay (logged)	.081***	.085***	.072***	.075***
Spouse employment status (permanent is base case)	***	***	***	***
irregular employment	1.473	1.446	1.567	1.542
self-employment	2.058***	2.002***	2.494***	2.457***
Financial difficulty (yes)		1.176		1.207
N	1379	1373	1161	1159
-2 Log likelihood	1585.14	1580.40	1317.59	1314.35
Model Chi-square (goodness-of-fit)	317.61***	314.32***	291.87***	292.35***

Source: the 3rd wave, KLIPS. Legend : * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, !<.06

2005, Model 1: Hosmer&Lemeshow test x^2 (8) =57.00, sig. =.000 ; Model 2: Hosmer&Lemeshow test x^2 (8) =54.16, sig. =.000

2006, Model 1: Hosmer&Lemeshow test x^2 (8) =42.28, sig. =.000 ; Model 2: Hosmer&Lemeshow test x^2 (8) =36.14, sig. =.000

Table 4.F Logistic regression (stepwise) analyses on whether employed or not by year and by gender (individual/situational factors) –for all the steps

Statistics: odds ratios - Exp(B)		Mother			By gender (2006)	
		2000	2002	2005	Mother	Father
Step 1	Job experience (retrospective)	1.125***				
	Children aged 0 to 5		.435***	.488***		
	Children aged 12 to 18				1.612***	
Step 2	Children aged 0 to 5	.502***	.460***	.514***		
	Children aged 12 to 18				1.535***	
	Job experience (retrospective)	1.112***	1.084***	1.065***	1.076***	
Step 3	Children aged 0 to 5	.519***	.442***	.501***		
	Children aged 12 to 18				1.540***	
	Job experience (retrospective)	1.112***	1.087***	1.066***	1.071***	
	Spouse pay (logged)		.599***	.605***	1.639***	
	Household income (logged)	1.845***				
Step 4	Children aged 0 to 5	.524***	.438***	.514***		
	Children aged 12 to 18				1.595***	
	Job experience (retrospective)	1.106***	1.084***	1.060***	1.063***	
	Spouse pay (logged)	.195***	.232***	.107***	.096***	
	Household income (logged)	6.051***	3.640***	7.235***	9.715***	
Step 5	Children aged 0 to 5	.549***	.452***	.539***		
	Children aged 12 to 18				1.518***	
	Job experience (retrospective)	1.095***	1.075***	1.054***	1.056***	
	Spouse pay (logged)	.161***	.180***	.097***	.078***	
	Spouse employment status (permanent is base case)	***	***	***	***	
	Irregular employment	1.590*	1.335	1.351	1.364	
	Self-employment	2.325***	2.397***	1.971***	2.189***	
	Household income (logged)	7.442***	4.241***	8.176***	12.054***	
Step 6	Age				.960**	
	Children aged 0 to 5	.648***	.518***	.661***		
	Children aged 12 to18	1.351**	1.241*	1.390***	1.730***	
	Job experience (retrospective)	1.090***	1.073***	1.050**	1.076***	
	Spouse pay (logged)	.161***	.181***	.095***	.073***	
	Spouse employment status (permanent is base case)	***	***	***	***	
	Irregular employment	1.510	1.305	1.305	1.425	
	Self-employment	2.297***	2.359***	1.893***	2.310***	
	Household income (logged)	7.464***	4.204***	8.275***	13.205***	

Continued from Table 4.F

Statistics: odds ratios - Exp(B)		Mother			By gender (2006)	
		2000	2002	2005	Mother	Father
Step 7	Age	.971*	.975*	.942***	.945***	
(Step 1	Children aged 0 to 5	.590***	.480***	.541***	.669**	
for father)	Children aged 12 to18	1.462***	1.326**	1.629***	1.592***	
	Job experience (retrospective)	1.098***	1.085***	1.074***	1.078***	
	Spouse pay (logged)	.162***	.178***	.085***	.071***	
	Spouse employment status (permanent is base case)	***	***	***	***	
	Irregular employment	1.542(.051)!	1.348	1.377	1.414	
	Self-employment	2.363***	2.410***	2.016***	2.398***	
	Household income (logged)	7.640***	4.310***	9.367***	13.320***	6.665***
Step 8	Education (year)			1.154*		
(Step 2	Age			.946***	.934***	
for father)	Children aged 0 to 5			.535***	.506***	
	Children aged 6 to 11				.711**	
	Children aged 12 to18			1.663***	1.289*	
	Job experience (retrospective)			1.077***	1.084***	
	Spouse pay (logged)			.081***	.075***	.327**
	Spouse employment status (permanent is base case)			***	***	
	Irregular employment			1.453	1.473	
	Self-employment			2.054***	2.454***	
	Household income (logged)			8.859***	12.978***	12.185***
	N	1929	1848	1910	1874	1545

Source: the 3rd , 5th, 8th and 9th waves, KLIPS. Note: statistics are rounded off. Legend : * p<0.05 (sig. at 95%), ** p<0.01 (sig. at 99%), *** p<0.001 (sig. at 99.9%), ! p<0.10 (sig. at 90%)

Continued from Table 4.F

Model summary			Model Chi-square	-2 Log likelihood	Hosmer&Lemeshow test x^2 *(sig.)*
Mother	2000	Step 1	102.690***	1794.135	8.514(.385)
		Step 2	172.076***	1724.749	10.887(.208)
		Step 3	203.298***	1693.527	10.409(.237)
		Step 4	283.881***	1612.945	24.945(.002)
		Step 5	322.447***	1574.378	29.333(.000)
		Step 6	333.436***	1563.389	22.721(.004)
		Step 7	337.416***	1559.410	21.556(.006)
	2002	Step 1	98.475***	1843.728	7.538 (.006)
		Step 2	143.209***	1798.994	19.379 (.013)
		Step 3	167.251***	1774.953	13.753 (.088)
		Step 4	249.009***	1693.195	12.585 (.127)
		Step 5	290.604***	1651.600	21.106 (.007)
		Step 6	296.521***	1645.683	19.746 (.011)
		Step 7	300.622***	1641.581	22.048 (.005)
	2005	Step 1	72.331***	1822.389	.512(.474)
		Step 2	96.004***	1798.715	9.282(.319)
		Step 3	117.723***	1776.997	9.847(.276)
		Step 4	250.054***	1644.666	62.409(.000)
		Step 5	276.109***	1618.611	64.622(.000)
		Step 6	290.128***	1604.592	39.983(.000)
		Step 7	307.754***	1586.966	54.434(.000)
		Step 8	312.030***	1582.690	52.126(.000)
	2006	Step 1	43.147***	1563.546	7.623(.006)
		Step 2	71.044***	1535.650	9.071(.336)
		Step 3	93.404***	1513.289	10.730(.217)
		Step 4	234.855***	1371.839	52.626(.000)
		Step 5	263.048***	1343.646	52.868(.000)
		Step 6	270.770***	1335.924	45.460(.000)
		Step 7	279.160***	1327.533	53.659(.000)
		Step 8	287.554***	1319.140	41.265(.000)
Father	2006	Step 1	46.172***	263.820	21.887(.005)
		Step 2	58.750***	251.241	20.009(.010)

Table 4.G Logistic regression (stepwise) analyses on whether employed or not for mothers by year (individual/situational factors) – models without the variable, household income

Statistics: odds ratios - Exp(B)		2000	2002	2005	2006
Step 1	Children aged 0 to 5		.436***	.485***	
	Children aged 12 to 18				1.615***
	Job experience (retrospective)	1.126***			
Step 2	Children aged 0 to 5	.498***	.461***	.511***	
	Children aged 12 to 18				1.540***
	Job experience (retrospective)	1.113***	1.084***	1.064***	1.075***
Step 3	Children aged 0 to 5	.512***	.443***	.498***	
	Children aged 12 to 18				1.550***
	Job experience (retrospective)	1.106***	1.086***	1.065***	1.077***
	Spouse pay (logged)		.607***	.605***	.632***
	Spouse employment status (permanent is base case)	***			
	irregular employment	1.306			
	self-employment	1.786***			
Step 4	Education (year)				1.265***
	Children aged 0 to 5	.595***	.456***	.617***	
	Children aged 12 to18	1.314**		1.405***	1.646***
	Job experience (retrospective)	1.102***	1.081***	1.061***	1.086***
	Spouse pay (logged)		.545***	.597***	.549***
	Spouse employment status (permanent is base case)	***	***		
	irregular employment	1.236	1.122		
	self-employment	1.766***	1.983***		
Step 5	Education (year)			1.287***	1.301***
	Children aged 0 to 5	.589***	.529***	.592***	
	Children aged 12 to18	1.312**	1.266**	1.496***	1.597***
	Job experience (retrospective)	1.101***	1.078***	1.069***	1.084***
	Spouse pay (logged)	.769*	.544***	.502***	.551***
	Spouse employment status (permanent is base case)	***	***		***
	irregular employment	1.103	1.092		1.393
	self-employment	1.801***	1.957***		1.720***

Continued from Table 4.G

Statistics: odds ratios - Exp(B)		2000	2002	2005	2006
Step 6	Education (year)	1.169*		1.310***	1.329***
	Children aged 0 to 5	.569***	.522***	.599***	.704**
	Children aged 12 to18	1.374***	1.284**	1.461***	1.425***
	Job experience (retrospective)	1.105***	1.075***	1.065***	1.079***
	Spouse pay (logged)	.695**	.491***	.496***	.535***
	Spouse employment status (permanent is base case)	***	***	***	***
	irregular employment	1.177	1.147	1.107	1.373
	self-employment	1.847***	2.039***	1.679***	1.753***
	Financially difficult (dummy)		1.373*		
Step 7	Education (year)		1.134*		1.346***
	Children aged 0 to 5		.510***		.561***
	Children aged 6 to 11				.727**
	Children aged 12 to18		1.326**		
	Job experience (retrospective)		1.079***		1.080***
	Spouse pay (logged)		.463***		.545***
	Spouse employment status (permanent is base case)		***		***
	irregular employment		1.222		1.422
	self-employment		2.096***		1.780***
	Financially difficult (dummy)		1.346*		
Step 8	Education (year)				1.342***
	Children aged 0 to 5				.503***
	Children aged 6 to11				.670***
	Job experience (retrospective)				1.080***
	Spouse pay (logged)				.551***
	Spouse employment status (permanent is base case)				***
	irregular employment				1.446
	self-employment				1.810***
	N	1929	1848	1910	1874

Source: the 3rd , 5th, 8th and 9th waves, KLIPS. Note: statistics are rounded off.
Legend : * p<0.05 (sig. at 95%), ** p<0.01 (sig. at 99%), *** p<0.001 (sig. at 99.9%)

Continued from Table 4.G

Model summary		Model Chi-square	-2 Log likelihood	Hosmer&Lemeshow test x^2 *(sig.)*
2000	Step 1	103.617***	1801.819	8.500(.386)
	Step 2	174.671***	1730.765	11.272(.187)
	Step 3	195.160***	1710.276	12.173(.144)
	Step 4	205.275***	1700.161	12.345(.136)
	Step 5	210.269***	1695.166	10.772(.215)
	Step 6	216.677***	1688.759	4.587(.801)
2002	Step 1	98.281***	1852.118	7.494(.006)
	Step 2	143.077***	1807.322	19.112(.014)
	Step 3	166.011***	1784.389	13.816(.087)
	Step 4	194.257***	1756.142	19.449(.013)
	Step 5	201.761***	1748.638	16.059(.042)
	Step 6	208.069***	1742.330	12.536(.129)
	Step 7	212.393***	1738.007	5.531(.700)
2005	Step 1	73.723***	1827.478	.545(.461)
	Step 2	96.936***	1804.264	10.073(.260)
	Step 3	118.781***	1782.420	10.252(.248)
	Step 4	135.468***	1765.732	14.074(.080)
	Step 5	152.865***	1748.335	9.418(.308)
	Step 6	169.451***	1731.750	8.936(.348)
2006	Step 1	43.479***	1564.609	7.688(.006)
	Step 2	70.832***	1537.255	5.491(.704)
	Step 3	88.196***	1519.892	15.673(.047)
	Step 4	102.302***	1505.786	1.588(.991)
	Step 5	118.116***	1489.971	10.366(.240)
	Step 6	126.459***	1481.628	1.555(.992)
	Step 7	135.504***	1472.584	3.199(.921)
	Step 8	134.069***	1474.018	5.350(.720)

Table 4.H Linear regression analyses on the number of employment break-offsa by gender for 2006 (individual/situational factors) - without the variable, job experience

Statistics: standardized coefficients *B*	Mother		Father			
	Step1	Step2	Step1	Step2	Step3	Step4
The number of children						
Age				.204***	.234***	.230***
Education (year)		-.141**	-.239***	-.210***	-.138***	-.115**
Household income (logged)	-.223***	-.164**			-.162***	-.129**
Work commitment						-.112**
Spouse pay (logged)						
Irregular employment (dummy)						
Married and living with spouse						
F	24.63	16.61	50.23	44.87	37.01	30.47
Adjusted R-square	.05***	.06***	.06***	.10***	.12***	.13***

Source: the 9th waves, KLIPS in the year 2006. Note: statistics are rounded off; [a] employment break-offs refer to the number of employment failures including job transitions during the career for the recent and retrospective ones. Legend : * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 4.I Gender difference in the results of linear regression analyses on work commitment - Mother

Statistics: standardized coefficients *B*	Step 1	Step 2	Step 3	Step 4
The number of children[a]				
Age			-.124**	-.113**
Education (years)		.203***	.148**	.150**
Pay	.455***	.361***	.362***	.356***
Irregular employment				
Discrimination experience				-.097*
The number of employment break-offs[b]				
Job experience[b]				
Household income (logged)				
F	131.92	79.24	56.39	44.30
Adjusted R-square	.21***	.24***	.25***	.26***

Source: the 9th wave, KLIPS (2006). Note: [a] statistics with the number of children were very similar with those with the three children age cohorts. [b] during the career for the recent years between 1998 and 2006. Legend: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Continued from Table 4.I - Father

Statistics: standardized coefficients *B*	Step 1	Step 2	Step 3	Step 4	Step 5
The number of children[a]					
Age					
Education (years)			.109**	.096**	.087*
Pay	.475***	.418***	.370***	.361***	.351***
Irregular employment		-.147***	-.134***	-.133***	-.133***
Discrimination experience				-.075*	-.069*
The number of employment break-offs[b]					-.067*
Job experience[b]					
Household income (logged)					
F	224.35	124.06	86.60	66.70	54.43
Adjusted R-square	.22***	.24***	.25***	.25***	.26***

Source: the 9th wave, KLIPS (2006). Note: [a] statistics for the number of children were very similar with those for children age cohorts; [b] during the career for the recent years between 1998 and 2006. Legend: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 4.J Gender difference in the results of linear regression analyses on work commitment – 'enter-method' analysis models

Statistics: coefficients B(SE)	Work commitment			
	Mother		Father	
	Model A	Model B	Model A	Model B
Constant	9.421***	8.105***	4.392**	3.899*
	(1.925)	(2.039)	(1.437)	(1.588)
Age	-.075**	-.049!	-.023	-.016
	(.022)	(.029)	(.017)	(.023)
Education (years)	.424**	.397**	.378***	.343***
	(.132)	(.139)	(.084)	(.090)
Recent job experience (years in jobs between 1998 and 2006)	.058*	.051!	.059***	.061***
	(.027)	(.029)	(.017)	(.017)
Pay (logged)	1.503***	1.637***	4.509***	4.449***
	(.277)	(.293)	(.554)	(.577)
Irregular employment	-.118	-.053	-.962**	-.880**
	(.309)	(.327)	(.306)	(.319)
The number of job breaks	-.235	-.171	-.601*	-.644*
	(.309)	(.319)	(.274)	(.286)
The number of children	.013		-.013	
	(.201)		(.150)	
Discrimination experience		-.286*		-.131
		(.120)		(.107)
The number of children aged 0 to 5		-.038		.274
		(.333)		(.230)
The number of children aged 6 to11		.223		-.125
		(.242)		(.170)
The number of children aged 12 to18		-.298		.009
		(.240)		(.194)
F	26.92	18.77	42.96	27.90
Adjusted R-square	.24***	.26***	.21***	.22***

Source: the 9th wave, KLIPS (2006). Legend: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, ! < 0.10

Table 5.A Logistic regression on whether employed or not by year and gender (gender regime factors) – 'enter-method' analysis

Statistics: odds ratios - Exp(B)	Mother				Father
	2000	2002	2005	2006	2006
The number of children aged 0 to 5	.818	.574**	.533***	.523***	1.011
The number of children aged 6 to11	1.000	.740	.677*	.721*	.815
The number of children aged 12 to18	1.500	.804	.983	1.760*	1.102
Age	.996	.999	1.016	1.022	.942**
Education (year)	.832	1.039	1.051	1.095	1.124
Household income (logged)	2.250*	2.603***	1.467*	1.817***	16.776***
Discrimination experience	1.187	1.124	.943	1.047	1.065
Childcare costs (for children under 6[a])	1.047**	1.012!	1.019***	1.017***	1.000
N	194	531	809	757	1575
-2 Log likelihood	201.48	649.19	976.06	924.83	626.44
Model Chi-square (goodness-of-fit)	29.86***	57.23***[b]	72.56***[b]	78.92***	69.11***

Source: the 9th wave, KLIPS. Note: [a] statistics for fathers are replaced by child costs for all age cohorts due to the model goodness-of-fit; [b] the models for 2002 and 2005 are insignificant in the Hosmer&Lemeshow test within 10% p-value. Legend: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, !<.06
For mothers, 2000: Hosmer&Lemeshow test x^2 (8)=13.72, sig. =.090 ; 2002: Hosmer&Lemeshow test x^2 (8)=6.54, sig.=.587[a] ; 2005: Hosmer&Lemeshow test x^2 (8)=12.62, sig.=.126[a] ; 2006: Hosmer&Lemeshow test x^2 (8)=16.94, sig.=.031; For fathers, 2006: Hosmer & Lemeshow test x^2 (8)=26.20, sig.=.001

Table 5.B Logistic regression analyses on whether employed or not for mothers by year (gender regime factors) –for all the steps

Statistics: odds ratios - Exp(B)		2000	2002	2005	2006
Step 1	Household income (logged)		2.957***		2.270***
	Childcare costs (for children under 6)	1.054***		1.021***	
Step 2	Children aged 0 to 5		.713*		
	Household income (logged)	2.003! (.050)	2.999***	1.551**	1.944***
	Childcare costs (for children under 6)			1.017***	1.013**
Step 3	Children aged 0 to 5			.711**	.648***
	Household income (logged)			1.592**	1.908***
	Childcare costs (for children under 6)			1.016***	1.014***
Step 4	Children aged 0 to 5			.522***	.676**
	Children aged 6 to 11			.687*	
	Children aged 12 to18				1.885**
	Household income (logged)			1.529**	1.916***
	Childcare costs (for children under 6)			1.019***	1.015***
Step 5	Children aged 0 to 5				.511***
	Children aged 6 to 11				.727*
	Children aged 12 to18				1.851*
	Household income (logged)				1.923***
	Childcare costs (for children under 6)				1.017***
	Model summary	Model Chi-square	-2 Log likelihood	Hosmer&Lemeshow test x^2 *(sig.)*	
2000	Step 1	21.327***	210.011	15.769(.027)	
	Step 2	25.495***	205.844	7.653(.468)	
2002	Step 1	42.111***	664.308	13.146(.107)	
	Step 2	48.760***	657.659	15.931(.043)	
2005	Step 1	46.170***	1002.447	6.319(.388)	
	Step 2	56.008***	992.609	21.454(.006)	
	Step 3	64.229***	984.388	23.778(.002)	
	Step 4	70.700***	977.917	17.730(.023)	
2006	Step 1	37.915***	965.837	34.119(.000)	
	Step 2	50.404***	953.348	7.375(.497)	
	Step 3	63.272***	940.481	20.155(.010)	
	Step 4	70.539***	933.213	16.141(.040)	
	Step 5	75.736***	928.017	5.065(.751)	

Source: the 3rd , 5th, 8th and 9th waves, KLIPS. Note: statistics are rounded off.

Legend: * p<0.05 (sig. at 95%), ** p<0.01 (sig. at 99%), *** p<0.001 (sig. at 99.9%), ! p<0.10 (sig. at 90%)

Table 5.C Logistic regression analysis results with discrimination experience by year

Statistics: odds ratios - Exp(B)	2000	2002	2005	2006
The number of children aged 0 to 5	.549***	.535***	.559***	.618***
The number of children aged 6 to11	1.046	1.003	.889	.840!
The number of children aged 12 to18	1.421*	1.348*	1.284**	1.385**
Age	.998	1.003	1.005	1.008
Education (year)	.991	.999	1.035	1.039
Household income (logged)	1.347**	1.380***	1.226*	1.366***
Discrimination experience	1.021	1.108!	1.037	1.077
N	1458	1567	1701	1604
-2 Log likelihood	1889.72	2030.50	2228.99	2090.23
Model Chi-square (goodness-of-fit)	127.33***[a]	141.78***	126.14***	133.27***

Source: the 9th wave, KLIPS. Note: statistics are rounded off; [a] statistics for 2000 are insignificant in the Hosmer&Lemeshow test. Legend: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, !<.06
For 2000, Hosmer&Lemeshow test $x^2(8) = 9.31$, sig=.317[a]; for 2002, Hosmer&Lemeshow test $x^2(8)=32.66$, sig=.000; for 2005, Hosmer&Lemeshow test $x^2(8)=35.67$, sig=.000; for 2006, Hosmer&Lemeshow test $x^2(8)=21.90$, sig=.005

Table 5.D Logistic regression analysis results without discrimination experience by year

Statistics: odds ratios - Exp(B)	2000	2002	2005	2006
The number of children aged 0 to 5	.549***	.526***	.555***	.595***
The number of children aged 6 to11	1.023	.952	.879	.836*
The number of children aged 12 to18	1.341**	1.314*	1.270**	1.327**
Age	1.004	.998	1.001	1.005
Education (year)	.974	.966	1.032	1.066
Household income (logged)	1.271**	1.305***	1.247**	1.348***
N	1851	1828	1896	1858
-2 Log likelihood	2396.32	2382.76	2486.49	2431.99
Model Chi-square (goodness-of-fit)	155.34***	148.06***	131.28***	139.94***

Source: the 9th wave, KLIPS. Note: statistics are rounded off; [a] statistics for 2000 are insignificant in the Hosmer&Lemeshow test. Legend: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, !<.06
For 2000, Hosmer&Lemeshow test $x^2(8)=15.18$, sig.=.056; for 2002, Hosmer&Lemeshow test $x^2(8) = 47.74$, sig=.000; for 2005, Hosmer&Lemeshow test $x^2(8)=34.25$, sig=.000; for 2006, Hosmer&Lemeshow test $x^2(8) = 20.87$, sig=.007

Table 5.E Linear regression analyses on the number of failures in employment during the career1 for mothers (gender regime factors) – for all the steps

Statistics: standardized coefficients *B*	(without pay & irregular employment) Model 1				(without overtime work) Model 2[2]		(all the list variables) Model 3	
	Step1	Step2	Step3	Step4	Step1	Step2	Step1[1]	Step1[2]
Children aged 0 to 5								
Children aged 6 to 11								
Children aged 12 to 18								
Age								
Education (year)								
Household income (logged)				-.084*				
Discrimination experience	.115**	.117**	.121**	.114**				
Overtime work (yes or no)[3]		.109**	.171***	.176***				
Parental welfare			-.157***	-.140***			-.235**	
Pay (logged)					-.230***	-.182***		
Irregular employment (dummy)						.120**		.173*
F	10.57	10.15	12.60	10.88	35.39	22.00	12.01	5.00
Adjusted R-square	.01**	.02***	.04***	.05***	.05***	.06***	.05**	.02*

Source: 9th wave (2006), KLIPS. Note: [1] 'employment failure during career' refers to the number of breaks between jobs including retrospective ones; [2] 'employment failure during career' is replaced by the number of breaks between jobs held *from 1998 to 2006* due to the goodness-fit-model; [3] overtime work refers to 'whether they had overtime work or not' for Model 1 and 3 (dummy). Legend: * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001

Table 5.F Linear regression analyses on the number of failures in employment during the career[1] for fathers (gender regime factors) – for all the steps

Statistics: standardized coefficients *B*	Model 1 (without pay & irregular employment)			Model 2[2] (without overtime work)					
	Step 1	Step 2	Step 3	Step 1	Step 2	Step 3	Step 4	Step 5	Step 6
Children aged 0 to 5									-.066 *
Children aged 6 to 11									
Children aged 12 to 18									
Age			.143 ***		.184 ***	.183 ***	.199 ***	.198 **	.165 ***
Education (year)	-.258 ***	-.219 ***	-.199 ***	-.226 ***	-.196 ***	-.166 **	-.128 ***	-.116 ***	-.114 ***
Household income (logged)							-.109 **	-.101 **	-.104 **
Discrimination experience								.078 **	.079 **
Parental welfare		-.214 ***	-.195 ***			-.135 ***	-.117 ***	-.114 ***	-.112 ***
Overtime work (average hours)									
Pay (logged)									
Irregular employment (dummy)									
F	44.70	38.98	31.21	60.06	51.25	42.01	34.85	29.51	25.34
Adjusted R-square	.07 ***	.11 ***	.13 ***	.05 ***	.08 ***	.10 ***	.11 ***	.12 ***	.12 ***

Source: 9th wave (2006), KLIPS. Note: [1] employment failure during career' refers to the number of breaks between jobs including retrospective jobs; [2] 'employment failure during career' is also applied to Model 2 for fathers (which is different from that for mothers) due to the goodness-fit-model.

Continued from Table 5.F

Statistics: standardized coefficients *B*	Model 3 (all the list variables)			
	Step1	Step2	Step3	Step4
Children aged 0 to 5				
Children aged 6 to 11				
Children aged 12 to 18				
Age			.160***	.158***
Education (year)		-.216***	-.196***	-.173***
Household income (logged)				
Discrimination experience				
Parental welfare	-.260***	-.221***	-.199***	-.184***
Overtime work (average hours)				
Pay (logged)				-.092*
Irregular employment (dummy)				
F	43.00	37.60	31.35	24.99
Adjusted R-square	.07***	.11***	.13***	.14***

Table 6.A (All) married women's class identification by employment status and economic activity status (percentage, N)

	Percentage (cases, N) within employment	Upper class	Middle class	Lower class
By employment status	Permanent workers	2.0 (16)	62.0 (500)	36.0 (290)
	Irregular(nonstandard) workers	0.3 (1)	37.3 (117)	62.4 (196)
	Self-employed and unpaid family workers	1.6 (11)	61.8 (424)	36.6 (251)
	Sub-total	1.6 (28)	57.6 (1041)	40.8 (737)
By economic activity status	Not working	1.9 (37)	64.3 (1225)	33.7 (642)
	Employed	1.6 (28)	57.6 (1041)	40.8 (737)
	Sub-total	1.8 (65)	61.1 (2266)	37.2 (1379)

Source: the 9th wave, KLIPS. By employment status, Pearson $x^2(4)=74.99$, sig (2-tailed)=.000; by economic activity status, Pearson $x^2(2)=20.16$, sig. (2-tailed)=.000

Table 6.B Cross-tabulation analysis of married women's employment and non-working by class across 5 waves (percentage)

%	2nd wave		3rd wave		5th wave		8th wave		9th wave	
	non-E	E	non-E	E	non-E	E	non-E	E	non-E	E
Upper class	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.9	0.5	1.0	0.8
Middle class	37.2	38.4	37.5	37.5	38.7	43.3	31.7	28.9	30.5	28.9
Lower class	10.2	13.9	11.4	13.2	7.3	10.6	16.7	21.3	17.0	21.8
% of Total N	47.6	52.4	49.1	50.9	46.1	53.9	49.3	50.7	48.6	51.4

Note: married women aged less than 65 and with job experience (more than 1 year). Pearson Chi-Square tests over the waves, x^2 (2)=10.850, p=.004 for the 2nd wave; x^2 (2)=3.032, p=.220 for the 3rd wave; x^2 (2)=8.853, p=.012 for the 5th wave; x^2 (2)=22.001, p=.000 for the 8th wave; x^2=16.79, df=2 p=.000 for the 9th wave

Table 6.C The percentage of non-employed and employed mothers by class (percentage)

	2nd wave		3rd wave		5th wave		8th wave		9th wave	
	non-E	E	non-E	E	non-E	E	non-E	E	non-E	E
Upper class	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1	1.0	0.4	0.9	0.8
Middle class	44.5	36.0	44.5	35.1	46.3	40.2	34.1	23.0	36.6	30.3
Lower class	9.0	10.2	10.1	10.1	5.8	7.4	23.7	17.9	14.8	16.6
% of Total N	53.7	46.3	54.6	45.4	52.3	47.7	58.8	41.2	52.4	47.6

Note: mothers aged less than 65 and with job experience. Pearson Chi-Square tests over the waves: x^2 (2)=10.850, p=.004 for the 2nd wave; x^2 (2)=3.032, p=.220 for the 3rd wave; x^2 (2)=8.853, p=.012 for the 5th wave; x^2 (2)=22.001, p=.000 for the 8th wave; x^2=16.79, df=2 p=.000 for the 9th wave

Table 6.D Logistic regression analyses on being employed for mothers in the four selected years and the gender difference (class factors) – 'enter-method' analysis

Statistics: odds ratios - Exp(B)	Mother				Father
	2000[b]	2002	2005	2006	2006
Children aged 0 to 5	.555***	.542***	.545***	.596***	1.006
Children aged 6 to11	1.025	.989	.859	.833*	.737
Children aged12 to18	1.351**	1.359**	1.240*	1.316**	1.067
Social class (Lower class is base)		**	***	***	**
upper class	2.232	.509	.370*	.396*	1.143
middle class	.757*	.578**	.621***	.556***	2.454**
Age	1.003	.999	1.002	1.007	.922***
Education(year)	.990	1.004	1.067	1.123**	.904
Household income (logged)	1.334**	1.483***	1.421***	1.596***	2.777***
Child costs[a]	1.000	.997	1.001	1.000	1.002
N	1851	1828	1885	1844	1522
-2 Log likelihood	2390.93	2368.05	2452.32	2385.74	608.73
Model Chi-square (goodness-of-fit)	160.73***[b]	162.77***	150.29***	167.12***	96.83***

Source: the 3rd, 5th, 8th and 9th waves, KLIPS. Legend: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, ! p<0.06
Note: [a] child costs include all costs for child education and childcare due to the goodness-of-fit model.
[b] note that this model in 2000 is not significant in the Hosmer&Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test.
Mothers: for 2000, Hosmer&Lemeshow test $x^2(8) = 9.97$, sig. =.267[b] ; for 2002, Hosmer&Lemeshow test $x^2(8)=20.84$, sig.=.008; for 2005, Hosmer&Lemeshow test $x^2(8)=17.06$, sig.=.029; for 2006, Hosmer&Lemeshow test $x^2(8) = 24.83$, sig. =.002; Fathers: for 2006, Hosmer&Lemeshow test $x^2(8)=14.56$, test sig.=.068

Table 6.E Logistic regression analyses on whether employed or not by year and gender

Statistics: odds ratios - Exp(B)		Mother			By gender (2006)	
		2000	2002	2005	Mother	Father
Step 1	Children aged 0 to 5	.439***	.446***	.487***		
	Children aged 12 to 18				1.764***	
	Household income (logged)					3.212***
Step 2	Children aged 0 to 5	.522***	.546***	.601***	.666***	
	Children aged 12 to 18	1.323***	1.362***	1.371***	1.473***	
	Household income (logged)					3.308***
	Age					.930***
Step 3	Children aged 0 to 5	.529***	.544***	.605***	.674***	
	Children aged 12 to 18	1.344***	1.358***	1.372***	1.487***	
	Household income (logged)	1.257**	1.280**	1.253**	1.385***	2.671***
	Age					.937***
	Social class (lower class is base)					**
	upper class					1.182
	middle class					2.419***
Step 4	Children aged 0 to 5		.555***	.613***	.688***	
	Children aged 12 to 18		1.346***	1.355***	1.467***	
	Household income (logged)		1.422***	1.457***	1.635***	
	Social class (lower class is base)		**	**	***	
	upper class		.520	.418	.446*	
	middle class		.574***	.647***	.588***	
Step 5	Children aged 0 to 5				.599*	
(step	Children aged 6 to11				.821**	.722*
(step4	Children aged 12 to 18				1.300**	
for	Household income (logged)				1.651***	2.754***
father)	Social class (lower class is base)				***	**
	upper class				.432*	1.098
	middle class[1]				.584***	2.378***
	Age					.928***
Step 6	Children aged 0 to 5				.579***	
	Children aged 6 to11				.822*	
	Children aged 12 to 18				1.320**	
	Household income (logged)				1.599***	
	Social class (lower class is base)				***	
	upper class				.401*	
	middle class				.554***	
	Education				1.109*	
	N	1929	1848	1910	1874	1545

Source: the 3rd , 5th, 8th and 9th waves, KLIPS. Note: statistics are rounded off.
Legend : * p<0.05 (sig. at 95%), ** p<0.01 (sig. at 99%), *** p<0.001 (sig. at 99.9%)

Continued from Table 6.E

Model summary			Model chi-square	-2 Log likelihood	Hosmer&Lemeshow test x^2 *(sig.)*
Mother	2000	Step 1	129.440***	2422.218	.089(.765)
		Step 2	145.289***	2406.369	5.071(.535)
		Step 3	154.797***	2396.861	24.516(.002)
	2002	Step 1	117.275***	2413.542	12.836(.000)
		Step 2	135.050***	2395.766	14.289(.014)
		Step 3	147.190***	2383.627	47.623(.000)
		Step 4	159.646***	2371.171	30.344(.000)
	2005	Step 1	99.807***	2502.801	2.353(.125)
		Step 2	119.746***	2482.862	3.393 (.494)
		Step 3	129.946***	2472.663	56.483 (.000)
		Step 4	145.027***	2457.581	21.089(.007)
	2006	Step 1	92.426***	2460.429	11.661(.001)
		Step 2	114.408***	2438.447	5.306(.257)
		Step 3	134.789***	2418.066	28.497(.000)
		Step 4	156.318***	2396.537	21.029 (.007)
		Step 5	161.868***	2390.987	10.712(.219)
		Step 6	166.628***	2386.227	22.221 (.005)
Father	2006	Step 1	57.923***	647.632	15.715 (.047)
		Step 2	76.950***	628.604	11.998(.151)
		Step 3	90.474***	615.080	10.125(.256)
		Step 4	95.441***	610.113	21.077(.007)

Table 6.F Korean mothers' labour market behaviour predictions from the interaction between social class and child age cohorts by year – for all the steps

Statistics: odds ratios - Exp(B) Logistic regression on whether employed or not		2000	2002	2005	2006
Step 1	Children aged 0 to 5 by middle class	.466***	.461***		.560***
	Age			1.047***	
Step 2	Children aged 0 to 5 by middle class	.443***	.455***		.511***
	Children aged 0 to 5 by lower class	.416***			.478***
	Children aged 12 to 18 by lower class			1.568***	
	Household income (logged)		1.326***		
	Age			1.037***	
Step 3	Children aged 0 to 5 by middle class	.466***	.483***		.486***
	Children aged 6 to 11 by middle class				.675***
	Children aged 12 to 18 by middle class			1.473***	
	Children aged 0 to 5 by lower class	.428***			.420***
	Children aged 12 to 18 by lower class	1.386**	1.895***	1.854***	
	Household income (logged)		1.443***		
	Age			1.019*	
Step 4	Children aged 0 to 5 by middle class	.472***	.565***		.468***
	Children aged 6 to 11 by middle class				.626***
	Children aged 12 to 18 by middle class		1.310***	1.416***	
	Children aged 0 to 5 by lower class	.476***			.452***
	Children aged 12 to 18 by lower class	1.566***	2.174***	2.061***	
	Household income (logged)	1.353***	1.402***	1.380***	1.490***
	Age			1.017*	
Step 5	Children aged 0 to 5 by middle class	.532***	.543***		.529***
	Children aged 6 to 11 by middle class				.688***
	Children aged 12 to 18 by middle class	1.247**	1.266**	1.502***	
	Children aged 0 to 5 by lower class	.539**	.609*		.517***
	Children aged 6 to 11 by lower class			1.473***	
	Children aged 12 to 18 by lower class	1.752***	2.083***	2.103***	1.578***
	Household income (logged)	1.344***	1.373***	1.468***	1.643***
Step 6	Children aged 0 to 5 by middle class		.564***		
	Children aged 12 to 18 by middle class		1.307**	1.532***	
	Children aged 0 to 5 by lower class		.589*	.652**	
	Children aged 6 to 11 by lower class		1.402*	1.494***	
	Children aged 12 to 18 by lower class		2.060***	2.133***	
	Household income (logged)		1.415***	1.415***	

Continued from Table 6.F

Step 7	Children aged 0 to 5 by middle class			.705***	
	Children aged 12 to 18 by middle class			1.322**	
	Children aged 0 to 5 by lower class			.565***	
	Children aged 6 to 11 by lower class			1.335**	
	Children aged 12 to 18 by lower class			1.863***	
	Household income (logged)			1.410***	
Step 8	Children aged 0 to 5 by middle class			.612***	
	Children aged 6 to 11 by middle class			.768**	
	Children aged 0 to 5 by lower class			.488***	
	Children aged 12 to 18 by lower class			1.630***	
	Household income (logged)			1.447***	
Step 9	Children aged 0 to 5 by middle class			.569***	
	Children aged 6 to 11 by middle class			.730***	
	Children aged 0 to 5 by lower class			.466***	
	Children aged 12 to 18 by lower class			1.556***	
	Household income (logged)			1.421***	
Step 10	Children aged 0 to 5 by middle class			.535***	
	Children aged 6 to 11 by middle class			.705***	
	Children aged 0 to 5 by lower class			.439***	
	Children aged 12 to 18 by lower class			1.478***	
	Household income (logged)			1.446***	
	N	1929	1848	1910	1874

Continued from Table 6.F

Model summary			Model Chi-square	-2 Log likelihood	Hosmer&Lemeshow test x^2 *(sig.)*
Mother	2000	Step 1	103.571***	2448.087	.069(.793)
		Step 2	128.815***	2422.844	.377(.828)
		Step 3	138.799***	2412.859	2.871(.580)
		Step 4	153.672***	2397.986	30.112(.000)
		Step 5	162.385***	2389.274	22.397(.004)
	2002	Step 1	101.827***	2428.990	10.538(.001)**
		Step 2	117.906***	2412.910	42.697(.000)***
		Step 3	140.021***	2390.796	45.723(.000)***
		Step 4	153.078***	2377.739	38.712(.000)***
		Step 5	158.307***	2372.510	42.821(.000)***
		Step 6	162.601***	2368.216	30.979(.000)***
	2005	Step 1	46.649***	2555.959	44.826(.000)
		Step 2	74.194***	2528.414	22.736(.004)
		Step 3	98.924***	2503.684	21.521 (.006)
		Step 4	117.441***	2485.167	47.130(.000)
		Step 5	132.737***	2469.871	47.572(.000)
		Step 6	140.873***	2461.735	40.397(.000)
		Step 7	153.603***	2449.005	22.998(.003)
		Step 8	161.893***	2440.715	12.709(.122)
		Step 9	159.340***	2443.268	15.394(.052)
		Step 10	157.978***	2444.630	12.728(.122)
	2006	Step 1	51.360***	2501.495	1.234(.267)
		Step 2	88.532***	2464.323	2.570(.277)
		Step 3	116.809***	2436.046	3.830(.574)
		Step 4	145.656***	2407.199	38.906(.000)
		Step 5	168.229***	2384.626	16.543(.035)

Table 6.G Logistic regression analyses on whether employed or not by year and by gender (class factors) – for all the steps

Statistics: odds ratios - Exp(B)		Mother			By gender (2006)	
		2000[1]	2002	2005	Mother	Father
Step1	Children aged 0 to 5	.427***	.437***			
	Children aged 12 to 18			1.523***	1.621***	
	Household income (logged)					3.201***
Step2	Children aged 0 to 5	.504***	.424***	.549***	.557***	
	Children aged 12 to 18	1.313**		1.370***	1.458***	
	Household income (logged)					3.282***
	Social mobility belief (positive)		.690**			
	Age					.930***
Step3	Children aged 0 to 5	.511***	.425***	.551***	.570***	
	Children aged 12 to 18	1.329***		1.358***	1.453***	
	Household income (logged)	1.245*	1.290*			
	Social mobility belief (positive)		.657**			
	Social class (lower class is base)			**	**	
	upper class			.634	.336*	
	middle class			.688**	.672**	
Step4	Children aged 0 to 5	.506***	.445***	.553***	.578***	
	Children aged 12 to 18	1.325***		1.356***	1.461***	
	Household income (logged)	1.270**	1.554***	1.211*	1.383**	
	Social mobility belief (positive)	.787*	.652**			
	Social class (lower class is base)		***	**	***	
	upper class		.284	.488	.224**	
	middle class		.398***	.604***	.544***	
Step5	Children aged 0 to 5	.516***	.393***	.567***	.590**	
(step3	Children aged 12 to 18	1.322***		1.392***	1.504***	
for	Household income (logged)	1.354**	1.584***	1.317**	1.493***	2.640***
father)	Social mobility belief (positive)	.794*	.651**			
	Social class (lower class is base)		***	**	***	**
	upper class		.257	.601	.242**	1.208
	middle class[1]	.744*	.379***	.632**	.574***	2.499***
	Child education costs[2]			.995*	.996*	
	(for children over 6)					
	Age		.974*			.936***

Source: the 3rd, 5th, 8th and 9th waves, KLIPS. Note: statistics are rounded off; [1] statistics for social class in 2000 are replaced by those for middle class (dummy) due to the goodness-of-fit model; [2] statistics for child education costs in 2000 are replaced by those for total child costs including childcare and education costs due to the goodness-of-fit model.

Legend : * p<0.05 (sig. at 95%), ** p<0.01 (sig. at 99%), *** p<0.001 (sig. at 99.9%)

Continued from Table 6.G

Statistics: odds ratios - Exp(B)		Mother			By gender (2006)	
		2000[1]	2002	2005	Mother	Father
Step6	Children aged 0 to 5		.391***			
(step4	Children aged 6 to11		.769**			.713*
for	Household income (logged)		1.580***			2.720***
father)	Social mobility belief (positive)		.649**			
	Social class (lower class is base)		***			**
	upper class		.260			1.123
	middle class		.377***			2.458***
	Age		.963**			.928***
	N	1929	1848	1910	1874	1545

Continued from Table 6.G

Model summary			Model Chi-square	-2 Log likelihood	Hosmer&Lemeshow test x^2 *(sig.)*
Mother	2000	Step 1	114.536***	1952.746	1.134(.287)
		Step 2	126.636***	1940.646	4.644(.590)
		Step 3	133.103***	1934.179	16.982(.030)
		Step 4	137.885***	1929.397	7.079(.528)
		Step 5	142.118***	1925.164	3.657(.887)
	2002	Step 1	32.164***	1353.669	.792(.374)
		Step 2	40.353***	1345.479	1.668(.434)
		Step 3	46.726***	1339.107	13.859(.086)
		Step 4	63.423***	1322.409	12.498(.130)
		Step 5	68.995***	1316.838	9.183(.327)
		Step 6	76.963***	1308.870	15.072(.058)
	2005	Step 1	37.756***	1829.259	7.387(.007)
		Step 2	53.570***	1813.445	3.864(.425)
		Step 3	63.780***	1803.235	5.704(.575)
		Step 4	68.083***	1798.932	5.714(.679)
		Step 5	73.833***	1793.182	10.723(.218)
	2006	Step 1	50.894***	1791.537	8.108(.004)
		Step 2	65.841***	1776.589	5.400(.369)
		Step 3	79.890***	1762.541	7.046(.424)
		Step 4	91.658***	1750.773	4.853(.773)
		Step 5	96.206***	1746.224	12.422(.133)
Father	2006	Step 1	58.012***	653.359	16.236(.039)
		Step 2	78.368***	633.002	13.101(.108)
		Step 3	93.094***	618.277	7.543(.479)
		Step 4	98.593***	612.778	21.538(.006)

Table 6.H The probability of being employed, for mothers within the upper/middle class - for 'enter-method' analysis with child costs including childcare and child education

Statistics: odds ratios - Exp(B)	2000	2002	2005	2006
Children aged 0 to 5	.513***	.526***	.575***	.617**
Children aged 6 to 11	.927	.992	.774*	.779*
Children aged 12 to 18	1.160	1.365**	1.218	1.339*
Age	1.011	.997	1.077	.987
Education (year)	1.054	.989	.986	1.127
Household income (logged)	1.282*	1.637***	1.410**	1.863***
Child costs [a]	1.007	.994*	1.001	.995
Social mobility belief (positive)	.842	.623**	1.097	.731
Interaction between child costs and social mobility	.993	1.005	1.000	1.007*
N	1203	1402	1277	1270
-2 Log likelihood	1545.75	1797.49	1676.68	1637.27
Model Chi-square (goodness-of-fit)	106.33***[b]	139.79***	75.72***	111.97***

Source: the 3rd, 5th, 8th and 9th waves, KLIPS. Legend: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Note: [a] child costs include both education and childcare costs; [b] this model in 2000 is insignificant in the Hosmer&Lemeshow test; For 2000, Hosmer&Lemeshow $x^2(8)=13.11$, sig.=.108[b] ; for 2002, Hosmer&Lemeshow test $x^2(8)=15.73$, sig.=.046 ; for 2005, Hosmer&Lemeshow test $x^2(8)=30.85$, sig.=.000 ; for 2006, Hosmer&Lemeshow test $x^2(8)=21.36$, sig.=.006

Table 6.I Logistic regression analyses on whether employed or not for mothers within the upper/middle class by year - for all the steps

Statistics: odds ratios - Exp(B)		2000	2002	2005	2006
Step 1	Children aged 0 to 5	.510***	.449***		
	Children aged 12 to 18			1.548***	1.664***
Step 2	Children aged 0 to 5	.606***	.436***	.646*	
	Children aged 12 to 18	1.400***		1.424***	1.661***
	Household income (logged)				1.522**
	Social mobility belief (positive)		.665**		
Step 3	Children aged 0 to 5		.446***		.588**
	Children aged 6 to 11				
	Children aged 12 to 18				1.495***
	Household income (logged)		1.432**		1.484**
	Social mobility belief (positive)		.629**		
Step 4	Children aged 0 to 5		.391***		.607*
	Children aged 6 to 11				
	Children aged 12 to 18				1.561***
	Household income (logged)		1.480**		1.651***
	Social mobility belief (positive)		.628**		
	Age		.972*		
	Child education costs (for children aged over 6)				.996*
Step 5	Children aged 0 to 5		.386***		
	Children aged 6 to 11		.758**		
	Household income (logged)		1.490**		
	Social mobility belief (positive)		.627**		
	Age		.959**		
	N	1181	1598	1264	1244

Model summary		Model Chi-square	-2 Log likelihood	Hosmer&Lemeshow test x^2 *(sig.)*
2000	Step 1	28.541***	860.230	1.180(.277)
	Step 2	36.999***	851.772	1.429(.921)
2002	Step 1	27.776***	1196.294	.864(.353)
	Step 2	36.571***	1187.499	1.263(.532)
	Step 3	45.217***	1178.853	20.070(.010)
	Step 4	50.486***	1173.584	20.854(.008)
	Step 5	58.335***	1165.734	21.310(.006)
2005	Step 1	25.897*	1173.594	2.699(.100)
	Step 2	31.044***	1168.448	1.752(.781)
2006	Step 1	37.140***	1157.618	2.097(.148)
	Step 2	48.999***	1145.759	15.458(.051)
	Step 3	56.907***	1137.851	7.338(.501)
	Step 4	61.163***	1133.595	6.663(.573)

Table 6.J Logistic regression analyses on whether employed or not for mothers by year - within the lower class

Statistics: odds ratios - Exp(B)		2000	2002	2005	2006
Step 1	Children aged 0 to 5	.362**		.372***	
	Children aged 12 to 18				1.543***
Step 2	Children aged 0 to 5	.376**		.450**	.582*
	Children aged 12 to 18			1.346*	1.434**
	Household income (logged)	2.224*	2.187*		
Step 3	Children aged 0 to 5			.435**	
	Children aged 6 to 11				
	Children aged 12 to 18			1.343*	
	Household income (logged)			1.383*	
	N	128/748	116/598	466/615	450/585
	Model summary	Model Chi-square	-2 Log likelihood	Hosmer&Lemeshow test x^2 *(sig.)*	
2000	Step 1	9.903**	167.043	1.937	(.164)
	Step 2	14.023**	162.922	7.733	(.460)
2002	Step 1	7.309**	140.820	8.264	(.408)
2005	Step 1	17.670***	615.225	.000	(.)
	Step 2	23.294***	609.602	1.427	(.699)
	Step 3	28.153***	604.743	15.562*	(.049)
2006	Step 1	13.025***	591.026	6.368*	(.012)
	Step 2	17.167***	586.884	7.029	(.218)

[i] 비맞벌이 가구에서는 가사는 부인이 주로 담당해야 한다는 생각이 지배적이다. 가사는 부인이 주로 담당해야 한다는 생각에 동의하는 비율은 남성과 여성 모두 91% 수준에 달하고 있으며 가사를 공평하게 분담해야 한다거나 남편이 담당해야 한다는 생각에 동의하는 비율은 극소수에 불과하다. 중략..., 반면에 맞벌이 가구의 경우 부인이 주로 가사를 담당해야 한다고 응답한 비율은 남성의 경우 50.7%, 여성의 경우 43.6%로 나타나고 있다. 주부가 밖에서 일을 하고 있더라도 가사일은 아무래도 여자가 해야 한다고 생각하는 사람이 절반에 이른다는 것을 의미한다. <표 8> 가사분담에 대한 태도 참조 (Hwang, 2002:26).

[ii] 전반적인 생활만족도는 맞벌이주부와 전업주부 간에 큰 차이가 없으나, 맞벌이주부의 경우는 여가활동과 주거환경에 대해서 만족도가 상대적으로 낮고 전업주부의 경우는 가족의 수입에 대해서 상대적으로 만족도가 낮은 것으로 나타난다. 자신의 취업을 통해 소득을 추가적으로 얻고 있는 맞벌이주부는 취업으로 인해 손실된 여가에 부족함을 느끼고 있고 반대로 상대적으로 여가를 많이 누리고 있는 전업주부는 취업하면 얻을 수 있었을 추가적인 수입에 대해 아쉬움을 갖고 있는 셈이다 (Hwang, 2002:28).

[iii] ...다른 한편으로 기혼여성의 직장생활에 대한 애착은 상당한 것으로 나타났다. 조사대상인 기혼여성노동자들은 '직장인'으로써의 강한 정체성을 가지고 있었고, 직장생활에 대한 애착 면에서 볼 때 여성이 남성에 비해서 뒤지지 않는다는 해석이 가능하였다. 이들은 가족과 사회가 출산,양육의 문제를 적극 지원해 준다면 가능한 한 오래 직장생활을 하고 싶다는 의견을 강하게 피력하고 있다 (Jang and Bu, 2003:1).

[iv] A= 출산 양육과 상관없이 가능한 오래 직장생활을 하고 싶다 B= 출산 양육으로 인해 회사에서 불이익을 주지 않는다면 가능한 오래 직장생활을 하고 싶다 C=가족과 사회가 출산 양육문제를 적극 지원해 준다면 가능한 오래 직장 생활을 하고 싶다 D= 경제적인 필요성이 없다면 언제든지 일을 그만두겠다 (Jang and Bu, 2003:18-9, the note of the table 6).

[v] 한국 조선시대 가족의 특징을 규정한다면 남성중심의 가부장적 사회하고 할 수 있다. 가족제도 안에서 영성의 지위와 위치는 남녀칠세부동석, 부부유별, 부장부수, 삼종지도, 칠거지악 등 가부장적인 유교 특유의 문화가치에 크게 위축될 수 밖에 없었다. 이러한 여성관은 여성을 남성에 비해 상대적으로 낮은 위치로 격하시켰으며, 여성의 활동범위도 가부장적인 가정 안으로 한정될 수 밖에 없었다. 중략. 조선시대에 여성의 사회참여 역시 신분과 직업에 따라 다르다. 사대부의 귀한 부인들은 가옥 내실에 깊숙이 들어앉아 내외법을 익히면서 존장녀로서의 리더십을 발휘하였다. 그러나 농민과 상인계층에 속하는 여성들은 남자와 더불어 밭에 나가 일을 해야 하고, 베를 짜고, 장에 나가 물물교환을 해왔다 (박용옥 (1975) 재인용, Byun, 2001:19).

[vi] 성별로 자영업주 비중의 추이를 살펴보면, 여성 비농 부문 자영업주의 비중이 1990년대 이후 상대적으로 안정적 모습을 보이는 반면, 남성은 2003년까지 증가하였다가 이후 급격히 줄어드는 역U자형의 모습을 보인다. 외환위기인 1998년 이후 자영업에서 발견되는 특징의 하나는 경제적 독립에 대한 인식의 제고 등으로 인해 여성의 자영업 증가율이 남성보다 더 빠르게 진행되었다는 점이다. 2007년까지 남성 자영업주는 13.4% 증가하였으나 여성은 23.5%나 증가하였다. 이러한 변화는 다른 OECD 국가들에서도 마찬가지로 관찰되고 있다 (Keum et al., 2009:59).

[vii] 한국개발연구원(2001)은 산업구조에 대하여 지식집약화와 경제의 서비스화가 진척되면서 GDP에서 차지하는 농림수산업과 제조업의 비중은 낮아지는 반면, 서비스업의 비중은 지속적으로 높아질 것으로 전망하고 있다. 서비스 부문에서도 산업 전반의 지식집약화와 세계화,

소득수준의 향상, 금융자산의 축적, 정보통신 인프라의 구축 등에 의해 금융, 의료, 보건, 디지털 컨텐츠, 사업서비스 등의 발전이 현저할 것으로 예상한다. 한편 여성 취업자가 집중되어 있는 도소매 및 음식숙박업이 GDP에서 차지하는 비중은 감소하는 것으로 나타나고 있다 (Keum, 2002:77).

[viii] 분석결과, …중략, 노동생산성 변동에 대한 변화 – 구성 요인분해 (shift-share decomposition) 결과, 제조업과는 대조적으로 서비스업에서는 고부가가치업종의 성장이 둔화되고 저부가가치-저생산성 업종의 고용이 확대되는 비효율적인 구조 변화가 진행되고 있는 것으로 나타났다. 중략…교육서비스업, 보건업 등에서의 부진도 서비스산업의 체질 개선에 실패하고 있는 주된 요인 중 하나로 파악된다. 중략…우리 서비스 부분이 임금상승에 대해 숙련노동 수요를 늘리거나 노동 효율을 높이는 방식 대신 직접적으로 고용을 줄이거나 비정규직을 늘리는 방식에 의존하는 대응 패턴이 관찰되고 있다 (Hwang, 2008:27).

[ix] 1980년대까지 지속적으로 하락하였던 비농 부문의 자영업주 비중은 1990년대에 들어 다소 높아지는 현상이 관찰되었다. 이러한 자영업주의 비중은 2001년을 기점으로 역전되어 그 비중이 하락하고 있으며, 특히 2003년의 신용대란은 자영업 감소에 결정적 영향을 주었다 (Keum et al., 2009:59).

[x] 이것은 달리 말하면 비정규직화의 추세 속에서 개인의 교육투자와 훈련으로 극복할 수 있는 문제가 아니라는 것이다. 비정규직 노동자 중에서 여성의 비중이 높고, 여성 임금근로자 중에서 비정규직의 비율이 매우 높은 이유는 일차적으로 여성의 노동력가치에 대한 일방적인 저평가를 가능하게 하는 가부장적 가치의식 때문이겠으나, 현실적으로 이것을 가능하게 하는 메커니즘은 성별로 구분지어진 직종분리와 직무분리이다. 임금근로자의 직종분포가 여성과 남성간에 현저히 다른 구조에서 특정 직종에 속한 근로자의 대부분이 비정규직으로 일하게 되는데, 특히 이 과정에서 전통적으로 여성직으로 알려진 일자리들이 비정규직화하는 경향이 있다 (Jang, 2001:90).

[xi] 이상의 분석결과는 정확성 및 자료의 한계를 지니고 있지만 성별 임금격차에 있어 승진의 중요성을 확인하고 있다는 측면에서 의의를 찾을 수 있다. 또한 임금격차의 69.5%를 근속기간, 교육, 거주지역 등의 설명변수를 통해 설명할 수 있지만 아직도 29.5%의 임금격차를 설명할 수 없다는 사실은 우리나라에 성차별이 존재할 가능성을 시사한다. 중략…전체 성별 임금격차의 34.1%가 명확한 원인을 모르고 성차별적 요인으로 간주된다는 것은 기업의 임금결정 및 성차별 구조의 존재 여부, 규모에 대한 고찰을 요구한다 (Keum, 2002:178-9).

[xii] 기업의 성차별을 이해하려는 노력의 일환으로 구직활동 및 채용에서의 성별 격차를 분석한 결과, 많은 여성들이 구직에 애로를 겪고 있으며 사업장들의 상당수는 채용시 성별 제한을 두고 있는 것으로 나타나고 있다. 이러한 사업체 조사 결과는 구직활동시 여성의 입직을 허용하는 직장 또는 직업에만 여성들이 지원하는 자기 선택적 과정으로 인해 성차별이 완화된 것으로 나타나고 있을 뿐 실제로는 아직도 성차별이 광범위하게 행해지고 있을 가능성을 시사한다 (Keum, 2002:196).

[xiii] …중략, 넷째, 여성 취업자의 '서비스산업 집중화 현상'이 발생하였다. 1990년대 들어 제조업 취업자의 비중 및 절대 숫자는 남녀 모두 감소하였으나 여성의 감소폭이 컸고, 줄어든 여성 근로자의 대부분은 서시스산업으로 진출하였다. 이에 따라 1990년대 여성 근로자의 전체 증가보다 훨씬 많은 여성이 서비스산업에 종사하게 되었다. 다섯째, 직업별로 산업구조의

고도화와 지식기반산업의 확대, 정보화 등으로 전문/기술/행정관리직에 대한 수요가 급증하였다. 그러나 고임금 고생산성으로 상징되는 이들 직업군에서 여성보다 남성의 증가 속도가 빠른 것으로 나타났다. 여섯째, 일자리의 증가 또는 창출이 남성은 상용직을 중심으로 이루어진 반면 여성은 임시 일용직을 중심으로 이루어졌다. 1990년대 중반 이후 임시/일용직의 비중은 급격히 증가하고 그 결과 2000년에는 여성 임금근로자의 69.7%가 임시/일용직인 것으로 나타났다 (Keum, 2002:104).

[xiv] 자녀들이 어느 정도 성장한 30대 후반 이후 여성의 상당수는 취업의사를 지니고 있으나 기술/기능 부족 또는 경험 부족과 같은 원인으로 인해 취업하지 못하고 비경제활동상태에 머무르는 경우가 다수 발견된다 (Keum, 2002:157).

[xv] 기초분석 결과 남성의 승진 경험이 여성의 3배에 달하지만 근속기간, 시간당 임금, 고용형태, 직종 등을 통제한 뒤에는 승진 경험 확률의 성별 격차가 2배로 줄어들었다. 비록 기업에 대한 충성도, 성실성, 인간관계와 같은 관찰 불가능한 요인들과 기대근속기간 및 노동비용에서의 성별 차이가 추정식에 반영되지 않았지만 승진 경험의 성별격차가 2배에 달한다는 추정 결과는 기업내 승진에서 성차별이 작용하였을 가능성을 강력하게 시사한다 (Keum, 2002:170).

[xvi] 자본주의 사회에서 성적 계급구조는 직무배분과 관련된 두 가지 사회적 과정과 연관되어 있다: 성차별적 직무 매칭 과정과 성차별적 경력이동 과정. 노동시장에서의 성별분리는 구직-구인 결합과정에 내재되어 있는 직무의 셩별 분업을 통해서 이루어진다. 성차별적 편견을 갖는 고용주의 선호와 태도가 구직-구인 결합과정에 영향을 미치는 요소이다. 대부분의 남성 고용주는 경영직 자리를 채우기 위하여 충원할 때 여성에 대한 편견을 가지고 있다 (Shin and Cho, 1998:718).

[xvii] 먼저 성별에 따른 경력의 차이를 보면, 남성과 여성에서 첫 번째 직업을 갖는 연령에서 큰 차이를 보이고 있다. 중략...남성의 경우 첫 번째 직업을 갖는 누적 빈도가 나이 30에 이르면 거의 증가하지 않는다. 그러나 여성들의 경우 30세 이후에도 지속적으로 꾸준히 증가하고 있다. 이러한 차이는 남성의 경우 대부분이 30세 이전에 직업을 갖기 때문이다. 30세 이후에 직업을 갖는 경우는 2.1%에 불과하였다. 이와는 대조적으로 25% 이상의 여성이 30세 이후에 직업을 갖는 것으로 나타났다. 35세가 넘어서 직업을 갖는 여성들의 경우 대부분이 승진의 기회가 없는 쁘띠부르조아지나 노동계급에 집중되어 있다. 그러므로 그들은 경영직이나 감독직으로 승진할 수 있는 기회를 갖고 있지 못하다. 이러한 초기적인 차이가 평생동안 남성과 여성의 계급궤적에 차이를 결정짓고 있다. 그러나 상대적으로 여성들이 노동시장으로 늦게 진출하는 것이 최초의 일에 기초한 계급위치의 상대적인 비율에 극적인 영향을 미치지는 않는다 (Shin and Cho, 1998:723).

[xviii] 여성들은 노동시장에서 노동자로서 그들이 지닌 능력을 충분히 실현할 수 없게 하는 권력관계(가부장제)로 인해 양육자로 '사회적으로 구성'된다. 여기에는 두 가지 요인이 상호 관련되어 있다. 첫째, 현재의 임금노동은 생계부양자와 양육자 사이의 분업, 즉 자신의 모든 시간을 회사를 위해 바칠 수 있는 '이상적 노동자'와 그의 노동력 재생산을 책임지는 '가사노동자' 사이의 분업에 기초해 있다. 둘찌, 노동시장이 가족과의 관계 속에서 움직이는 방식으로 인해 두 가지 분화된 역할은 성별화된다. 여기서 노동시장에 존재하는 차별은 여성이 양육자의 역할로 전환하게 되는 중요한 요인으로 작용한다. 중략...이상적 노동자 규범에 전제를 둔 어떤 법이나 사회정책도 여성을 양육자 역할에 한정시킬 수 있다. 어머니들은 정의 자체에서 이상적 노동자의

지위에서 배제되기 때문이다. 이러한 규범이 존재하는 한 여성은 이상적 노동자나 양육자 둘 중의 하나만이 될 수 있다 (Shin, 2001:104).

[xix] KLIPS를 통해 분석한 결과를 요약하면 근로시간 단축은 제도적으로 고안된 것보다 느린 확산 속도를 보이며, 근로시간 단축이 개인에게 미치는 영향은 아직까지 '큰 변화가 없다'로 요약할 수 있다 (Kim, 2007:451,abstract 인용).

[xx] 이와같은 고용상 지위에 따른 기업복지의 배제 현상은 비정규직 근로의 질의 저하와 고용불안정을 야기할 뿐만 아니라, 기업복지의 임금보충 기능이 약화됨으로써 정규직과의 소득격차가 심화되는 등의 노동시장에서의 전반적인 배제 현상으로 이어질 수 있다 (Ban, 2006:28).

[xxi] 여성들이 쁘띠부르조아지나 노동계급일 경우 남성들에 비해서 더 높은 비율로 잔류하는 경향이 있다. 이러한 계급들은 생산수단의 소유나 권위의 차원에서 상대적으로 열악한 계급들이다. 여기에서 알 수 있는 점은 먼저 남성들의 경우 첫 번째 계급이 자본가나 경영자와 같은 상대적으로 혜택을 누리는 계급인 경우 여성들에 비해서 더 높은 비율로 잔류한다. 여성들의 경우 상대적으로 혜택을 누리지 못하는 계급에서 남성에 비해서 더 높은 비율로 잔류한다. 이것은 한국사회에서 성과 계급궤적간의 분명한 상호작용이 있음을 보여주는 것이다 (Shin and Cho, 1998:724).

[xxii] 분석결과 한국의 여성들은 남성에 비해서 노동시장에 진출하는 연령이 늦기 때문에 승진이 보장되지 않는 직무나 직종으로 더 많이 진입을 하는 것으로 나타났다. 그리고 진입 후에 여성들의 계급이동은 남성에 비해서 절반에 불과하여 여성들의 계급이동이 어려운 것으로 나타났다. 이것은 한국의 세대내 계급이동체제가 성차별적 속성을 강하게 지니고 있다는 것을 의미한다 (Shin and Cho, 1998:715).

[xxiii] 가족은 가족구성원의 소득을 합법적으로 통합하는 유일한 제도일 뿐 아니라 소비생활의 기본단위이기도 하다. 또한 계급이동에 영향을 미치는 자녀 교육에 대한 투자도 가족 전체의 가용한 물질적 자원에 의해서 결정되며 자녀의 일상적인 여가활동이나 문화생활도 가족의 물질적 자원의 규모에 의해서 제약을 받는다 (Bourdieu, 1977; Passerson, 1986; Alice, 2001; Katsillis and Runbinson, 1990). 따라서 가족 간 경제적 불평등은 '세대 내' 생활기회의 불평등뿐 아니라 자녀의 교육과 직업 획득에 직접 영향을 미쳐 '세대 간' 사회이동을 제약하는 불평등을 재생산한다. 중략, 기혼여성의 경제활동참여율이 50%를 상회하는 사회에서 부인들의 경제활동은 가족 간 소득 불평등에 영향을 미치는 중요한 요인이 되고 있다 (Kim and Shin, 2008:81).

[xxiv] 해방 후 한국사회에서 비교적 빠른 속도로 진행된 산업화/도시화 과정은 한국 가족구조와 가치관의 변화를 야기하였으며, 이에 따라 한국여성의 위치는 과거와 비교해 볼 때 많은 변화가 있어왔다. 이러한 변화에 법, 제도의 변화는 여성의 지위향상에 많은 영향을 미쳤다 (Byun, 2001: 20). 근대화 과정에서 한국가족의 가장 큰 특징은 사회계층간에 상이한 모습을 보인다는 점이다. 한국사회에서 고용안정성의 차이와 가구주 소득수준 차이는 사회계층간의 격차를 심화시켰고, 그 결과 가족의 안정성의 차이와 이에 따른 계층간의 상이한 가족전략이 나타나게 된다. 따라서 고용안정이 보장되고 비교적 후한 보수를 받는 상층 근로자와 불안정 고용, 저임금을 받는 하층근로자와 가족생활은 다른 모습을 띨 수 밖에 없다. 남성가구주의 고용이 안정되고 비교적 안정된 수준의 임금을 받는 중산층 가족의 경우 가족 내에서 성별역할분업구조는 명확하게

나타난다. 이들 가족은 대개 남편이 단일 생계부양자이며, 부인은 전업주부이다. 중략, 이들의 가족 전략은 친족간의 자원교환을 통해 가족지위와 계급지위를 유지하는 전략과 자녀교육을 통한 가족상승전략이 중심이다. 중략, 한편 남성가구주의 고용이 불안정하고 저임금을 받는 생산직 근로자 가족과 도시빈민 가족의 경우 가족내 성별역학분업구조는 좀 더 복잡하다. 이들 가족은 남성가구주뿐만 아니라 부인, 자녀들까지 취업을 하여 각각의 소득을 결합하는 소득극대화 전략과 지출극소화 전략을 취함으로써 생계를 유지하는 것이 가능해진다. 따라서 여성들의 높은 경제활동참여율과 부부간의 경제적 의존성, 그리고 다가구취업이 이들 가족의 중요한 특징이다. 중략, 또한 교육기회에 있어서 아들, 딸 사이에 차별이 나타나는 경우가 많기 때문에 이 과정에서 가족내 젠더관계의 불평등성이 재생산되는 경향이 있다. 즉 이들 가족의 생존전략과 상승전략은 가족성원간의 성차별에 크게 의존한다는 점이다 (Byun, 2001:43-44).

[xxv] 사회계층의식 (social status consciousness) 또는 계층정체성 (status identification)은 사회구성원들이 자신의 사회경제적 지위가 어떠한 계층적 위계수준에 속하는지를 주관적으로 인식하는 것이다. 다시 말해, 계층의식은 사회계층의 위계속에서 자신의 지위를 자리매김하거나 특정 계층지위에 주관적 일체감을 갖는 것으로 정의하고 있다 (Lee and Shin, 2009:271).

[xxvi] 분석결과 기초분석에서 유의가 차이가 있는 것으로 나타난 자녀연령, 어머니의 취업여부, 가구소득을 포함하여 기초분석에서 드러나지 않은 어머니 연령이 자녀의 교육 및 보육기관 이용에 영향을 미치는 요인으로 밝혀졌다. 즉 어머니가 미취업인 경우보다는 취업한 경우에, 자녀의 나이가 아주 어린 영아의 경우보다는 유아의 경우가, 어머니의 연령이 적을수록, 그리고 가구의 소득이 많을수록 영유아가 교육 및 보육기관을 이용할 가능성이 높다는 것이다. 중략, 뿐만 아니라 가구의 월평균 소득이 많은 가계일수록 자녀가 교육 및 보육기관을 이용한다는 것은 저소득층 자녀를 중심으로 지원하는 정부의 미미한 재정지원수준으로 인하여 대다수 가계들이 영유아 자녀에 대한 부담스러운 교육 및 보육비 지출을 하고 있음을 반증하는 것이라 할 수 있다 (Kim, 2004:7).

[xxvii] 우리 사회에서 학교교육이 갖는 의미는 남다르다. 근대화의 시작과 함께 식민지를 경험했고 독립을 하면서 얼마 있지 않아 전쟁을 경험함으로써 전통사회의 계급이나 사회적 불평등이 연속되지 못했다고 해도 과언이 아닐 정도로 모든 것을 잃고 말았다. 다른 말로 하면 사회적 불평등의 문제보다는 절대 빈곤의 문제가 더 컸다. 계층이동, 지위상승 등에 대한 욕구가 강하게 작동할 수 있었던 조건 역시 이러한 절대빈곤이 있었기 때문으로 해석할 수 있다. 자녀 세대의 계층이동을 위해 교육을 지원하는 관심과 열의, 즉 소위 말하는 '교육열'이 폭발적으로 일어나면서 해방 후 한국 사회 지표의 변화 가운데 가장 극적인 영역이 학교 진학률이 되었다 (Sung, 2009:317).

[xxviii] 특히, 한국사회에서 사교육은 성적을 향상시키고, 소위 '명문' 대학에 입학하기 위하여 필수적이라고 여겨지는 만큼 (정영숙, 1996; 이수정, 2007), 사교육은 부모들의 주요한 계급 재생산 또는 상향 이동의 전략이며, 지위경쟁의 장이라고 할 수 있을 것이다. 이외에도 교육공급자의 측면에서 공교육의 낮은 질과 획일성 등의 문제 (이주호/홍성창, 2001)나 한국적 또는 유교적 특수한 교육열의 현상으로 사교육 문제를 설명하려는 시도(이종각 편, 2005 참고)도 있었지만, 이는 사교육의 계급적 차이를 밝혀내는데 적절하지 못하다. 경험적 연구에 의하면 부모의 사회경제적 배경이 교육열이나 학교만족도에 영향을 미치지 않는 것으로 나타났기 때문이다 (김현진, 2004; 노현경, 2006). (Kim and Yeom, 2009:31-2).

[xxix] 한국사회에서 모성은 출산과 양육이 미분화되고 교육의 관리자 역할이 과도하게 강화되어 있다. 이는 한국사회에서 어머니 역할의 규범적 전형이 전업주부의 삶을 토대로 하고 있어, 취업주부적 삶의 양식에 기초한 모성의 이념형이 보편화되고 있지 않음을 보여준다 (Shin, 2001:97).

[xxx] 부모의 자녀 양육 및 사회화를 위한 역할은 아버지보다 어머니에게 과중적으로 부담되고 있다. 이는 '우리사회에서 어머니 역할에 대한 사회적 기대가 더 크고, 더 많은 가치가 부여되며, 역할수행에 대한 규범이 더 엄격하기 때문이다' (유희경, 1995). 여성이 배우자인 남성과 마찬가지로 직업활동을 통해 가정경제에 기여를 하고 있는 경우에도 자녀양육 및 교육을 위한 책임은 여성의 몫으로 돌려지는 경향이 있다. 중략, 가정 내에서의 이러한 부모의 성 역할 분담적 태도는 자녀세대에 대해 암묵적으로 내면화되는 사회화 과정의 핵심적인 내용을 이룬다 (Byun, 2001:61-2).

[xxxi] 자녀교육을 위한 지원활동은 계층별로 격차가 두드러기게 나타났는데, 고소득계층일수록 그리고 고학력계층일수록 자녀교육 지원활동에 참가하는 비율이 높게 나타나 이 분야에서도 양극화가 존재하는 것을 살펴볼 수 있었다. 중략, 소득활동참가에 대한 회귀분석결과, 비록 통계적으로 아주 유의하지는 않지만, 사교육비 지출이 소득활동참가와 부의 상관관계에 있는 것으로 나타났다. 특히 사교육비 지출의 소득활동참가에 대한 부의 영향은 소득계층별로 다르게 나타났는데, 저소득(남편소득 기준) 계층보다 중위 고위소득 계층에서 사교육비가 증가할수록 기혼여성의 소득활동참가가 상대적으로 크게 줄어드는 것으로 나타났다. 이러한 결과를 종합하면, 저소득 계층에서는 사교육비가 증가하면 이를 마련하기 위해 노동시장에 남아 있으려는 유인이 있는 반면, 상위 소득계층에서는 사교육비가 늘어나게 되면 일부 기혼 여성들이 노동시장 활동을 포기하고 집안에서 자녀교육을 위한 지원/지도하는 유인이 강하게 작용하는 것으로 보인다 (Choi, 2008:99).